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Abstract 
This thesis analyses Nietzsche’s use of eros in The Gay Science through the 
concepts of passion and eternity. Nietzsche deploys the conceptual resources of 
the Hellenistic schools, particularly Stoicism and Epicureanism, to articulate an 
“affirmative” rival to the Platonic sublimation of eros. However, the Stoic and 
Epicurean therapies prove insufficient remedies for Platonism: in all three cases, 
Nietzsche diagnoses a pathological fear of transience. Throughout The Gay 
Science Nietzsche develops an anti-Platonic and, in the end, anti-Hellenistic 
philosophical therapy. Traditional readings of Nietzsche rightly emphasise his 
antagonism with Plato, but in doing so overlook the richness of his engagement 
with later philosophical thought of antiquity. 
Stoicism provides the starting point for Nietzsche’s attempt at an immanent, 
affirmative ethics. Nietzsche comes to reject Stoic indifference as an evacuation 
of value from the world, but the terms of his rejection shed light on the criteria 
against which his develops his own ethics. Nietzsche’s appraisal of 
Epicureanism above Stoicism in The Gay Science shows that an intimate 
relationship with worldly goods is a necessary condition of joy, but the terms 
of this comparison also exposes the limits of both Hellenistic philosophies: 
neither is able to evoke and maintain an erotic attachment to life. A reading of 
Plato’s Symposium illuminates Nietzsche’s rejection of a metaphysical 
treatment of eros. The first three chapters of the thesis show the failure of 
Stoicism (chapter one), Epicureanism (chapter two), and Platonism (chapter 
three) in forging a strong-enough attachment to what Nietzsche calls life. 
Chapter four explains Nietzsche’s revaluation of the passions by means of a 
conceptual history of Leidenschaft. Nietzsche’s praise of the Provençal 
troubadours, whose gaya scienza provides The Gay Science’s subtitle, 
demonstrates the possibility of a life-affirming eros. A recuperation of eros 
requires the renovation of the concept of eternity, which has hitherto 
functioned as an escape path from transience. Chapter five figures Nietzsche’s 
feud with the ancients in terms of this function of eternity in relation to the 
fear of death. Each of the three ancient conceptions arises from different 
refractions of a common fear of transience. The final chapter presents 
Nietzsche’s alternative, anti-Hellenistic ethics of eternity: a youthful and 
voluptuous art of living. This youthful sensibility must be specified in terms of 
the eternal recurrence, a conception of eternity developed by Nietzsche in a 
sustained dialogue with classical and Hellenistic ethical thought. 
I demonstrate that Nietzsche’s engagement with classical and Hellenistic 
thought feeds directly into the central doctrine of the eternal recurrence. By 
means of the attention paid to Nietzsche’s eternity, the thesis arrives at a richer 
understanding of Nietzsche’s middle-period ethics and of his relationship to 
antiquity. 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Introduction 
This thesis analyses Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844–1900) development of an art 
of living indebted to classical and Hellenistic philosophies in The Gay Science. 
Nietzsche’s debt to the ancients revolves around their shared conception of 
philosophy as an “art of healing the soul”.  The philosopher as therapist or 1
physician is one who cares for the soul in the same way the medical doctor 
cares for the body. While the theme of the philosophical physician is a constant 
presence in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, his most direct engagement with ancient 
therapies occurs throughout the ‘free-spirit trilogy’, which culminates in 1882’s 
The Gay Science.  The ancient therapeutic tradition grants Nietzsche a 2
standpoint from which he can await a “philosophical physician in the 
exceptional sense of that word”.  Compared with his and our contemporaries, 3
this orientation radically alters what is at stake in the practice of philosophy, in 
Nietzsche’s words, not “‘truth’ but something else—let us say, health, future, 
growth, power, life”.  4
Interest in Nietzsche’s therapeutic orientation has grown in recent years.  5
Scholars have investigated Nietzsche’s precursors in the therapeutic tradition, 
especially from the Hellenistic period. Congruencies, contestations, and lines of 
 Cicero Tusc. 3.6.1
 For an early indication of this interest see Nietzsche’s 1873 unpublished plan for an essay, 2
“The Philosopher as Cultural Physician,” in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's 
Notebooks of the early 1870’s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey and London: 
Humanities Press International, 1990), 69–76.
 GS P 2, emphasis in original.3
 GS P 2.4
 See Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works (Lanham: 5
Lexington Books, 2008) and Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland, eds., Nietzsche’s Therapeutic 
Teaching: For Individuals and Culture (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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influence between Nietzsche and the Skeptics,  the Cynics,  the Epicureans,  6 7 8
and the Stoics  have been explored. The influence of the Stoics and Epicureans 9
on Nietzsche has rightfully received the greater part of scholarly attention. 
Nietzsche suggests that these two schools are the “experimental laboratories” 
we should avail ourselves of in living our own lives.  In significant sections of 10
The Gay Science Nietzsche evokes Stoicism  and Epicureanism  to either 11 12
illustrate or give contrast to his own position. 
Viewing Nietzsche through the lens of the Hellenistic schools also accords 
with a broader trend to reconsider the philosophical significance of this period. 
 Jessica Berry, Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition (New York: Oxford University 6
Press, 2011).
 R. Bracht Branham, “Nietzsche’s Cynicism: Uppercase or lowercase?,” in Nietzsche and 7
Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition, ed. Paul Bishop (Rochester, 
NY: Camden House, 2004), 170–81.
 See Richard Bett, “Nietzsche, the Greeks, and Happiness (with Special Reference to Aristotle 8
and Epicurus),” Philosophical Topics 33, no. 2 (2005): 45–70; Howard Caygill, “Under the 
Epicurean skies,” Angelaki 11, no. 3 (2006): 107–15; Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Heroic-Idyllic 
Philosophizing: Nietzsche and the Epicurean Tradition,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy  Supplements 74 (2014): 237–63; and Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed., “Nietzsche & 
Epicureanism,” special issue, The Agonist 10, no. 2 (2017).
 See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, 9
Morality, ed. Richard Schacht (University of California Press, 1994), 139–67; R. O. Elveton, 
“Nietzsche's Stoicism: The Depths Are Inside,” in Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reaction and 
Response to the Classical Tradition, ed. Paul Bishop (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004), 
192–204; Nuno Nabais, “Nietzsche and Stoicism,” chap. 4 in Nietzsche & the Metaphysics of 
the Tragic (London: Continuum, 2006), 85–98; Thomas H. Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Reading of 
Epictetus,” Nietzsche-Studien 32, no. 1 (2008): 429–52; Michael Ure, “Nietzsche’s Free-Spirit 
Trilogy and Stoic Therapy,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38 (2009): 60–84; Aurelia Armstrong, 
“The Passions, Power, and Practical Philosophy: Spinoza and Nietzsche Contra the Stoics,” 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44, no. 1, (2013): 6–24; and Michael Ure, “Sublime 
Losers: Stoicism in Nineteenth Century German Philosophy,” in The Routledge Handbook of 
the Stoic Tradition, ed. John Sellars (London: Routledge, 2015), 287–302.
 KSA 9:15[59].10
 GS Prelude 34; GS 12; GS 99; GS 122; GS 305–6; GS 326.11
 GS 45; GS 277; GS 306; GS 375.12
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The work of Michel Foucault,  Pierre Hadot,  and Martha Nussbaum,  13 14 15
amongst others  has brought the ethical practices of the Hellenistic schools to 16
wider philosophical attention. What these scholars draw from the Hellenistic 
sources is an approach to ethical deliberation centred on questions of the self, 
processes of self-formation, and the good life. This agent-centric approach 
provides an alternative to the narrow focus on right action of major ethical 
traditions. Nietzsche is a common reference point for those working on 
philosophies of self-formation. Consequently, a fuller elaboration of his 
contribution to the reception of the Hellenistic schools will advance not only 
the understanding of his philosophy, but this significant and growing strand of 
moral philosophy. 
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of the Stoics and Epicureans to 
Nietzsche during his middle period, his ultimate rejection of the Hellenistic 
therapies and the terms of this rejection are relatively undeveloped. Why did 
Nietzsche turn away from the schools that at one point seemed to offer a 
viable way out of that “incautious and pampering spiritual diet, called 
romanticism”?  The claim of this thesis is that despite a common therapeutic 17
orientation, we will not comprehend the depth and subtlety of Nietzsche’s art 
of living unless we recognise his radical break with his forebears. 
This thesis draws on the concept of eros to make sense of this reversal. It 
demonstrates that Nietzsche challenges Hellenistic therapies precisely for their 
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 3, The Care of The Self (New York: 13
Pantheon Books, 1986); Michael Ure, “Senecan Moods: Foucault and Nietzsche on the Art of 
the Self,” Foucault Studies 4 (2007): 19–52.
 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 14
2004); Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
 Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics 15
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
 See Bethany Parsons and Andre Okawara, eds., “Self-Cultivation: Ancient and Modern,” 16
special issue, Pli (2016).
 GS P 1.17
 3
exclusion of eros. Stoic apatheia and Epicurean ataraxia are two instances of 
the wider ancient understanding of happiness as tranquillity. They manifest the 
“desire for tranquillity” which, according to Nietzsche, motivated ancient 
philosophy more generally.  They hope to achieve tranquillity by eliminating 18
(in the case of Stoicism) or diminishing (in the case of Epicureanism) our 
attachment to transient objects. Nietzsche claims that the ancient valorisation 
of tranquillity is symptomatic of an underlying cowardice in relation to the 
passions. But rather than cure this fear, the Hellenistic therapies offer merely 
palliative treatments which serve only to deepen their patients’ malady.  19
Nietzsche hones in on the role of eternity in effecting these malignant or failed 
‘therapies’: eternity promises the deliverance from transience. 
Eros is not only the central concept of Nietzsche’s criticism of the ancients. 
It is also plays a central role in the development of his own ethics of self-
fashioning. Nietzsche’s recuperation of eros allows him to investigate and 
experiment with forms of life that philosophers have hitherto either derided or 
ignored. The Gay Science is a pivotal moment in this development, because it is 
here that the role of eros and love in the good life becomes apparent. The 
passions, Nietzsche suggests, allow for a voluptuous enjoyment of life. 
Nietzsche formalises his conditions for the affirmation of life in the doctrine 
of the eternal recurrence. Not only does the doctrine establish a passionately 
inflamed state of longing as Nietzsche’s ideal. It directly challenges, and seeks 
to displace, the ancient ethics of eternity. While the ancient desire for eternity 
was premised on the denial of the passions, Nietzsche’s craving for eternity 
entails affirming the intoxication of desire. By reading the renowned section 
341 in the context of the pedagogy of eros Nietzsche puts forward in book 
 GS 110.18
 See Thomas Ryan and Michael Ure, “Nietzsche’s Post-Classical Therapy,” Pli 25 (2014): 91–19
110.
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four of The Gay Science, the thesis challenges and develops recent 
interpretations of this key doctrine,  namely the long-neglected ‘cosmological’ 20
understanding,  and a particular development of the more popular ‘practical’ 21
or ‘existential’ line of interpretation that I dub ‘heroic’.  The existing literature 22
does not sufficiently account for the central role of eros in the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence. By connecting eros to the doctrine, the thesis better explains 
the importance of the eternal recurrence to Nietzsche’s art of living. 
By systematising Nietzsche’s post-classical art of living, this thesis lays the 
necessary groundwork for further questions about Nietzsche’s philosophical 
project. The most pressing such question concerns the viability of the passion 
for knowledge in sustaining a post-classical philosophy or, in other words, 
whether Nietzsche successfully rescues the philosophical drive for truth from 
its nihilistic impasse. Does The Gay Science present an alternative to the 
‘moraline’ unconditional will to truth?  Nietzsche himself asks “To what 23
extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the 
experiment”.  The achievement of this thesis is to give coherence to 24
Nietzsche’s diagnoses of past philosophies as forms of sickness, alongside the 
centrality of eternity, both to these diagnoses and to the prospects of devising a 
viable therapy. 
 See Lawrence J. Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 20
115–25; Paul S. Loeb, “Eternal Recurrence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, eds. Ken 
Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 645–71.
 Paul S. Loeb, The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University 21
Press, 2010), 11–31.
 Bernard Reginster, The Affi rmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism (Cambridge, 22
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 224–26.
 On Nietzsche’s tortured reflections on the will to truth, see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on 23
Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Bernard Williams, 
Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 12–19; and Christopher 
Janaway, “The Gay Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, eds. Ken Gemes and 
John Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 267–69. See also Nietzsche’s claim 
in A 6 that he makes a “moraline-free” (emphasis in original) judgement on humanity.
 GS 110.24
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Chapter one contextualises Nietzsche’s affirmative, post-classical art of 
living through his shifting evaluation and ultimate rejection of Stoicism across 
the works of his middle period (1878–1882). Recent scholarship has explored 
Nietzsche’s meta-philosophical debt to the Stoics incurred in his therapeutic 
conception of philosophy.  While I refer to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of 25
indifference as a symptom of a Stoic temperament, my primary concern in this 
thesis is with the substantive issue of the role of the passions in the good life. 
On this substantive issue, the apparent similarity between the cosmic 
perspective of the Stoic sage and the Nietzschean intoxication with the world 
belies a deeper incompatibility between the two ethical projects. 
This chapter analyses Nietzsche’s volte-face on Stoic indifference, from 
apparent endorsement in Human, All Too Human to sustained attack in The 
Gay Science. The charge in the later work is that the Stoic disposition 
evacuates the world of value. The tranquillity granted by Stoic indifference 
turns on the opposition between the pathê and universal reason. The Stoic 
aspiration to embody universal reason implies the destruction of the passions. 
While Nietzsche inherits Schopenhauer’s criticism of the Stoics as 
hypocritically driven by pride, he deepens its force by rejecting the tranquillity 
of the sage as monotonous. The Stoic aspires to expand the boundaries of the 
self by eliminating the passions; Nietzsche’s ethical ideal pursues the same goal 
by incorporating an ever more comprehensive and diverse panoply of affects. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche unfavourably compares the Stoic’s hard and 
insensitive temperament with the Epicurean’s “subtle irritability” [feine 
Reizbarkeit].  Whereas the Stoic denies the pleasures and pains of the world, 26
taking pride in his capacity to heroically endure the accidents of existence, the 
 See Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy; Hutter and Friedland, Nietzsche’s Therapeutic Teaching; Marta 25
Faustino, review of Kulturkritik et philosophie thérapeutique chez le jeune Nietzsche, by 
Martine Béland, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47, no. 3 (2016): 488–92.
 GS 306.26
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Epicurean admits of these pleasures and pains and, due to his sensitive 
disposition, selects his surrounds carefully to suit. Nietzsche’s rejection of Stoic 
rationalism leads him to an engagement with Epicurus’ school. 
Chapter two examines Nietzsche’s sympathetic, yet ultimately critical, 
assessment of the Epicureans. Nietzsche turns to Epicureanism over Stoicism 
because the Epicureans’ sensitivity to accident is a necessary condition for the 
good life. Nietzsche finds a “subtle irritability” preferable to Stoic insensitivity 
because it allows for a deeper and richer attachment to the world: the 
Epicurean has the means to escape Stoic monotony.  27
In the second volume of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche praises 
Epicureanism as an antidote to metaphysical anxiety and speculation. It is 
Epicurus’ “wonderful insight” that “to quieten the heart it is absolutely not 
necessary to have solved the ultimate and outermost theoretical questions”.  28
He expresses sympathy for the modest happiness of Epicurus who needs only 
“a little garden, figs, little cheeses and in addition three or four good friends”.  29
By the time of The Gay Science, however, Nietzsche departs from and criticises 
Epicurus’ modest happiness. Epicureans cope with their irritable temperament 
by fleeing to the garden. More precisely, Nietzsche argues that Epicurean 
therapeia consists of purgative exercises that aim at protecting its patient from 
transience. In The Gay Science he rejects Epicurus’ negative hedonism as a 
coping strategy born of weakness. He reverses Epicurus’ recommendation to 
flee into the garden, counselling “build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!” 
and “live dangerously!”  While the Epicureans possess the temperament to 30
forge an intense attachment to life, Nietzsche claims, they lack the audacity to 
 GS 306.27
 WS 7.28
 WS 192.29
 GS 283, emphasis in original.30
 7
pursue an adventurous, experimental art of living. By the end of his middle 
period, Nietzsche sees Epicurean voluptuousness as too modest. In contrast, he 
encourages “thirsty life and drunkenness of life”  and an “insatiable lust for 31
possession and spoils”.  Thus The Gay Science augurs the return of Dionysus 32
in the post-Zarathustran works. Chapter two systematises Nietzsche’s qualified 
praise and ultimate rejection of the Epicurean philosophical therapy. 
Throughout The Gay Science, Nietzsche uses Stoicism and Epicureanism to 
articulate his own anti-Hellenistic art of living. Where Stoicism withdraws and 
Epicureanism contracts one’s sensitivity to transience, Nietzsche considers the 
expansion, in both scope and intensity, of one’s entanglement with transient 
objects as a necessary condition of a sufficiently strong attachment to life. This 
demand implies a recuperation of eros: one must not just endure life, one must 
love it.  33
Chapter three approaches Nietzsche’s anti-Hellenistic recuperation of eros 
through his relationship with Plato. The chapter focuses on Plato’s pedagogy of 
eros in The Symposium, wherein tranquillity is guaranteed by love of the ever-
present and unchanging form of the good. Plato’s philosophical lover escapes 
the vulnerability of human erotic aspiration to the transient nature of its object 
by means of the ascent to metaphysics. 
Nietzsche considers Schopenhauerian resignation as the logical and 
historical culmination of Platonism. Plato and Schopenhauer’s accounts of 
desire are connected by their shared belief that the transcendence of desire is 
the only condition of its satisfaction. Schopenhauer combines this belief with 
the disenchanting knowledge that such transcendence is an illusion. 
Schopenhauer’s disbelief in transcendence leads to his advocacy for the “denial 
 GS 278.31
 GS 292.32
 GS 276; GS 326; GS 334; GS 341.33
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and abandonment of all willing” and thereby “a passage into empty 
nothingness”.  34
For Nietzsche, an empty nothingness is the horizon of possibility for the 
Platonic–Schopenhauerian account of desire. Our inherited Platonism fails as 
an art of living because it cannot sustain an attachment to life. He names this 
failure of desire nihilism. To overcome nihilism, then, he requires a rejuvenated 
account of desire and the passions not tied to the possibility of transcendence. 
Chapter four investigates Nietzsche’s rejuvenated account of the passions in 
The Gay Science. The genealogy of the Leidenschaften shows the importance 
of the Augustinian case against the Stoics and the post-Augustinian secular love 
poetry of the Provençal troubadours for the conceptual history of the passions. 
Nietzsche’s allusion to the troubadours in the first volume of The Gay Science 
is made explicit in its second volume, which he subtitles “la gaya scienza”. 
Only by following both the conceptual history of the passions and Nietzsche’s 
shifting evaluation of the passions across the middle period can we make sense 
of Nietzsche’s self-conscious allusions to the troubadours he claims invented 
passionate love.  35
The second part of the chapter traces the development of Nietzsche’s 
account of the passions, from Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science, 
where the passions are a necessary condition of the good life. This development 
is illustrated with reference to the prefaces Nietzsche writes for his earlier 
works in 1886. In these prefaces, Nietzsche claims that each work is one rung 
on “a long ladder upon whose rungs we ourselves have sat and climbed”.  36
Nietzsche’s ascent arrives at a happiness premised upon the flourishing of the 
passions. 
 WWR 1.71.34
 BGE 230.35
 HH P 7.36
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Chapter five tightens the focus of Nietzsche’s break with the ancients to the 
role of eternity in consoling for the fear of death. Nietzsche contests the 
characterisations of eternity present in the main ethical traditions of antiquity 
because, he argues, these characterisations express pathological judgments 
about the value of existence. In Platonism, the eternal is conceived as 
unchanging, perfect, and immune to the passage of time. In Stoicism, the 
eternal appears as the dynamic, but lawful and rational procession of nature. 
In Epicureanism, eternity figures in the infinite descent of dead atoms through 
void, as the painlessness before birth and after death to which the philosopher 
aspires. Nietzsche holds that these figures’ veneration of the unchanging, the 
rational, and the painless entails a concomitant contempt for transient 
particulars and the natural lives these transient particulars comprise. 
Nietzsche shows how in each tradition we find a refraction of a common 
fear of transience. His diagnosis in each particular case exposes an acute 
awareness of and hostility to transient existence. The diagnoses of classical 
figurations of eternity as kronophobic poses the question of how Nietzsche’s 
affirmation ethics coheres with his renovated conception of eternity, the eternal 
recurrence.  Plato and Nietzsche agree that the passions put eternity at stake. 37
How does Nietzsche’s conception of the passions allow him to avoid the 
enervating eternities of the ancients?  
Chapter six answers the question posed in chapter five by linking 
Nietzsche’s voluptuous art of living with the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche elaborates his position in relation to the Hellenistic schools. In 
particular, he attacks the Hellenistic aspiration to live a complete life in a single 
moment. This aspiration, Nietzsche claims, is a symptom of old age. I consider 
Nietzsche’s opposition between youthfulness and senescence in his ‘untimely’ 
 Bernd Magnus coins the term kronophobic to endorse Nietzsche’s diagnoses of traditional 37
understandings of eternity as symptomatic of a fear of transience. See “Nietzsche's Eternalistic 
Counter-Myth,” The Review of Metaphysics 26, no. 4 (1973): 604–16.
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essay On the Utility and Liability of History for Life. In that work Nietzsche 
was concerned with the debilitating effects of an overgrown historical sense, 
seeking refuge from history in youthful naïvety. In The Gay Science, his 
rejuvenated account of the passions allows for a more sophisticated pedagogy 
of eros. Love, he claims, has to be learned.  Rather than blind folly, Nietzsche 38
expounds a sensitivity and exposure to transience as necessary for a sufficiently 
intense attachment to life. 
Against both classical philosophical therapies and contemporary 
interpretations of Nietzsche, I show how his voluptuous art of living implies an 
intoxication with and enjoyment of desire. The centrality of eros to the good 
life sheds light on the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. One longs for the 
eternal recurrence of life if and only if one has learned to love oneself in 
Nietzsche’s sense of the intoxication of unquenchable desire. This reading 
develops the ‘practical’ interpretation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
as pertaining to the character of the affirmation of life, rather than the 
‘theoretical’ claim that life is eternally recurrent. It challenges ‘practical’ 
interpretations that hold that the affirmation of the eternal recurrence heralds 
the cancelation of desire. On the contrary, the doctrine implies the enjoyment 
and intensification of the desire for nothing but one’s life repeated into eternity. 
This passionately inflamed state of longing is Nietzsche’s image of health, not 
just for himself (“what is it to us that Herr Nietzsche has become well again?”) 
but for humanity.  39
This thesis develops our understanding of Nietzsche’s art of living, first by 
showing how he formulates it as an explicit challenge to ancient philosophies 
and therapeia, which he comes to conceive as illnesses, and second by clarifying 
and systematising the significance of his recuperation of eros as a necessary 
 GS 334.38
 GS P 2.39
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condition of affirmation. Nietzsche’s ethics of affirmation requires the 
affirmation of and by eros.  
 12
1. Stoic Exercises: Cosmic Indifference 
Writing on Nietzsche’s engagement with Stoicism, Martha Nussbaum argues 
that the Stoic practice of indifference to external goods is a kind of self-
protection that expresses a fear of the world and all of its contingencies.  Far 1
from his claims to strength and peace of mind, the Stoic “looks like a fearful 
person, a person who is determined to seal himself off from risk, even at the 
cost of loss of love and value”.  Nietzsche makes a similar claim about 2
Stoicism in The Gay Science. The Stoic, here, exchanges a life of external pain 
and pleasure for one of internal virtue, because the life beholden to external 
commitments is plagued by pain and burden.  Nietzsche questions this 3
exchange and the pessimism it contains regarding external goods: “We are not 
so badly off that we have to be as badly off as Stoics”.  4
Nevertheless, an earlier Nietzsche strongly endorses the Stoic temperament. 
Discussing how one responds to the terrible knowledge that value falsifies the 
world,  Nietzsche praises those “firm, mild and at bottom cheerful soul[s]” 5
who live in accordance with nature and who forgo “much, indeed almost 
everything upon which other men place value”.  These souls achieve a simpler 6
 This modern view of Stoicism follows Hegel’s influential account in his lectures on the 1
Philosophy of History. Under the chaotic political conditions of the Roman empire “the whole 
state of things urged [individuals] to yield themselves to fate, and to strive for a perfect 
indifference to life – an indifference which they sought either in freedom of thought [Stoicism] 
or in directly sensuous enjoyment [Epicureanism]”. These two Hellenistic schools, with 
Skepticism, served this goal by “rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything the real 
world had to offer”. (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. John 
Sibree [Mineola, NY: Dover, 1956], 317–18). For further discussion of Hegel’s reception of 
Stoicism see John Sellars, “Marcus Aurelius in Contemporary Philosophy,” in A Companion to 
Marcus Aurelius, ed. Marcel van Ackeren (Chichester, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 532–44 and Michael Ure, “Stoicism in Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, ed. John Sellars (Routledge, 2015), 287–302.
 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, 2
Morality, ed. Richard Schacht (University of California Press, 1994), 160. 
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and emotionally cleaner life through the purifying pursuit of knowledge, as the 
Stoic achieves a tranquil state of mind through communion with universal 
reason. 
Nietzsche explains his shifting assessment of the Stoic temperament 
between 1878’s Human, All Too Human and 1882’s The Gay Science in his 
preface to the latter’s second edition. This book marks the convalescence from 
a period of “determined self-limitation to what was bitter, harsh, and hurtful to 
know” during which his pain was overcome only by a “tyranny of pride” not 
to suffer the nauseous consequences of pain.  He credits his recovery to a 7
cheerfulness that allows him the “attraction of everything problematic”, the 
chance for adventure, and a love of life like that for someone who “causes 
doubts in us”.  Already in 1881’s Dawn, Nietzsche considers his engagement 8
with Stoicism in this manner. Wracked by physical sickness, Nietzsche requires 
above all a defence “against all pessimism”.  Such is provided by a pride which 9
holds the thoughtless comforts of the healthy—“the noblest and most beloved 
of the illusions in which he himself formerly indulged”—in contempt.  10
Nietzsche uses this pride, and the bitter contempt which accompanies it, as a 
counterweight against his intense physical pain: as an “advocate of life in the 
face of [the] tyrant [of pain]”.  Despite its role in combatting sickness, this 11
pride remains a consequence and condition thereof. At the crack of 
convalescence, when pride is no longer required to combat physical pain, it 
appears to Nietzsche as “vain and foolish”, as a dominating influence that he 
will seek to fend off. 
 GS P1.7
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If Nietzsche rebukes Stoicism as itself a condition of sickness, it is not so 
obvious what work his new notion of cheerfulness—“what above all is 
needed” —does in distancing his new health from Stoicism. To this end, this 12
chapter sets out the Stoic cheerfulness that Nietzsche endorses in Human, All 
Too Human, and seeks to explain how he comes to regard this cheerfulness as 
insufficient for human flourishing in The Gay Science and beyond. 
In this chapter I investigate Stoicism as a philosophical therapy and 
Nietzsche’s debt to this approach. I begin with an examination of the chief 
Stoic teaching, to live according to nature, according to the early Greek Stoic 
Chrysippus (c. 282–206 BCE). I lay out the attendant doctrine of indifference 
to external goods, noting the modern objections of Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche. I follow the debate over nature and indifference to the later Roman 
Stoics, in particular Seneca (c. 1 BCE–65 CE), Epictetus (c. 55–135 CE), and 
Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE). I find three intertwined currents of thought 
regarding the Stoic ideal: of moderation, of asceticism, and of cosmic consent. 
After teasing out the congruities and tensions between these three notions, I 
situate Nietzsche in relation to these Stoic ideals, especially in relation to the 
cosmos, a site of philosophical reflection. 
In what follows my purpose is two-fold. First I would like to elaborate an 
account of Stoicism with sufficient fidelity to explain its influence on Nietzsche. 
This is necessary to grasp both his explicit praise of Stoicism in Human, All 
Too Human, and his continuing implicit reference to the conceptual tools of 
Stoicism through Dawn and The Gay Science. The second motive behind this 
chapter is to understand the terms of Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of Stoicism 
in Dawn and The Gay Science. For this end what is required is an account of 
how Nietzsche conceptualised Stoicism in the early 1880s. Notwithstanding his 
 GS P4.12
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previous classical scholarship, Nietzsche increasingly identifies Stoicism with a 
philosophical disposition, expressed in but not confined to, the school’s 
doctrines. His criticisms take on the form of a diagnosis of the pathologies of 
this disposition rather than a direct confrontation with Stoic doctrine. In both 
aspects, the aim of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for Nietzsche’s ethics 
of affirmation in The Gay Science, which will be elaborated in the following 
chapters. 
Life according to nature 
Diogenes Laertius tells us that the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno (c. 333–
261 BCE), was the first to recommend the life lived “in agreement with 
nature”.  Stobaeus, to the contrary, says that Zeno only taught to live 13
harmoniously with oneself, that is, “in accordance with one concordant 
reason”.  Stobaeus leaves the Stoic concern for nature to Zeno’s successors: 14
first Cleanthes (c. 331–232 BCE), who taught to live in harmony with nature 
as a whole, and then Chrysippus, who taught to live in harmony with the 
“experience of what happens by nature”.  In either case, it was not until 15
Chrysippus (the third Stoic leader) that Stoic doctrine was collected and 
systematised to the extent that the orthodoxy of the life lived according to 
nature could be established.  Before him, there was a diversity of opinions 16
amongst Zeno’s students as to the proper end of life;  with him the question 17
was settled.  
 DL 7.87.13
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 John Sellars, Stoicism (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), 8.16
 Besides Cleanthes, two other students of Zeno and putative Stoics, Herillus and Dionysius, 17
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Chrysippus’ highly systematised account of the end has a dual character. If 
Zeno’s teaching was of internal consistency, and Cleanthes’ was of consistency 
with the cosmos as a whole, Chrysippus marries both conceptions together in 
his recommendation that one live according to “both universal nature and 
more particularly the nature of man”.  This dual imperative is only possible 18
because of the connection the Stoics draw between the individual’s nature and 
the nature of the whole, namely that one regulative principle, reason, pervades 
both the whole cosmos and each individual. The law of the cosmos is human 
rationality writ large. Indeed, the position that human nature is an intrinsic 
part of cosmic nature is one of Stoicism’s enduring tenets.   19
The Stoics hold that the central concern of human nature is self-
preservation. This is an instance of their more general claim that all individuals 
(human and otherwise) naturally seek to maintain their own constitution. This 
concern is given to the individual by cosmic nature, through a process 
encompassed by the Stoic term oikeiôsis. The term describes the manner in 
which nature disposes the individual towards its own constitution. Because the 
individual is well-disposed or endeared to itself by nature,  acting on this 20
disposition is at once to act according to one’s own nature and according to 
nature as a whole. Because plants, animals, and humans differ in their 
constitution, they will differ in the kind of life which nature prescribes, but the 
underlying principle—the maintenance of this constitution—is the same. 
The theory of oikeiôsis contrasts sharply with the claim of other Hellenistic 
schools that pleasure is a human’s first and natural impulse. But more than a 
 DL 7.89.18
 Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 19
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simple counter-argument, the theory serves as the basis of Stoic ethics. Ethics 
begins, for the Stoics, with the observation that amongst the animals, nature 
has bestowed reason on humans alone.  Nature regulates plants through 21
appropriate vegetative processes. Animals, which have been additionally 
granted impulse and sensation, live according to nature by following these 
faculties. In humans, “vegetative” processes like digestion as well as impulse 
and sensation are still operative, but to these reason has been added. While the 
constitution of non-human animals is tended to by impulse, humans are 
characteristically rational and hence require maintenance of their rational 
constitution: their soul. 
According to the Stoics, value resides in those objects which aid in the 
preservation of the rational soul. What falls within the Stoic’s ethical concern is 
what pertains to the rational soul: correct and incorrect judgements. 
Nevertheless the Stoic, as a rational animal, remains an animal, and external 
goods may nurture or harm her constitution at a pre-rational, pre-ethical level. 
Since food, shelter, and other external goods neither aid nor harm the 
preservation of the rational soul, they do not fall within the Stoic’s ethical 
concern. In this sense, it is appropriate to human nature to value health, family, 
and social relations, if only ever “under reserve” or “if Fate permits”.  22
Those objects of one’s primary impulses such as food or health or wealth, 
although apparently beneficial to every human being, do not contribute to the 
preservation of a rational being qua rational being. They only contribute to its 
survival qua animal.  23
Acting under reserve, the Stoic insulates herself from disappointment should 
such external goods (which it is appropriate to take and enjoy) prove to be out 
 DL 7.86.21
 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 134.22
 John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy 23
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 58.
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of reach.  The Stoics nominate external objects, which neither aid nor harm 24
one’s rational soul, as indifferents. 
Indifference in theory 
The Stoic indifference to external goods is conditioned by an awareness of 
vulnerability in the external world. Our lives are inexorably subject to the 
procession of fate and external causes, no matter what our individual desires 
and aversions may be. A desire for external goods will be either fulfilled or 
frustrated, but according to the Stoics which outcome eventuates is not under 
our control. To judge an external object as a good or an evil is, therefore, to 
give one’s happiness as a hostage to fate. The only route to “happiness”, 
according to the Stoics, is through that which is under our control: “the will to 
do good and to act in conformity with reason”.  Thus Epictetus, for whom 25
Nietzsche developed an admiration during the period of Human, All Too 
Human’s publication,  counsels that we should cultivate an indifference 26
towards what is not under our control, since it cannot contribute to our virtue. 
This condition prohibits the sacrifice of one’s virtue for bodily pleasure or 
physical health,  or the impassioned pursuit of the social goods of reputation, 27
property and office, since the attainment of these goods does not fall 
exclusively under our own control. The Stoic will, rather, treat these external 
goods as a matter of indifference, and will not judge their attainment or loss as 
a good or an evil. This does not, as we have seen, preclude the Stoic from 
holding preferences amongst the indifferents; for instance she may prefer 
 Richard Sorabji, Emotions and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation 24
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 54.
 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 127.25
 Thomas H. Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Reading of Epictetus,” Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2008): 430.26
 The contrast between Epictetus, for whom “disease is an impediment to the body, but not to 27
the moral purpose” (Ench. 9) and Nietzsche, for whom philosophy is the transposition of states 
of health and disease “into the most spiritual form and distance” (GS P3) is here striking.
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health to sickness, as long as she is not misled into the belief that such 
preferences contribute to her virtue. 
The Stoic who holds preferences between indifferents is in an 
uncomfortable position. She is committed to distinguishing between, for 
example, a feast and a plain loaf of bread, even though she denies there is any 
difference in value between the two. There would appear to be no basis, if the 
Stoic account of value is correct, for preferring one over the other. The Stoics 
overcome this difficulty by appealing to the distinction between an individual’s 
rational constitution (the real grounds of virtue) and animal constitution (the 
grounds of mere preferences). The Stoic may prefer one indifferent to another, 
so long as she does not incorrectly judge it a good. 
The Stoic term for the appropriate pursuit of preferred indifferents, 
according to reason and without mistaking an indifferent for a good, is eklogḗ 
(selection). Epictetus quotes Chrysippus’ defence of the selection of preferred 
indifferents under reserve: 
“As long as the consequences are not clear to me, I cleave ever to what is better 
adapted to secure those things that are in accordance with nature; for God 
himself has created me with the faculty of choosing things [eklektikón]. But if I 
knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even 
move towards it.”  28
The division between goods and preferred indifferents rests on the 
independence of one’s virtue from one’s bodily conditions. This distinction does 
not rest on a dualism between mind and body, since the Stoic’s materialism 
extends to the mind’s bodily nature.  29
For the Stoics, virtue consists in the state in which the harmful emotions, 
the pathê, are eliminated. The emotions are precisely those cognitions through 
 Epict Diss. 2.6.9–10.28
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which we misapprehend nature: they are mistaken judgements. This 
understanding of emotions allows the Stoic to undergo various bodily and 
mental disturbances with her virtue, and hence apatheia, intact. Pathos, for 
Seneca, “does not consist in being moved by the impressions that are presented 
to the mind, but in surrendering to these and following up such a chance 
prompting”.  These “first movements” [propatheia] include physical 30
movements, such as the buckling of one’s knees before danger, as well as “bites 
and little contractions of the mind”.  Such movements are involuntary, and 31
only become emotions if one assents to their occurrence as appropriate, an 
independent volition. 
Nietzsche agrees with the Stoic counsel, to subject one’s primary 
inclinations and aversions to the strictures of “our reason and our 
experience”.  He claims that these feelings originate in often false, disguised, 32
and inherited judgements that one ought to replace with one’s own. Yet he is 
unwilling to grant the stronger Stoic claim that one’s capacity for judgement is 
independent of the feelings brought about by one’s bodily and mental 
constitution. In The Gay Science he cautions that certain diets produce “ways 
of thinking and feeling that have narcotic effects”.  In his later Ecce Homo, 33
Nietzsche argues that nourishment, location, and climate, “little things which 
according to the traditional judgement are matters of indifference”, are 
constitutive of one’s virtue. Here Nietzsche denies the independence of 
conscious thought from bodily and mental conditions on which the Stoic 
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division between goods and preferred indifferents depends, and thus the 
security of the happiness achieved solely through intellectual virtue.  34
Schopenhauer attacks not only the security of Stoic happiness, but its 
possibility. Schopenhauer claims that Stoic happiness, the blissful life free from 
emotional disturbance, is unattainable, even for “those purely rational types”, 
practical philosophers.  This is because, on his account, “the blissful life” 35
contains an inner contradiction. According to Schopenhauer, life on earth is a 
“narrow, paltry, and ephemeral” experience and a “state or condition of 
suffering”.  One can find deliverance from suffering in “a better existence” 36
only by means of “moral effort, sever renunciation, and the denial of our own 
self”.  The blessedness which the Stoics strive for, then, is not achievable 37
within the constraints of earthly life: life and suffering are inextricably linked 
and the quest for perfect tranquillity is inevitably frustrated. Schopenhauer 
thinks that this contradiction is exposed by the approbation the Stoics give 
suicide. Seneca sanctions the wise man to “quickly take leave of life and cease 
being a trouble to himself” should “the utmost pinch of need arrive”.  This 38
advice is of a kind with the more famous Cynic dictum that “we must procure 
either understanding or a rope [for hanging ourselves]”.  That is, the 39
progression of our practical reason will either grant us tranquillity or indicate 
that death is preferable to the continued tribulations of life. But Stoicism 
professes to cure us of these tribulations, that nothing in life correctly 
 In a hopeful section at the opening of The Gay Science, he ventures to ask whether our 34
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understood is an evil, and that therefore, nothing should compel us to suicide. 
Stoicism is supposed to lead to a blissful life but instead “philosophises away” 
life or, if this proves too great a task, recommends its cessation. Suicide remains 
a tonic of last resort for the Stoic, and this reveals that Stoicism is more 
sedative than curative regarding life’s ills. In some situations suicide may be (as 
the Stoics argue) a virtuous action, but it is never a happy one. 
At the time of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche praises the Stoic attitude 
to suicide. In HH 80 he singles out the “bravest Roman patriots” as adopting a 
“natural, obvious” response to the decline of their powers.  Against this 40
“victory for reason” he sets a “mania for prolonging our lives” even in 
conditions of distress “when lacking the strength to come closer to the real 
goal of life”.  Nietzsche rejects the anxious longing of those who are 41
“enamoured of life”.  In subsequent chapters we will see that Nietzsche 42
reverses his rejection of a passionate attachment to life, but even now we can 
detect a break with Stoicism. The “real goal of life” for a thinker or artist is, 
according to section 209 of the same work, to infuse one’s works with a 
“better self”. Again, we will interrogate the connection between the love of life 
and Nietzsche’s project of the self in subsequent chapters.  43
Epictetus puts little stock in the task of choosing between preferred and 
non-preferred indifferents. Instead, he claims that we ought to devote our 
attention to the only thing that is genuinely good, the fashioning and 
maintenance of a virtuous soul, in accordance with its rational nature. 
Of primary importance in this fashioning is to jettison the false judgements 
by which we conventionally value external goods and in doing so guard 
 HH 80.40
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ourselves against the passions that originate in these false judgements. 
Transience is in the nature of all external objects, and so we should not be 
disturbed if something we are fond of is destroyed. Epictetus counsels that we 
recognise and affirm this nature, to prepare ourselves for the inevitable passing 
of all things. 
If you are fond a jug, say, “I am fond of a jug”; for when it is broken you will not 
be disturbed.  44
Purifying oneself of false judgements is a task of constant self-discipline. 
Epictetus directs the Stoic who experiences something outside his control to 
turn to what is under his control—his own faculties—in order to respond. In 
particular, Epictetus refers to the hêgemonikon or commanding faculty, “the 
thing which utilises everything else, submits everything else to the test, selects, 
and rejects”.  The hêgemonikon comprises the faculties of impression, impulse 45
and assent. As has been shown, of these, humans share impression and impulse 
with other animals. It is the capacity for rational assent, the ability “to weigh 
and evaluate [one’s] representations”  and respond appropriately, that is 46
distinctively human. Standing between one’s impressions and impulses, the 
faculty of assent is “that part of the mind that engages in conscious decision-
making processes”.  Assent is “a distinctive kind of causal contribution that a 47
rational agent (and only a rational agent) can make to the production of an 
action”,  and it is in this sense that the Stoic’s response to an event is under 48
his own control. 
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Epictetus’s counsel is to exercise the faculty of assent, such that the Stoic’s 
commanding faculty operates according to reason and nature. The faculty of 
assent is an ineliminable part of human action. When one fails to act in 
accordance with nature, it is not the case that one’s assent is bypassed, but that 
one assents to an incorrect judgement of either impressions (by ascribing value 
to a jug of which one is fond, for example) or impulses (by reacting with anger 
or some other emotion). The later Roman Stoics were increasingly concerned 
with the faculty of assent as the locus of psychological self-control.  Through 49
the use of spiritual exercises which work upon assent, the Stoic habituates 
himself to the proper use of the faculty such that his “external impressions will 
not run away from [him]”.  The harm of the passions is precisely that they 50
run away from us, escaping our control. 
While the Stoic practicing the withdrawal from external goods implied by 
apatheai (“freedom from passion”) does forgo their attendant pleasures—since 
these are dependent on false judgements of their worth—the Stoic does not 
forgo all emotional impulse. On the contrary, just as the passions are 
dependent on false judgements, the Stoic eupatheiai (“good emotions”) are 
emotional impulses dependent on correct judgement. While the Stoic avoids 
laughter at obscenity, in the theatre, or as a result of intoxication (since all 
three are beyond his control), his indifference to external goods does not 
preclude him from a serene cheerfulness and even laughter at the “near-
universality of human folly and delusion”.  Epictetus provides an example of 51
this serene cheerfulness, when he shows how a Stoic might respond to the 
threat of physical violence.  Because the Stoic is secure in the knowledge that 52
 Reydams-Schils, The Roman Stoics, 26.49
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his body is nothing to him, and that only he controls his moral purpose, he can 
mock someone who attempts coercion: “My leg you will fetter, but my moral 
purpose not even Zeus himself has power to overcome”.  53
As a result the passions, which the Stoics counsel against, should not be 
identified with emotional impulse in toto, but rather the condition which 
obtains when these impulses overstep their “proper and natural proportion”  54
and continue “disobedient to the dictates of reason”.  Chrysippus likens an 55
excessive emotional impulse to the momentum an athlete picks up running: he 
cannot “stop or change [direction] whenever he wants to”.  The track sprinter 56
who overshoots the finish line exceeds the measured distance of the race, just 
as the impassioned individual goes beyond the measure of reason. Chrysippus 
warns against this excess. 
Chrysippus returns to the athletic metaphor in his pathology of the 
passions: 
The passions are called ailments not just in virtue of their judging each of these 
[external] things to be good, but also with regard to their running towards them 
in excess of what is natural.  57
Here Chrysippus expresses a moderate approval of, or at least indifference 
towards, the opinion that external possessions are a good, as long as this 
opinion is kept within the bounds of reason. The indifferents falls within these 
bounds since, as long as one participates in virtue, one’s moral goodness is 
neither helped nor harmed by choices between indifferents, as long as the Stoic 
is not misled into incorrectly appraising an indifferent as a moral good. 
Chrysippus’s contention is that, while they do not contribute to our virtue, 
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there are natural activities, for instance social participation and raising a 
family, which can be undertaken in moderation. 
Hypocrisy 
Schopenhauer charges with hypocrisy the Stoic who possesses and enjoys 
supposed indifferents while denying their value. According to the doctrine of 
indifferents, a Stoic may take part in a luxurious Roman banquet, all the while 
protesting that the fine food and wine are merely preferred indifferents, and 
not real goods. Schopenhauer claims that the Stoic who behaves in this manner 
is simply self-deluding in “boldly asserting that they gained nothing whatever 
from the whole feast”.  Schopenhauer argues that Stoicism should be 58
understood as a theoretical translation of the practical spirit of Cynicism, that 
“life in its simplest and most naked form, with the hardships that naturally 
belong to it, is the most tolerable, and is therefore to be chosen”.  The Stoics 59
accept the Cynic’s claim that desirous and passionate attachments cause more 
suffering than the possession of the desired object can assuage. Rather than 
renouncing the enjoyment of external objects, the Stoic is satisfied in the 
conviction that this renunciation is possible, if demanded by fate. By this 
theoretical move, in which everything is “reduced [...] to a mental process”, 
Schopenhauer concludes that the Stoics have “sophisticated themselves into all 
the amenities of life”.  60
The theory of indifferents grants the Stoic latitude in everyday life, so long 
as she holds the correct convictions, to indulge in available luxuries. 
Schopenhauer’s claim is that this marks a divergence between Stoic theory and 
lived experience. This divergence is illustrative of the tripartite structure of 
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Stoicism detected by Sellars. According to Sellars, Stoic philosophy aims at a 
“distinctively rational way of life” (bíos), underpinned by rational discourse 
(logos) and achieved through the use of philosophical exercise and training 
(áskêsis).  Since áskêsis constitutes the means through which philosophical 61
ideas are translated into philosophical actions, the manner in which Stoic 
exercises treat indifferents will shed light on what Schopenhauer claims is a 
failure of Stoicism. Marcus Aurelius counsels, in an exercise aimed at purifying 
the soul’s concern for earthy indifferents, as follows: 
Observe the courses of the stars as if revolving with them and reflect upon the 
continuous changes of the elements into one another; for impressions such as 
these are for cleansing the filth of earth-bound life.  62
Epictetus, too, recommends as the “only way” to freedom from the 
emotions, “to despise the things which are not in our power”.  Yet, if things 63
outside of one’s control and the goings-on of earth-bound life are indifferents, 
the Stoic lacks the grounds to despise them, or decry their filth, since these 
dispositions imply strongly negative valuations. The incongruity in this case is 
the reverse of that which Schopenhauer identified. Whereas the Stoic’s actions, 
according to Schopenhauer, betray the positive regard in which they hold 
external goods, Stoic exercises suggest an equally inappropriate negative 
regard, given their supposed indifference. The contemptuous attitude towards 
externals that Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus recommend one adopts solves the 
practical problem Schopenhauer identifies in that it counteracts the growth of 
desires for luxuries to which one might become accustomed. Yet it achieves this 
at the cost of multiplying Stoicism’s theoretical difficulties. The Stoic who 
adopts this attitude of contempt for externals tacitly admits that self-mastery is 
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a struggle between drives, in this case one’s appetite, fed by regular 
gratification, and the pride in self-control that is threatened by appetite. 
While Chrysippus tolerates the judgement of externals as welcome (within 
the bounds of reason), in the later Seneca, these bounds have tightened almost 
entirely. Seneca has it that the passions, since they are in essence irrational, 
cannot be brought under the control of reason. In contrast to the measured 
emotional response which Chrysippus sanctions, for Seneca “if reason prevails, 
the passions will not even get a start”.  Seneca argues that the position that 64
we ought to control rather than eliminate the passions is “misleading and 
useless”, and “to be regarded just as the declaration that we ought to be 
‘moderately’ insane, or ‘moderately’ ill”.  65
The banquet table of life 
Seneca finds cheerfulness in obedience to God, counselling only the defiant 
endurance of chance events.  Epictetus instructs similarly, that we steel 66
ourselves against the impositions of chance by despising the things that are not 
under our control, in order that we not desire them.  One exercises control 67
over oneself, against the passions, through attuning one’s judgements with that 
of the universal rational ordering of the universe. Seneca’s cheerfulness thus 
depends on the Stoic division between the internal rational faculties, which fall 
under our control, and the hostile external world, which does not, and will 
indeed thwart our pursuit of eudaimonia. 
Epictetus is aware of the tension between the rational moderation of and 
the ascetic withdrawal from the valuing of external goods, and exhibits this 
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tension in a parable that one ought to live as one behaves at a banquet.  He 68
speaks approvingly of two kinds of banqueters: the first, like Chrysippus, 
samples politely and values what fate brings, not desiring a dish outside of her 
grasp and not detaining a dish when the time comes to pass it on; the second, 
like Seneca, not only controls her desire for distant dishes and goods, but 
maintains this indifference when the good is within grasp, in fact despising it as 
an external, and therefore of no real value. A striking example of the second 
kind of banqueter is Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, who reportedly “declined 
most invitations to dinner”.  69
The banqueter who refrains from partaking in external goods is wedded to 
the Stoic division between the self and a hostile external world. Under this 
division, the task of the Stoic is to heroically endure the world’s impositions, 
while perfecting his (internal) virtue. Simplicius, in his Neoplatonic 
commentary on the Enchiridion, reads Epictetus as presenting a progression 
towards the banqueter who “transcends the realm of generation”  and, in 70
despising external things, joins in the governance of the universe “without 
being subordinated within it”.  71
Both banqueters remain tied to an appraisal of themselves and the world 
from an individual perspective. The first partakes in the polite satisfaction and 
moderation of personal desires, ready to digest whatever fate happens to bring. 
The second engages in a disdainful asceticism in which moral perfection is 
achieved by abstention from worldly proceedings and is rewarded by a share in 
the proud and divinely detached rule of the world. 
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However, a more or less ascetic individualism committed to the sharp 
distinction between the self and the external world does not exhaust the Stoic 
ethical project. Diogenes Laertius describes the Stoic telos as a life lived “in 
accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe”.  72
Sellars finds in Epictetus, and more explicitly in Marcus Aurelius, a strain of 
Stoic thought that emphasises this double aspect of life ‘according to nature’ in 
broadening the human perspective to that of the universe.  Marcus writes: 73
Of the life of man, his time is a point, his substance flowing, his perception faint, 
the constitution of his whole body decaying, his soul a spinning wheel, his fortune 
hard to predict, and his fame doubtful; that is to say, all the things of the body are 
a river, the things of the soul dream and delusion, life is a war and a journey in a 
foreign land, and afterwards oblivion.  74
Marcus here takes on the perspective of the river of existence, drawing on 
Heraclitus. On the scale of this perspective, the particular details of an 
individual’s life—his fame, his fortune, and his political power—shrink to a 
point that will soon return to oblivion, being “taken up into the [...] life-giving 
principle of the cosmos”.  The Stoic who has adopted the point of view of the 75
cosmos can properly appreciate the indifference of nature to the speck of their 
own life within the immensity of all other existence. Sellars terms this strain of 
Stoic thought, which practices a loving consent to our place in the whole, 
“cosmic Stoicism”, in contrast to the “human Stoicism” of “heroic endurance 
or patient fortitude” exemplified by Epictetus and Seneca.  76
Adopting an impersonal cosmic perspective “will free one from the 
emotional turmoil that goes with”  the limited first-person point of view. The 77
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cosmic perspective is not the transcendental point of view of Simplicius’ 
Neoplatonic reading of Epictetus, which escapes the “realm of generation”. 
Instead, the Stoic attains the cosmic perspective by identifying with this very 
realm, or with the generative principle that the Stoics variously call nature, 
reason, and God. This identification allows him to cheerfully affirm the 
proceedings of nature as expressing God’s will. External events are no longer 
interpreted as hostile and chance impositions from the world, but as an 
ineliminable part of rational fatefulness. This view is not confined to the later 
Roman Stoics. The Greek Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus praises Zeus for “[making] 
the uneven even and [putting] into order the disorderly”: “For you have thus 
joined everything into one, the good with the bad, that there comes to be one 
ever-existing rational order for everything”.  Throughout the development of 78
Stoicism there exists a strain of thought that anchors indifference to externals 
in the practice of communion with the rational cosmos. 
Whither Nietzsche? 
Nietzsche’s deep affinity for Stoicism has been widely acknowledged. Nietzsche 
adopts both the form of Stoic philosophy as “eine Kunst des Lebens”,  and 79
many of its substantive commitments: its rejection of pity, its affirmation of 
fate, and its fundamental aspiration to live (in some sense) with nature. By 
“nature”, the Stoics refer to that teleological divinity which endears individuals 
to themselves through oikeiôsis, and the consequent drive to self-preservation 
which underlies the Stoics’ broader ethical theory. Pity is rejected as a species 
of distress, to suffer which harms an individual’s rational constitution. 
According to Epictetus, pity is assent to another’s judgement that she is 
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affected by external evils. But this judgement is necessarily mistaken, since 
externals are a matter of indifference. Epictetus suggests that one sympathise 
“as far as words go”, but not “in the centre of [one’s] being”.  The divine 80
providence which endears us to ourselves additionally ensures that fate 
proceeds according to reason. By adopting the perspective of this providence 
(nature itself), the Stoic comes to understand the rational place of all things 
within the whole, and thus not only endures, but lovingly affirms her own fate. 
These substantive Stoic positions are grounded in a teleological understanding 
of nature—that nature has endeared us to ourselves and that the art of living is 
synonymous with obedience to nature. 
Yet no part of Stoicism receives more explicit condemnation from Nietzsche 
as the Stoic understanding of nature, and in particular their contention that 
individuals are disposed by nature towards self-preservation. Whereas in The 
Gay Science Nietzsche’s treatment of Stoicism is primarily concerned with the 
Stoic temperament, in Beyond Good and Evil he turns to the Stoic theory of 
nature.  
“According to nature” you want to live? O you noble Stoics, what deceptive 
words these are! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, 
indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy 
and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine 
indifference itself as a power—how could you live according to this 
indifference?  81
Whereas for the Stoics, “it was not likely that nature [...] should leave the 
creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its 
own constitution”,  for Nietzsche—indebted to Schopenhauer’s anti-82
teleological view of the world—nature is precisely so indifferent to our 
individual affairs. He argues that it is only anthropomorphic projection that 
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allows the Stoic to think of nature as prescribing the Stoic way of life. In this 
projection the Stoics are unremarkable: 
But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened with the Stoics still 
happens today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always 
creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this 
tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the 
world,” to the causa prima.  83
The reason that Nietzsche specifically remarks upon the Stoics is not their 
anthropomorphism, but their denial thereof. Instead of living according to 
nature as they pretend, the Stoics have read nature according to Stoicism. That 
is, they have believed in Stoicism as an underlying principle of nature, all the 
while pretending to perceive nature free from anthropomorphic projection. It is 
this self-deception which Nietzsche attacks. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, all 
previous philosophies have believed in themselves, and in doing so, tyrannised 
the world. This immediately raises a number of questions regarding the status 
of Nietzsche’s own philosophy. Does Nietzsche ‘believe’ in his own philosophy? 
If so, is his criticism of Stoicism merely a lament on the way to repeating the 
same mistake in his translation of “man back into nature”?  If not, how does 84
Nietzsche avoid following the Stoics into self-deception? The role played by 
poetry, music, and artistic creation in The Gay Science will go some way 
towards allaying this concern, as we will see in the second half of this thesis. 
At the very least, the Stoics claim to find empirical confirmation of the 
theory of oikeiôsis in so-called ‘cradle arguments’.  The self-concern of infants 85
in the cradle testifies, so they say, that nature is the source of this self-concern. 
The theory of oikeiôsis is not just an a priori claim, although as Brunschwig 
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notes this is how Chrysippus is reported to justify it.  But if oikeiôsis is 86
deployed to explain observable phenomena, it is open to refutation on 
empirical grounds. Nietzsche makes this point when he subjects the instinct of 
self-preservation to criticism as an explanatory principle.  That the 87
explanatory power of the instinct of self-preservation has previously been 
championed by philosophical dogmatism is no reason in itself to reject it. 
Nietzsche makes the same argument regarding the soul in the previous 
aphorism. While the “soul atomism” of Christianity “ought to be expelled from 
science”, this does not require the expulsion of any and all soul-hypotheses.  88
Rather, such hypotheses ought to be granted “citizen’s rights in science”, that 
is, subjected to scientific analysis and accepted or rejected accordingly. The 
same is true regarding the instinctual behaviour of organic individuals. While 
in the case of the soul Nietzsche simply proffers a number of hypotheses, in the 
case of instinctual behaviour he is more confident of having found the correct 
account, against the principle of self-preservation in both Stoicism (as dogma) 
and Darwinism (as scientific theory).  
A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; 
self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results.  89
He finds self-preservation a superfluous principle: it is explained by the 
notion that organic things seek to exercise their power, not only to conserve it. 
The desire of prior philosophers to restrict the biological instinct to self-
preservation is, according to Nietzsche, symptomatic of conditions of 
distress.  Such philosophers require all their strength for self-preservation, and 90
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thus the projection of their own temperament which comes to stand for 
“nature” bears the mark of this need. 
For the Stoics, nature (or God) directs the expression of an individual’s 
power inwards, towards the maintenance of its own constitution; for Nietzsche 
such expression is free of such theological constraint. Thus, while the broad 
aim of Nietzsche’s philosophy accords with that of the Stoics’, in that both 
strive to foster and perfect the expression of one’s power, their contents diverge 
sharply. 
Both the Stoics and Nietzsche seek a cheerfulness purified by the pursuit of 
knowledge.  For both, feelings and emotional states correspond to judgements 91
and evaluations, and the purification of feelings is to be achieved through cool, 
rational reflection.  But whereas the Stoics believe this coolness gives rise to a 92
tranquil indifference to the outside world, according to Nietzsche a great 
character “possesses [feeling] to the highest degree” and thus values to the 
highest degree. Such a character is able to control feelings without their 
removal. 
 For both Nietzsche and the Stoics, a condition of knowledge is the capacity 
to transcend the limited point of view of the individual. “[T]he eye of 
knowledge” allows Nietzsche’s sage to no longer “experience the stars as 
something ‘above’”  in much the same way as Marcus Aurelius sees the earth 93
as “in its entirety [...] merely a point in space”.  But for Nietzsche, again, it is 94
not the elimination of feelings which aids in the venture for knowledge, but the 
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development and control of a more comprehensive and diverse panoply of 
feelings.  95
For both Nietzsche and the Stoics, the means of the pursuit of knowledge is 
broadening of the individual’s intellectual perspective to encompass existence 
on a grander, cosmic scale. Adopting this cosmic perspective is instrumental in 
the Stoic achievement of indifference, or devaluation, just as as it is in 
Nietzsche’s revaluation. Yet the rationally ordered cosmos to which the Stoics 
appeal as a ground for this transcendental perspective is unavailable to 
Nietzsche. Without the God’s-eye view of the Stoic, it remains to be seen how 
Nietzsche ascends to a supra-individual perspective. Nietzsche rejects 
indifference and the Stoic cosmos, but remains indebted to Stoic thought on 
both accounts. 
Value 
The well-being of the Stoic sage is impervious to the world’s apparent evils. 
The sage correctly judges that such external objects threaten him with no real 
harm. By judging objects according to their natural value, the sage frees herself 
from the harm of the passions and achieves tranquillity. As we have seen, 
Nietzsche understands the Stoic view of nature as a projection of the Stoic 
temperament. The case of “natural value” is no different: 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to 
its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a 
present—and it was we who gave and bestowed it.  96
Nietzsche makes the striking claim that indifference has been bestowed 
upon external objects as a consequence of a Stoic desire for as little pain as 
possible.  On Nietzsche’s telling, Stoic doctrine is a rationalisation of the Stoic 97
 GM III 12.95
 GS 301, emphasis in original.96
 GS 12.97
 37
temperament. In effect, he accuses the Stoics of a kind of meta-philosophical 
negative hedonism, because they supposedly give up the capacity for pleasure 
in return for avoiding pain.  In this, according to Nietzsche, the Stoics 98
implicitly agree that pleasure and pain are intimately related such that large or 
small quantities of one necessarily imply the same of the other. By dulling their 
sensitivity to both pleasure and pain, the Stoics ensure that knowledge of the 
(therefore) indifferent external world contributes to the sage’s tranquillity. 
Nietzsche is concerned with finding a criterion of value distinct from 
‘nature’, at least insofar as we consider this as the world purified of 
anthropomorphisms. He claims to find an alternative measure under the 
heading of ‘life’. While all values serve the demands of a certain kind of life,  99
Nietzsche wishes to judge values on the basis of the extent to which they 
promote and preserve life.  By ‘life’, Nietzsche refers to the instinctive drive 100
to discharge one’s strength which he believes to have established as essential to 
explain the behaviour of living things. As far as the Stoic directs his energies 
exclusively towards the maintenance (preservation) of his rational soul and 
treats the external world with indifference, he is, according to Nietzsche, 
leading an impoverished life. The operative distinction is, we might say, 
between a Stoic will-to-live (oikeiôsis) and Nietzsche’s will-to-power. This is 
why Nietzsche describes the Stoics as petrified  and statuesque.   101 102
Stoicism’s petrification is due to the Stoic’s minimisation of both pleasure 
and pain. The clear implication is that Nietzsche would rather as much pain as 
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possible, in order to open the possibility for “new galaxies of joy”.  The 103
means to cultivating both pleasure and pain, according to Nietzsche, is science. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche closely aligns joy with pleasure or 
voluptuousness [Wollust], in sharp contrast with Stoicism, and indicating a 
radicalised Epicurean sensitivity to the world. 
Correct judgements concerning the value of objects comprise the central 
goal of Stoic therapy. Thus for the Stoic, truth will always help us on our way 
towards happiness and consequently is of supreme utility. For Nietzsche the 
situation is less fortuitous. His claim, repeated consistently throughout his 
corpus, is that belief in “unities which do not exist”,  “basic errors of all 104
sentient existence”,  and “the constant falsification of the world by means of 105
numbers”,  may well prove a necessary condition of life. The progress of 106
science in these areas, to the extent that it displaces belief in these necessary 
falsehoods, is deleterious to our happiness: for Nietzsche there is a tragic 
conflict between science and life, between truth and value. He asks, “to what 
extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the 
experiment”.  107
Cosmic therapy 
In 1881 Nietzsche conceives of the Hellenistic schools as “experimental 
laboratories”  for the development of practical wisdom. The results of these 108
experiments rightly “belong to us”, in that we are entitled to practice Stoic, as 
well as Epicurean, techniques of living according to our own needs. In 
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particular, Nietzsche reports that he has learnt from Stoicism to ask, in the 
midst of storm and strife, “What does it matter?”.  That Nietzsche believes 109
we can help ourselves to Stoic practices without a commitment to the broader 
Stoic system perhaps explains his continued use of Stoic exercises after his shift 
away from Stoicism itself in the early 1880s. 
Marcus Aurelius’ technique of ascending to the point of view of the cosmos 
is one exercise that Nietzsche adopts as his own. In section 380 of The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche describes how one might confront the question of the value 
of morality. One must “rise, climb, or fly” to a height outside of morality: 
One has to be very light to drive one’s will to knowledge into such a distance and, 
as it were, beyond one’s time, to create for oneself eyes to survey millennia and, 
moreover, clear skies in these eyes.  110
The eyes which Nietzsche creates to survey millennia of moral history allow 
him to transcend the limited first-person view of the individual. Unlike Marcus, 
however, Nietzsche has no ready-made cosmic perspective or God’s-eye view to 
which he can aspire. Both Nietzsche and Marcus reject any conception of the 
self as separated from or opposed to the world.  However, Nietzsche’s new 111
cheerfulness, as propounded in book five of The Gay Science (published with 
the second edition in 1887), is predicated not on an identification with the 
cosmic God, but on the “greatest recent event—that ‘God is dead.’”.  The 112
therapeutic success of adopting a cosmic point of view on the world hinges 
upon the Stoic conception of the cosmos and its capacity to ground correct 
judgements regarding nature. In the absence of the regulative cosmic power of 
God, Nietzsche attempts to expand his perspective beyond the narrow 
individual point of view. This may still carry a sedative effect in that it exposes 
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the folly in our conventional first person valuations, but it cannot guarantee 
happiness in the same way as it does for the Stoics. Indeed, given Nietzsche’s 
claim in the preface to The Gay Science that life has “become a problem”,  it 113
is not at all obvious that bringing more perspectives to bear on our condition 
will not harm our tranquillity and cause us distress. Nietzsche seeks a solution 
to this problem in a daring, adventurous engagement with the world,  and as 114
far as he goes along these lines he leaves Stoicism behind. 
Marcus Aurelius uses the cosmic perspective to quiet the soul and diminish 
the perceived importance of worldly affairs: “the earth as a whole is but a 
point in the universe”.  Nietzsche draws precisely the opposite conclusion 115
from adopting the point of view of the cosmos: 
Whoever looks into himself as into vast space and carries galaxies in himself, also 
knows how irregular all galaxies are; they lead into the chaos and labyrinth of 
existence.   116
Rather than indifference towards the infinitesimally small, Nietzsche 
deduces a cosmic grandness and profundity from the cosmic perspective. The 
cosmic perspective grants Nietzsche a “dance floor for divine accident”:  the 117
cosmic platform gives Zarathustra’s life a profundity opposed to the lives of 
the last human beings who “[make] everything small”.  Nietzsche does not 118
seek the cosmic perspective to remind himself of his own smallness, but to 
shade life with cosmic grandeur and in doing so revalue life within the natural 
world. 
By 1882 Nietzsche saw the Stoic need to ground happiness in universal 
reason as indicative of an impoverished and unpredictable life. The Stoic’s 
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exchange, by which she forgoes worldly pleasures in order to avoid worldly 
pains, is defensible only in a world so hostile, dangerous, and painful as to 
make worldly engagements unbearable. But, according to Nietzsche, such an 
exchange exaggerates the pain and misfortune in the world and ignores the 
profusion of worldly palliatives and pleasures.  Nietzsche’s rejection of Stoic 119
rationalism leads him to an engagement with that other great Hellenistic 
school, Epicureanism. In The Gay Science Nietzsche expresses a preference for 
the Epicureans’ sensitivity to the world over Stoic indifference.  The next 120
chapter examines the terms of this preference as well as Nietzsche’s ultimate 
assessment of Epicurus as “essentially” Romantic.  121
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2. Epicurean Purgatives: Pleasure, Sensation, Irritation 
Where Nietzsche baulks at the Stoic’s ambitious and speculative cosmology, he 
finds common ground with the Epicureans’ caution regarding ultimate 
convictions. The Stoics and Epicureans concur in holding a form of divinity as 
the sage’s highest aspiration, but while the Stoics conceive of the divine as the 
rational procession of the whole of nature, the Epicureans celebrate the divine 
as a serene independence from human concerns. The gods, according to 
Epicurus (c. 341–270 BCE), exist in a state of perfect bliss, separated from our 
world and indifferent with human affairs. They incarnate the Epicurean ideal 
of freedom from pain and fear, in strict opposition to the interventionist gods 
of Greek myth, and the providential God of the Stoics.  The Epicurean sage, 1
although she aspires to divinity, achieves this precisely by shucking off her 
concern for the actions, particularly the wrath, of particular divine beings. 
Consequently, Epicurean philosophy aims at dispelling fears which 
groundlessly impinge on human happiness. 
Nietzsche echoes the Epicurean sentiment that one should neither fear the 
gods’ wrath nor be seduced by the notion of their “personal providence”.  It is 2
Epicurus’ “wonderful insight,” according to Nietzsche, that “to quieten the 
heart it is absolutely not necessary to have solved the ultimate and outermost 
theoretical questions”.  And ‘to quieten the heart’ is exactly the task which 3
Epicurus sets for philosophy: for him, the blessed [makarios] life is one that is 
free from pain and fear and his counsel is that we direct every effort to ridding 
ourselves of these evils. 
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Epicurus singles out two fears as particularly harmful to human happiness: 
fear of the gods and fear of death. Both of these fears arise from “a certain 
irrational perversity” —belief in the opinions of the multitude regarding the 4
gods and regarding death. Thus the task of Epicurean philosophy is to reform 
the minds of individuals affected by these erroneous beliefs, and in doing so 
free them from the harm wrought by irrational fears. In this sense 
Epicureanism adopts the ancient medical model of philosophy aimed at 
treating the soul. The Roman Epicurean Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE) describes his 
poem De Rerum Natura in these terms, as using the sweetness of poetry to 
deliver his Epicurean balm, in the same way as, when physicians administer a 
bitter medicine, “they first touch the rims about the cups with the sweet yellow 
fluid of honey”.  5
In this chapter I present Epicureanism as a philosophical therapy. I consider 
three aspects of the Epicurean therapy: its doctrinal commitments, the exercises 
that the Epicurean student and sage employ, and the limits on possible 
experience set by the Epicurean temperament. As I will show, the effect of each 
of these is to limit the exposure of the Epicurean to the pains of existence 
through a diminution of her passionate engagements with, and activity within, 
the world. I conclude with an analysis of ataraxia, the Epicurean ideal, and 
consider Nietzsche’s criticism of this. As in chapter one, my goal is to 
understand both the influence of Epicureanism on Nietzsche as well as his 
conception and use of “Epicureanism” in the middle period. To begin, I 
introduce the principal goal of philosophy according to Epicurus: to allay both 
the fear of the gods and the fear of death.  
 DL 10.81.4
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Physics against fear of the gods 
Motivated by the task of alleviating the fear of the gods, Epicurus and his 
followers propound a physical theory that is strictly materialist, offering 
natural explanations of cosmological and meteorological phenomena that were 
hitherto blamed on the gods.  The therapeutic motive of natural enquiry is 6
made explicit in Epicurus’ letter to Pythocles: 
In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial 
phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other 
end in view than peace of mind and firm conviction.  7
Epicurus explains one such meteorological phenomenon, thunder, which 
was mythically ascribed to Zeus,  through no less than four distinct natural 8
hypotheses.  Lucretius, following his forebear, lists ten.  The goal of Epicurean 9 10
meteorology is not to arrive at a single definitive account of phenomena, but to 
assuage human fear of the gods. Epicurus warns against the kind of enquiry 
that would narrow down the range of natural explanations since in it “there is 
nothing [...] that contributes to our happiness”.  11
The Epicureans do not purport to give a definitive account of 
meteorological phenomena, as this is unnecessary for and in some cases 
destructive towards, their therapeutic purpose. It is unnecessary, since the 
attainment of ataraxia depends only on the rejection of divine explanations 
and the consequent removal of fear of the gods. It is sometimes destructive, 
since the possession only a single hypothesis lends itself to dogmatic fixation. 
 Liba Taub, “Cosmology and Meteorology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, 6
ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124.
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In The Wanderer and his Shadow, Nietzsche approves of this Epicurean 
strategy. With only a single account of a particular phenomenon, he observes, 
we risk overstepping the limits of our capacity to know distant and obscure 
events. We are in danger of falling into the “superstitious trap” of dogmatism,  12
or becoming embroiled in “a laborious pondering over a single hypothesis 
which, being the only one visible, is a hundredfold overrated".  Epicurean 13
meteorological explanations, Nietzsche notes, sanction the consolation that 
“things may be thus but they may also be otherwise”.  This consolation is 14
won at the cost of not looking too deeply into nature. Anything more than a 
possible explanation of natural phenomena is superfluous to Epicurean physics
—“the stimulus to enquiry ceases once [freedom from fear and anxiety] is 
attained”.  15
For Epicurus, then, the ethical impulse circumscribes the purview of science. 
The Neo-Kantian Lange, whose History of Materialism was a formative 
influence on Nietzsche,  finds such a science “childishly inadequate” compared 16
to “true scientific enquiry”.  Indeed, the Epicurean does not wish to perform 17
the rigorous analysis of natural events which gives Lange’s modern science a 
rich and complex understanding of the world. Since they restrict natural 
enquiry to narrow boundaries, the Epicureans are only able to account for a 
narrow range of natural phenomena and human experience. The Epicureans 
understanding of life is necessarily limited in comparison with one informed by 
more thorough scientific enquiry. 
 Taub, “Cosmology and meteorology,” 111.12
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Illinois Press, 2008), 32–36.
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Nietzsche follows Lange’s criticism of the unscientific modesty of Epicurean 
physics, stating that “Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge, in order to 
retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values".  And yet, Nietzsche 18
does not oppose Epicurean explanations to a true science, absolved of ethical 
commitments. Instead, he detects a competing ethical root at the base of 
modern scientific enquiry. The starting point for the scientific attitude, 
according to Nietzsche, is the unconditional will to truth—to hold truth above 
all other values.  But this will to truth, the unconditional rejection of 19
deception, is ambiguous in its motivation. It could grow either from the desire 
not to be deceived or from a desire will not to deceive. In the first sense, science 
would be justified so long as it harms us to be deceived—“One does not want 
to be deceived because one assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to 
be deceived”.  But for Nietzsche it is, at the start of scientific enquiry, an open 20
question whether deception is always so harmful, dangerous, and calamitous. 
Precisely because science values truth above utilitarian concerns and because 
science pursues truth even at the cost of human happiness (and indeed, at any 
cost), Nietzsche concludes that science cannot grow out of the prudential desire 
not to be deceived. The only alternative, he claims, is the will against deception 
in the second sense, a desire not to deceive: a moral demand to tell the truth 
unconditionally. 
Thus, according to Nietzsche, both the Epicureans’ natural enquiry and 
modern science are grounded in moral demands. While Lange criticises the 
inadequacy of Epicurean natural enquiry because it aims at happiness—in the 
form of negative hedonism—rather than truth, Nietzsche claims that modern 
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New 18
York: Vintage Books, 1968), section 578.
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science is similarly grounded in a moral dictum, namely the unconditional will 
to truth. In book four of The Gay Science, he celebrates his own compulsion to 
physics  as a result of a competing ethical position, his commitment to the 21
virtue of Redlichkeit—honesty or probity.  Nietzsche’s mention of Redlichkeit 22
comes at the conclusion of a diatribe against “moral chatter”, and so 
presumably he finds reason to distinguish it from the moral truthfulness of 
modern science. Yet by the time of book five’s publication in 1887, Nietzsche is 
more self-conscious, conceding that: 
[E]ven we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take 
our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that 
Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth 
is divine.  23
Here Nietzsche admits that Redlichkeit has it genesis in the unconditional 
will to truth. Having rejected the latter’s metaphysical foundation, Nietzsche 
acknowledges that Redlichkeit, like science is now “in need of a 
justification”.  The admission does not force Nietzsche to reject Redlichkeit 24
wholesale, but demands Nietzsche give an alternative, non-metaphysical 
account of the value of truth. 
If Nietzsche rejects the unconditional will to truth, and he surely does, this 
opens a space for deception, mendacity, and “the most unscrupulous 
polytropoi” on the side of which “the great sweep of life has actually always 
shown itself to be”.  It also raises the prospect that some form of the will to 25
truth may remain as a conditional value in Nietzsche’s thought, as suggested by 
 Nietzsche speaks of physics in the ancient sense of the study of phusis or nature, rather than 21
the more restrictive modern discipline.
 GS 335. The translation of Redlichkeit is contentious. In common German the word is 22
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the new table of cardinal virtues he draws in section 556 of Dawn, where 
Nietzsche reserves Redlichkeit for oneself and one’s friends. In subsequent 
chapters we will see how Nietzsche’s passion for knowledge grounds a 
commitment to Redlichkeit. 
The after-death 
Besides the fear of the gods, which the Epicureans remove by means of their 
modest physical enquiry, the other great fear which Epicurus identifies as 
fundamentally injurious to tranquillity is the fear of death. In particular, 
Epicurus argues against the position—common in ancient cults and 
subsequently adopted by the Christian tradition—that one ought to fear death 
because of the harms one might suffer in the afterlife. He achieves this by 
conceiving of the soul as part of the material and mortal body.  Upon death, 26
according to the Epicureans, the soul simply disintegrates into its constitutive 
atoms, in opposition to the immortal soul according to Plato and to 
Christianity. Epicurus claims that this account of the soul rules out the 
possibility of harm after death, since after death one can suffer neither pain nor 
distress. This argument is put in both his Letter to Menoeceus and second 
amongst his Principle Doctrines: 
Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply 
sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding 
that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life 
an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality.  27
Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has 
no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.  28
The Epicurean claim that definitive death—death as the permanent 
dissolution of the material soul—precludes all harm associated with death 
 Christopher Gill, “Psychology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James 26
Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 126.
 DL 10.124–25, emphasis added.27
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remains contentious.  Modern commentators agree, however, that definitive 29
death successfully dispels one species of the fear of death: the fear of 
punishment in hell. Death is “the cessation of one’s existence, the first moment 
of a state of nonbeing, which is beyond harm or gain”.  30
Nietzsche calls the reemergence of the idea of definitive death, after 
Christianity had expunged it as an Epicurean doctrine, an “unspeakable 
benefit” and Epicurus’ triumph—that “the ‘after-death’ no longer concerns 
us”.  Yet again, the Epicureans narrow the scope of human concern and yet 31
again, as Nietzsche notes, “we have grown poorer by one interest” from 
following the Epicureans.  32
Nietzsche can celebrate the freedom from the fear of punishment in hell 
without acceding to the stronger Epicurean claim that death precludes all harm 
or the Epicurean account of death as the permanent dissolution of a material 
soul. Indeed, Nietzsche rejects this simple materialist account of death, 
frequently referring to his own posthumous status  and claiming in relation to 33
the writing of Thus Spoke Zarathustra that “one pays dearly for being 
immortal: one has to die several times while alive”.  We will consider 34
Nietzsche’s discussion of death in subsequent chapters, particularly in relation 
to a Wagnerian Liebestod in chapter four, and the classical fear of death in 
chapter five. 
 See Thomas Nagel, “Death,” Noûs 4, no. 1 (1970): 73–80 and Joel Feinberg, “Harm to 29
Others,” in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1984) for two representative, contrary accounts, both attributing harm to the 
deprivation which death causes.
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The Epicurean compromise 
In response to both the fear of the gods and the fear of death, the Epicureans’ 
philosophical doctrines involve them in a compromise. Their means of 
removing unhealthy concerns are, in both cases, a narrowing of perspective. 
Nietzsche claims that it produces a poorer life as a result. The Epicureans give 
up all but the barest pleasures in return for a life of as little pain and suffering 
as possible. For Nietzsche, this is a constitutional demand: 
The Epicurean selects the situation, the persons, and even the events that suit his 
extremely irritable, intellectual constitution; he gives up all others, which means 
almost everything, because they would be too strong and heavy for him to digest.  35
Both the Epicureans and the Stoics aim for a life free from disturbance. The 
Stoic achieves this through insensitivity to events in the outside world. On the 
other hand, the Epicurean avoids situations which would upset her delicate 
sensitivities. The Epicurean settles for “a garden, figs, little cheeses, and three or 
four good friends”.  We might note at the point that Epicureanism admits of 36
some worldy attachments and hence some degree of an attachment to life.  As 37
we will see, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche is unsatisfied by the depth and 
intensity of the Epicurean attachment to life. 
In The Gay Science 306, where Nietzsche distinguishes between the 
Epicurean and Stoic temperaments, he suggests that “those whose work is of 
the spirit”  will profit from an Epicurean disposition. The “hard Stoic skin 38
with porcupine spines” is necessary only for those who find themselves in 
volatile social conditions.  In other situations, where a Stoic insensitivity is not 39
 GS 306.35
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required, Nietzsche claims that “subtle irritability” [feine Reizbarkeit] is 
essential to spiritual work and to those who spin “a long thread”.   40
The preceding aphorism sheds light on Nietzsche’s meaning. Moralists who 
preach self-control above all else afflict their followers with an aversion to 
“natural stirrings and inclinations,” to “any instinct or free wingbeat,” because 
these involuntary impulses seem to threaten such control.  By turning himself 41
“into a castle,” the one who strives after self-control cuts himself off “from the 
most beautiful fortuities of his soul,” as well as “all further instruction”.  In 42
his quest for self-control, he turns away from any productive relationship he 
might otherwise have with the outside world—“one must be able to lose 
oneself occasionally if one wants to learn something from things different from 
oneself”.  43
The one who turns himself into a castle in GS 305 is undoubtedly the Stoic 
of GS 306: the former seeks to wrest control of himself from the accidental 
and the exterior; the aim of the latter is to become “ultimately indifferent to 
whatever the accidents of existence might pour into [his stomach]”.  Why 44
might such a temperament be incapable of spinning a long thread? When 
Nietzsche returned to preface The Gay Science in 1887, he described 
philosophy itself as an “art of transfiguration”.  Philosophers, according to 45
Nietzsche, constantly transpose their lives—including their pains and 
 GS 306, emphasis in original. Nietzsche repeats the idea of spinning a long thread from a 40
letter to Erwin Rohde, March 22 1873. There, in discussing his and Rohde’s ambitions for the 
future, he writes: “our lives must spin themselves out long enough to make sure that many of 
our wishes become deeds”. Nietzsche employs the motif of the thread of life weaved by the 
Fates in Greek myth. If the Fates spin us a long thread, we will benefit from “Epicurean 
arrangements”.
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“everything that wounds [them]”—into the most spiritual form.  The long 46
thread is the result of this process of spiritualisation, which takes philosophers’ 
lives as raw material. The Stoic suffers an impoverished life, according to 
Nietzsche, because he is insensitive to the wealth of accidents and externals 
which punctuate his life and thus cannot incorporate them into spiritual 
work.  The Stoic who swallows stones in GS 306 is, in this sense, similar to 47
the Christian in D 70, who accepts “any food” and digests “opposites like 
pebbles”.  While this digestive versatility constitutes an admirable display of 48
the church’s power, it nevertheless exposes an “astonishing crudeness” in its 
insensitivity to that which is consumed.  Both the Stoic and Christian who 49
swallow stones recall modern man in HL 4, who has become so enamoured 
with his historical sense that he “drags around with him a huge quantity of 
indigestible stones of knowledge”.  At issue in all three cases is a deficiency in 50
the individual’s plastic power: 
the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate 
into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to 
recreate broken moulds.  51
Nietzsche’s conclusion in GS 306 is that, while the Stoic might swallow 
stones and be present for the accidents of existence, both will pass through him 
as matters of indifference—they will not affect him and they will not provide 
for his spiritual nourishment. 
The Epicurean, in comparison with the Stoic, retains a sensitivity to the 
accidents of life and for this very reason, tries to avoid such accidents. The 
 GS P 3.46
 This criticism foreshadows Nietzsche’s claim in BGE 9 that the Stoics see nature wrongly, 47
namely “according to the Stoa” and “only after [the Stoic] image”.
 D 70.48
 D 70.49
 HL 4.50
 HL 1.51
 53
thread that she spins depends on the tending of her natural stirrings and 
inclinations, and the careful arrangement of externals. The Epicurean 
sensitivity to the world is necessary for any engagement with the world. But 
because the Epicurean mollifies her sensitivity by sheltering from the accidents 
of existence, she does not achieve the kind of attachment that Nietzsche is 
seeking. 
A strong and well-formed human digests his experiences (deeds, misdeeds included) as 
he digests his meals, even when he has hard bites to swallow.  52
In The Wanderer and His Shadow 172, as well as The Gay Science 45, 
Nietzsche emphasises the smallness and the modesty of the Epicurean life. That 
the Epicureans’ needs are met by such small pleasures, and that their sensitivity 
is so finely attuned to the smallest of wants, explains why Nietzsche calls their 
irritability subtle [feine]. This smallness of life also explains why Nietzsche 
breaks with the Epicureans. Although their sensitivity ensures that they digest 
and incorporate the accidents of existence, their weak stomaches prevent them 
from embracing a wide and diverse range of experiences. This smallness and 
narrowing of perspective is reflected not only in the Epicurean doctrines, but 
also in their purgative philosophical exercises. 
Philosophical purgatives 
Epicurean practical philosophy is primarily purgative.  Epicurus identifies the 53
sole good, pleasure, with “the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the 
soul,”  and so the attainment of pleasure is more properly the removal of pain 54
and anxiety. Epicurus distinguishes two kinds of pleasure: dynamic pleasures 
that consist in the movement between need and satisfaction (or between 
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sickness and health) and static pleasure that consists in the blissful state which 
results when one is free and secure from pain altogether. The latter of these 
constitutes ataraxia (freedom from disturbance), the prime Epicurean goal. 
This freedom from disturbance is modelled by the Epicurean gods, whose 
divine indifference to worldly concerns frees them from the fears and anxieties 
which plague human existence. 
This tranquillity is a fragile condition. In contrast to the Stoic, who finds 
happiness solely in moral virtue and thus gives no hostage to the external 
world, Epicurus admits some needs as necessary if we are to be happy, to be rid 
of disease and, more fundamentally, to live.  These needs are natural and easy 55
to satisfy, yet, if left untended, will imperil the Epicurean’s happiness. Even 
ensconced in her garden, the Epicurean’s need for food, shelter, and sociality 
are satisfied, but not extinguished. Indeed, the Epicurean’s neediness and what 
Nietzsche calls their “subtle irritability”  are what drive them into the garden. 56
Epicurus’ happiness at quieting his unnecessary desires and carefully tending to 
those that remain is “the happiness of eyes that have seen the sea of existence 
become calm, and now they can never weary of the surface and of the many 
hues of this tender, shuddering skin of the sea".  The tender shuddering of 57
Epicurus’ existence testifies to the vulnerability of his tranquillity. As a 
consequence, the Epicurean way of life requires constant maintenance: a 
perpetual tending to natural desires (and concomitant dynamic pleasure) which 
makes possible the tranquil happiness (and static pleasure) of ataraxia. 
Nietzsche suggests something similar in The Gay Science 288: that a “great 
mood incarnate” would involve “a continual ascent as on stairs and at the 
same time a sense of resting on clouds". The Epicurean is involved in the 
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continual care for her natural desires and, inasmuch as she achieves ataraxia, 
transcends these desires to participate in divine indifference. 
The joy of existence 
Despite the purgative nature of Epicurean philosophical practice, the 
Epicureans maintain that such exercises give access to positive experience of 
happiness or joy. In the Proem to the second book of De Rerum Natura, 
Lucretius describes the serene sanctuaries afforded him by the study of 
philosophy. In particular, he employs the metaphor of spectating a shipwreck. 
The philosopher, secure on dry land, gazes upon the tribulations of others as 
the sea tosses them to and fro. Knowledge, bequeathed to him by Epicurus, 
secures Lucretius from harm and thus grants him the highest happiness: 
But nothing is more delightful than to possess lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by 
the teachings of the wise, whence you may look down upon others and behold them 
all astray  58
Lucretius is careful to distinguish between two kinds of joy granted by 
gazing upon the suffering of others. The first, what we might call the 
experience of Schadenfreude, he explicitly denies. He claims that it is not the 
suffering of others that is delightful in itself, but rather that the suffering of 
others reveals what ills he has secured himself from. Knowledge, for Lucretius, 
affords the philosopher a position of comparative security removed from the 
suffering of the unenlightened multitude. 
He depicts the philosopher as overlooking the sea of existence. Epicurean 
knowledge removes the philosopher from the shuddering surface of troubled 
waters and the unrelenting threat of suffering. The philosopher stands securely 
atop solid and rocky cliffs at shore, while out to sea the multitude is embroiled 
in shipwreck. Thus Lucretius conceives of philosophy’s principle benefit as 
displacement from the passions: not only spatial separation but psychological 
 Lucr 2.7–10.58
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detachment. His static [katastematic] pleasure is the satisfaction of observing 
the trials and tribulations of others, to which, as philosopher, he is not subject. 
When Nietzsche, in GS 45, claims that he has understood Epicurus as no 
one has previously and evokes the image of the shuddering sea of existence, 
placing Epicurus atop the cliff with no shipwreck in sight, we can understand 
this in the context of Lucretius’ use of the metaphor of the shuddering sea. In 
claiming a novel insight into Epicurus, Nietzsche questions the authority of 
Epicurus’ most famous student. Nietzsche’s heterodox reading of Epicurus ends 
with the observation that “never before has voluptuousness [Wollust] been so 
modest”.  Whereas for Lucretius, philosophy guarantees freedom from 59
suffering, Nietzsche paints Epicurus as “a man who was suffering 
continually”.  In Nietzsche’s portrait, Epicurus’ happiness is not grounded in a 60
comparison with the hapless non-philosopher, but the ‘shuddering sea’ of 
existence itself—the ever-present threat of new and returning pains. Nietzsche’s 
point in highlighting the modesty of Epicurus is two-fold. Firstly, he rejects 
Lucretius’ presumptive immodesty or pretension to secure impassivity: the 
Epicurean is sensitive to the accidents of existence as much as the non-
philosopher. As we have seen, this fine-grained sensitivity characterises 
Epicureanism for Nietzsche. Secondly, Nietzsche claims that the state of calm 
which constitutes the Epicurean ideal could only be invented by someone 
experiencing Epicurus’ continual suffering. Epicurean ataraxia belongs to the 
broader Hellenistic ideal of tranquillity—of “stillness, mildness, patience, 
medicine, balm in some sense” —which trades away the value of the passions 61
in return for a calm and quiet life. Epicurus’ notion of happiness betrays a 
 GS 45.59
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modest appreciation for the passions, inasmuch as he maintains a passionate 
sensitivity, but Nietzsche desires more. 
Nietzsche returns to the metaphor of seafaring and shipwreck repeatedly in 
The Gay Science. In GS 124, Nietzsche alludes to the recently announced (in 
GS 108) death of God, after which “we have left the land and have embarked 
[…] there is no longer any ‘land’”.  Nietzsche again denies the possibility of 62
the secure Lucretian standpoint and mocks those who “feel homesick for the 
land as if it had offered you more freedom”.  As Blumenberg shows, 63
Nietzsche pushes this metaphor further, through the experience of a shipwreck 
“in which the artificial vehicle of self-deception and self-assurance was long 
since smashed to pieces”  and then to newly discovered dry land: 64
Terra firma is not the position of the spectator, but rather that of the man rescued from 
shipwreck; its firmness is experienced wholly out of the sense of the unlikelihood that 
such a thing should be attainable at all.  65
Nietzsche begins 1887’s book five of The Gay Science with a section titled 
“the meaning of our cheerfulness [Heiterkeit]”—that after the news of the 
death of God, “at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to 
face any danger” of which presumably the most likely is shipwreck.  In 66
Nietzsche’s use of the metaphor of seafaring and shipwreck, and his 
counterposition of his own ideal to the tranquil spectatorship of Epicurus, we 
see that an essential component of Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy is an 
appreciation of, an engagement with, and even an adventure through the 
passions. 
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The “spiritual joyfulness” that finds pleasure in existence is an attractive 
sentiment for Nietzsche.  Epicurus’ practical philosophy aims at a happiness 67
that is free from metaphysical commitments or concerns over ultimate 
convictions, and for this reason Nietzsche admits he looks like an Epicurean.  68
Yet Epicurus has little time for adventure or the world outside his garden. 
Rather, he is concerned only with relieving his own pain, a concern Nietzsche 
diagnoses as appropriate only for “a man who was continually suffering".  69
The needs served by Epicureanism come, not from a superfluity of life, which 
Nietzsche’s cheerfulness in the 1880s celebrates, but from its impoverishment, 
seeking “rest, stillness, calm seas, [and] redemption from” himself.  His needs, 70
both bodily and of the mind, are modest, satisfied by little cheeses and 
deliverance from fear. 
In section 349 of Assorted Opinions and Maxims we find another 
evocative, literary depiction of the Epicurean temperament, described as the 
“freezing point of the will”:   71
“Finally, one day, it arrives, the hour that will envelop you in a golden cloud free from 
pain: where your soul takes pleasure in its own fatigue and, happy in a playing patiently 
with its own patience, is like the waves of a lake that lap at the shore on a calm summer 
day in the reflect glow of a brightly coloured evening sky, lap again, and then grow still
—without end, without purpose, without being sated, without need—wholly at peace, 
while rejoicing in change, wholly absorbed in the ebb and flow to the pulse of nature”  72
Nietzsche indicates that this tranquil pleasure of the afternoon is “the 
feeling and language of all invalids”.  The Epicurean enjoyment of repose, 73
rather than granting lasting happiness, eventually gives way to boredom. He 
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concludes that this boredom, dissatisfaction with restfulness, is the prospect of 
a “thawing breeze for the frozen will”.  He conceives of his own boredom 74
with Stoic and Epicurean therapies a sign of coming convalescence. 
Nietzsche considers the emergence of a immodest, voluptuous cheerfulness 
in his work as synonymous with his return to health.  In the coming chapters I 75
make sense of this anti-Hellenistic stance through the lens of a recuperation of 
eros. This requires, in chapter three, a consideration of Nietzsche’s relationship 
to Plato through a reading of The Symposium. 
 AOM 349.74
 GS P 1.75
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3. Platonic Ascent: The Metaphysical Pathology 
Both the Stoics and Epicureans practice a philosophy of caution against the 
passions.  Stoic apatheia and Epicurean ataraxia are instances of the 1
tranquillity celebrated by all the Hellenistic schools in the period Nietzsche 
dubs the “afternoon of antiquity”.  Nietzsche makes clear, as I have shown in 2
the two preceding chapters, that this ideal is not his own. Rather than the 
diminution of the passions, Nietzsche envisions their proliferation and 
intensification in order to open up “new galaxies of joy”.  In this chapter I set 3
the scene for Nietzsche’s anti-Hellenistic recuperation of the passions through 
an examination of passionate love as it appears in Plato’s Symposium. 
If Nietzsche in The Gay Science laments what he sees as the timidity of the 
schools of late antiquity, it may be suggested that his recuperation of the 
passions marks a return to the birth of philosophy. And if Nietzsche conceives 
the philosopher as a practitioner of eros, this places him in close company with 
Plato, who in the Symposium depicts love as proper task of the philosopher.  4
Nevertheless, the most appropriate object of philosophical love according to 
Plato is the stable and eternal form of the good. Plato’s love leads the 
philosopher into the metaphysical realm, and if Nietzsche is to adopt Plato’s 
erotic orientation, he must find a way to avoid following Plato into 
metaphysics. 
In this chapter I explicate Plato’s treatment of love in the Symposium. I 
elucidate Plato’s concept of philosophy as the highest form of love and Socrates 
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as an example of the best kind of lover. I connect the Platonic account of desire 
with Schopenhauer, before explaining how Schopenhauer’s rejection of 
transcendence leads to him to resignation. On Schopenhauer’s account, eros 
necessarily fails to find satisfaction. Nietzsche considers Schopenhauerian 
pessimism the historical culmination and logical extension of Platonism. 
Noting the consequent necessary failure of the Platonic erotic pedagogy, 
Nietzsche attempts an anti-Platonic, anti-Schopenhauerian renovation of eros 
and the passions, which I will consider in chapter four. 
In chapter four, I argue that Nietzsche is aware of the danger posed by 
Platonic idealism, and draws on the Provençal concept of gaia scienza and the 
supposed “invention” of a passionate, secular notion of love in order to arrest 
a slide to metaphysics.  Contrary to the wretched state of the impassioned 5
lover depicted in the Symposium redeemed only by transcending the mortal 
realm, the love of the troubadours “encouraged self-sufficiency among human 
beings”.  The title of Nietzsche’s Gay Science recalls both the art of the 6
troubadours, and the more modern, scientific, demands of intellectual probity
—Nietzsche’s Redlichkeit—which compels him to naturalism. Nietzsche’s 
science owes much to, but exceeds, the naturalism of modern science. While 
modern science aspires to describe the world “objectively”, free from the 
distortions and falsifications of perspective, Nietzsche’s gay science is centrally 
concerned with the problem of value. It portends the question “whether science 
can furnish goals of action”.  The task which Nietzsche sets the gay science is 7
to cultivate passionate attachments to worldly objects through careful 
attention.  His naturalistic disposition enables him to read value in the world 8
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without becoming deceived into Platonic idealism; his philosophical ascent is 
not an escape from nature, but a return.  9
Nietzsche thus situates himself between the Stoics, who oppose and 
subordinate the passions to reason, and Plato, whose passionate devotion to 
the form of the good culminates in a flight from the world. He attempts a 
theory of value which denies that objects are “beautiful, attractive, and 
desirable” in themselves, but nevertheless sustains passionate attachment to 
such objects. I argue that the resulting account gives Nietzsche a collection of 
techniques for cultivating and training the passions in accordance with the 
promotion of human flourishing. As Nietzsche concludes in GS 334, “love, too, 
has to be learned”.  10
On graduating from boarding school in 1864, Nietzsche named the 
Symposium as his favourite ancient text.  The same year he had written an 11
essay on the work titled “On the relationship of Alcibiades’ speech to the other 
speeches in Plato’s Symposium” and around 1875 would write in a note that 
“Socrates, simply to confess it, stands so near to me, that I almost always fight 
a battle with him”.  In The Gay Science, Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as 12
a species of love and in particular as the highest form of love. Plato too 
conceives philosophy as the treatment of eros, and nowhere is this made more 
explicit than in the figure of Socrates in the Symposium. But if Nietzsche and 
Plato share the orientation of philosophy towards the treatment and perfection 
of eros, this similarity also explains their bitter rivalry as to how eros should be 
philosophically trained. As Cooper notes, “Nietzsche seeks to take on Plato—
and seeks to rival Plato by following Plato’s way in the pursuit of a decidedly 
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non-Platonic end”.  Cooper’s claim is that Nietzsche proposes the will to 13
power as a unifying account of human striving and, like Plato with eros, 
purports to have hit upon “the ‘thing’ in which it finds fullest satisfaction”.  14
But whereas Plato finds the highest expression of eros in metaphysical 
contemplation, Nietzsche spurns metaphysics. According to Cooper, the ‘thing’ 
in which the will to power finds its fullest satisfaction is the eternal recurrence 
of all things. The end point of Nietzsche’s philosophical treatment of desire is 
that one “crave[s] nothing more fervently” than the recurrence of the very same 
life.   15
What follows is a consideration of the Symposium to the extent necessary 
to illuminate Nietzsche’s rejection of Plato’s metaphysics of love and his 
concurrent adoption of a therapeutic model of philosophy. While incomplete, 
this reading is sufficient to explain Nietzsche’s objection to the metaphysical 
therapy of eros. 
Framing the Symposium 
The Symposium opens with Apollodorus, a follower of Socrates, responding to 
an unnamed questioner. Apollodorus’s friend has asked for an account of a 
party hosted by the tragic poet Agathon, involving Socrates and Alcibiades, 
where the three and others gave speeches on the topic of love. It turns out that 
Apollodorus is well prepared to give such an account, having recently 
recounted the party’s speeches to Glaucon (who also appears as an interlocutor 
in the Republic). This framing illuminates how Plato’s audience would have 
read the seven speeches that make up the bulk of the dialogue. That Alcibiades 
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is included amongst the speakers on love is surprising, since he joins the party 
only after the other speeches have concluded. He enters, drunk, with a band of 
revellers. Rather than speaking in praise of love, Alcibiades professes to “speak 
the truth” in praise of Socrates.  Alcibiades is a “manifest lover”, according to 16
Cooper, in that rather than simply offering a speech about love, he 
“unambiguously demonstrate[s] or act[s] upon it before our eyes”.  The 17
“truth” which Alcibiades speaks and enacts is the lover who is afflicted by his 
passions. The twenty-year-old Nietzsche of 1864 concurs: the figure of 
Alcibiades in the Symposium “illustrate[s] the effect of love for beauty on the 
actual life of men”.  His arrival heralds “the turning point of the artistic 18
drama and philosophy toward reality”.  Alcibiades represents the actual 19
afflicted lover and with him the task of the Symposium—to treat the unruly 
passions—becomes most clear. 
Socrates and Agathon give the final two speeches before Alcibiades’ 
entrance. They receive the highest applause, with only the comic poet 
Aristophanes objecting after Socrates concludes. The contest between their 
accounts—love of the beautiful and love of the good—is, according to Strauss, 
“the great theme of the Symposium”.  But not only do Agathon and Socrates 20
present contrasting accounts of love, they represent two factions of Athenian 
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society. While the speech of Socrates is the centrepiece of the dialogue, the 
preceding five speeches give voice to “the mythic and traditional conceptions 
[of love] prevalent in Greek society”—they lay the foundation upon which 
Socrates builds and to which he reacts.  And, although perhaps “all Platonic 21
wisdom”  resides in the definition that “love is desire for the perpetual 22
possession of the good”,  the accounts of desire and of the good which 23
unfolds through the first five speeches are essential for grasping Plato’s final 
position. One of Plato’s primary concerns, here as elsewhere, is to distinguish 
philosophy from existing cultural traditions in the Athenian polis, and 
furthermore to establish its supremacy. Socrates represents the insurgent 
philosophical tradition. Agathon, on the other hand, stands for tragic poetry, 
philosophy’s strongest opponent. The role of Socrates’ speech in the 
Symposium, is to establish philosophy as an alternative account of love and its 
perfection to those represented by the other speakers, especially Agathon the 
poet who views love as the desire for the beautiful. The central dispute in the 
Symposium, and Plato draws our attention to this fact in the opening 
conversation, is the so-called quarrel between philosophy and poetry, declared 
in the Republic.  24
Agathon is not the only poet at the party, however, and not even the poet 
who speaks best or in strongest opposition to Socrates.  Aristophanes, rather 25
than Agathon, gives the strongest speech against Socrates’ philosophical eros. 
While Plato presents the Symposium as primarily a contest between Agathon 
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and Socrates (by putting these two names in the mouth of Apollodorus’ friend), 
the more contentious quarrel takes place between Socrates and Aristophanes. 
Alcibiades the patient 
At issue in the quarrel between Socrates and the poets is the treatment of the 
passions. Rosen casts the quarrel in terms of the effects of philosophy and 
poetry on desire: 
The quarrel amounts to this: poetry encourages desire, and hence the will. It encourages 
production for the sake of satisfying the desires, or in other words defines completeness 
as satisfaction. Philosophy, on the other hand, advocates the restriction of the desires or 
the transformation of desire in accord with the definition of completeness as wisdom.  26
Both poetry and philosophy, according to Rosen, are responses to the feeling of 
incompleteness brought about by desire. Each soothes this painful feeling by 
promoting a distinct notion of completeness. For poetry, completeness is the 
satisfaction of desire or the attainment of the desired object. Because the 
satisfaction of desire depends on the attainment of objects outside of one’s 
control, the poetic account of completeness consigns individuals to a life where 
their happiness is hostage to the chancy outside world. Poetry, by encouraging 
desire, disrupts the rational control of one’s life. Philosophy, in contrast, takes 
the complete life to be one which is rationally directed. Since desire disrupts the 
exercise of rational control over one’s life, according to Plato, desire is an 
impediment to completeness. The object of philosophy is the transform desire 
so that one can gain rational control over one’s life. 
In the Symposium, Alcibiades manifests the desirous lover. The intoxication 
of his love for Socrates underscores the fact that he is not in rational control of 
his life. Socrates offers Alcibiades a philosophical treatment of desire through 
which he might regain rational control of his life. Plato’s selection of the 
 Stanley Rosen, The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry (New York and London: 26
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dramatic dates of the dialogue—the timing of Apollodorus’ conversations and 
of the party itself—serve to draw further attention to the figure of Alcibiades. 
Nussbaum sets the date of Apollodorus’ two conversations, first with 
Glaucon and then with his unnamed friend, in 404 BCE.  In the closing years 27
of the fifth century BCE, Athens was on the verge of military defeat with 
seemingly the only hope for victory over Sparta and the restoration of 
democracy being the return of Alcibiades. The year 404 BCE is also the date of 
production for Aristophanes’ Frogs, wherein he “testifies to the fear that not 
only political freedom, but poetic speech as well, are on the verge of 
extinction”.  In this tense political situation, Critias—Plato’s uncle and an 28
associate of Socrates—leads the pro-Spartan, anti-democratic thirty tyrants to 
power, with the assassination of Alcibiades abroad soon to follow.  
Agathon’s party itself occurs in early 416 BCE, on the occasion of his first 
victory at the dramatic festival.  This date too evokes memories of Alcibiades. 29
The following year, Alcibiades was implicated in two religious scandals: the 
mutilation of statues of Hermes and profaning the Eleusinian mysteries at a 
drunken meeting.  Alcibiades was tried and found guilty in absentia, while on 30
an ill-fated military expedition, and these scandals served for the Athenians as 
“the most egregious case of Alcibiades' lack of control over his actions, the 
recklessness and emotional disorder that were seen constantly to undercut his 
 Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium,” 27
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genius”.  The events of 415 BCE led to Alcibiades long exile and ultimately to 31
his assassination in 404 BCE. 
Plato ties these two events together—the scandal of 415 BCE and the 
disastrous conclusion to Alcibiades’ long exile in 404 BCE. Alcibiades was 
offered a therapy of his pernicious desires in 416 BCE. He failed to heed 
Socrates’ therapy, and so a decade of estrangement from Athens culminated in 
the calamity of his death in 404 BCE. Contemporary readers of the Symposium 
could not have overlooked Alcibiades’ need for the therapy which Socrates 
supplies. 
Three uninspired speeches 
Six speeches on love are recorded before Alcibiades’ raucous entrance to 
Agathon’s party. The first three, from Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus, 
are what Strauss calls the dialogue’s “uninspired” speeches.  The three praise 32
love in terms of the human goods it might grant. Phaedrus, the first speaker, 
claims that love is the oldest god and “the source of our greatest blessings”.  33
Pausanias praises love as the source of virtue and lawfulness in the city. 
Eryximachus expands the scope of love to all endeavours—love is that which 
brings about the reconciliation of opposites in any skilful profession [techne]. 
For all three speakers, love is praised as instrumentally useful for attaining 
some other good. Love is the best means to personal gain, civic virtue, and 
technical prowess. But, as Agathon later complains,  when the first three 34
speakers praise love for its instrumental value, they overlook the nature of love 
itself.  
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Aristophanes makes a similar point when he jokes at Eryximachus’ expense 
at line 189a. Aristophanes was to speak before Eryximachus, but was unable to 
because of an attack of hiccups. Eryximachus, the doctor, offers both to speak 
in his place and prescribes a number of treatments for his hiccups: first to hold 
his breath, to gargle water, and, if the first two treatments fail, to tickle his own 
nose.  Eryximachus praises the power of love to reconcile opposites—it 35
produces “harmony and a blending in right proportions [sophron]”.  At the 36
conclusion of Eryximachus’ speech, Aristophanes exclaims that his hiccups 
have been cured, but only when “the sneeze was applied to it”.  Aristophanes 37
wonders whether “the orderliness [kosmion] of the body desires these 
[disorderly] kinds of noises and ticklings”.  He suggests that love, even if it 38
aims at orderliness in the body, achieves its ends through disorderly, ugly, and 
base means. That love is instrumentally valuable does not guarantee its nobility 
in itself. This is the first indication that love might involve a mixture of higher 
and lower properties. 
Aristophanes’ joke marks the transition from the first three “uninspired” 
speeches to his own, Agathon’s, and Socrates’ “inspired” speeches. When he 
jokes at Eryximachus, Aristophanes (as a writer of comic poetry) refers to his 
art as a muse [moûsa] in contrast to Eryximachus’ skill [techne]. The meaning 
of this distinction is that the musician is divinely inspired, while the technician 
is not.  39
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Love of the same 
Aristophanes’ account is intimately concerned with the bodily contingencies of 
love. His account takes seriously the experience that one has of love for a 
single particular individual and the danger passionate attachment to such an 
individual poses to our happiness. According to Aristophanes, lovers desire “to 
join with and melt into” a particular beloved.  The path to happiness depends 40
on finding this individual, “which rarely happens at the present time”.  Like 41
many of the other speakers, he poses his account of love in the form of a 
mythic story. According to the tale he spins, humans were originally large 
spherical creatures with four arms, four legs, and a pair of faces on a single 
circular head. Each individual had a pair of reproductive organs, and each of 
these was either male or female, so that the individual had either two male 
organs, two female, or one of each. Thus these creatures were divided into 
three sexes. The two faces of each individual were oriented outwards, towards 
the being’s two dorsal surfaces, as were the creature’s genitals. These 
primordial humans were twice the size and strength of humans today, and were 
so powerful as to threaten the gods. Rather than annihilate the primordial 
humans in defence and lose the worship and sacrifices they provided, Zeus 
decided to slice each creature in half such that the newly formed individuals 
have half the limbs, a single face, and supposedly pose no threat to the gods. 
Zeus then asked Apollo to heal the wounds produced on the newly fashioned 
humans’ abdomens, gathering their skin together into the navel “like a purse 
with a drawstring”.  Apollo additionally rearranged the newly created 42
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humans’ faces so that they are oriented towards the abdominal scar, so that the 
sight of it reminds them to behave in moderation and obedience to the gods. 
Love, according to Aristophanes, is the nostalgic yearning each person has 
for this lost primordial unity. Affection [philia], intimacy [oikeiotes], and love 
[eros] overcome those who happen upon their other half: a pair, once reunited, 
will happily spend the rest of their lives in an embrace, imitating the nature of 
their originary whole by holding each other at the abdomen. Pairs who had 
reunited in this manner—so goes Aristophanes’ story—would not separate 
even to eat. Out of pity, and to prevent the humans trapped in a loving 
embrace from starving, Zeus moves the reproductive organs (hitherto in their 
original orientation on the new humans’ backs) so that an embrace would 
subsequently beget new individuals through sexual activity. Aristophanes 
explains that thereby each of the pair “might achieve satisfaction from the 
union and after this respite turn to their tasks and get on with the business of 
life”.  43
Three principal characteristics emerge from Aristophanes’ account. Firstly, 
he allows the bodily and the base into love’s characteristic activity. Love arises 
out of the “painfully needy” body and the hope that these needs might be met 
through the “peculiar, or even grotesque” interpenetration of another.  While 44
sexual activity grants temporary reprieve from the needs of the body, they soon 
return to distract the lover from the “business of life”.  Mere interpenetration 45
cannot re-establish the two lovers’ originary unity; only the god Hephaestus 
could do that. Secondly, Aristophanes’ love leaves the lover radically exposed 
to contingency. One loves a single other, and happening upon the right 
individual is an extreme piece of luck. Even if one does find the right individual 
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this momentary success is fragile, subject to the threats of loss or jealousy. 
Lastly, there is a question over what might become of desire if one’s originary 
whole were to be restored. Nussbaum suggests that were Hephaestus to join 
two lovers completely, the result would be “a wholeness that would put an end 
to all movement and all passion”.  Indeed, this is what, according to 46
Aristophanes, the lovers would profess—no one, having heard Hephaestus’ 
offer, “would deny them or would admit to wanting anything else”.  Yet 47
Aristophanes also describes the behaviour of the original spherical creatures, 
and they do not resemble Nussbaum’s static and emotionless artefact. The 
progenitors of humans were ambitious and impious. Indeed, Zeus’s order to 
separate them was motivated by the fear that they would rebel against the 
gods. If the reunion of two lovers is the achievement of their original unity, 
then the reunited lovers would presumably regain their Promethean ambition 
against the gods. Thus for Aristophanes, the motive power of love is not 
quelled or exhausted by communion with the beloved, but continues 
excessively beyond such narrow bounds.  48
In Aristophanes’ tale this never occurs, because a union of two individuals 
necessarily eludes us as post-separation humans. Aristophanes’ warning that 
the unruly passions will eventually lead to profanity would be read by Plato’s 
contemporary readers, as mentioned, in light of the accusation that shortly 
after the party Alcibiades would deface the statues of Hermes.  This is not the 49
only parallel between Aristophanes’ account and the figure of Alcibiades. 
Alcibiades speaks about love by praising Socrates, because his experience of 
love is of a single individual, who affects him like no other. Alcibiades’ “entire 
 Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” 144.46
 Symp. 192e.47
 Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 68.48
 Nussbaum, “The Speech of Alcibiades,” 138.49
 73
speech is an attempt to grasp and communicate that uniqueness, to make 
credible and imaginable for us an experience and a feeling that is by its nature 
difficult to describe”.  Alcibiades love of Socrates, that individual who he 50
praises as “completely unlike any other human being who has ever lived”,  is 51
of a kind with Aristophanes’ account. 
Aristophanes concludes by counselling piety, that one should arrest the 
excesses of love out of fear or respect for the gods. But as the Symposium’s 
reader would be aware, Alcibiades failed to heed this prescription, and suffered 
greatly for his irreverence. 
Love of the beautiful 
Agathon’s “pretty but unmistakably superficial”  speech is the first to set out 52
to praise the character of love itself, before making an appraisal of its human 
effects. As noted, he complains that the forerunning speeches have focused 
exclusively on love’s utility for humans. But if Agathon’s speech is novel in 
form, its content recycles the accolades the previous speakers have already 
announced: love is graceful,  just,  possessing self-control [sophrosune],  53 54 55
brave,  and wise in the arts [moûsa];  love is “not only supreme in beauty 56 57
and goodness himself but is also the source of beauty and goodness in all other 
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things”.  Agathon’s praise of love culminates in verse that encapsulates the 58
first three speeches’ unbridled veneration of love, that love creates 
Peace among humankind, windless calm on the open sea,  
Rest for the winds and sleep in sorrow.  59
The first five speeches set the scene for the centrepiece of the Symposium, 
the speech of Socrates. The young Nietzsche of 1864 summarises the first five 
speeches as offering an account of love as “love of the Beautiful, a natural law 
aimed at producing the Good”, an account “not substantially different” from 
the one which Socrates will go on to give.  Before moving to Socrates’ speech, 60
it is worthwhile to summarise the problems for an analysis of love thrown up 
by the first five speeches, to which Socrates will respond. Three of these are of 
particular importance in this chapter: i) the nature of love, ii) the object of 
love, and iii) the relationship with the world that love instils in the lover. First, 
as Agathon rightly points out, the nature of love is a neglected topic in the first 
four speeches. Agathon’s posits that love’s nature is supremely beautiful and 
good. As noted, however, when Aristophanes makes a joke at Eryximachus’ 
expense, he suggests that love involves a mixture of higher and lower 
properties. We can read Aristophanes as contesting the other speakers’ 
veneration of love as supremely noble in itself. Socrates spends a great deal of 
time arguing, against Agathon, that love is not beautiful, and involves a 
movement between higher and lower properties. The object of love is covered 
explicitly by each of the first five speeches, either a well-ordered arrangement, 
recuperation into a whole, or in Agathon’s view, beauty and goodness 
themselves. This is the second point on which to analyse Socrates’ speech. The 
third problem posed is the relationship between the lover and the sensuous life 
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of the body. In Aristophanes’ speech, base sexual desire functions to arrest the 
excess of love, while in Agathon’s, love overcomes the brutish existence ruled—
prior to its advent—by bare necessity. In all five speeches, love is an alternative 
to and an escape from the vulgarities of the sensuous. Since the everyday 
meaning of eros in Ancient Greece was, as its modern English cognates remain, 
intimately tied to sexual desire,  this aversion to the sensuous goes towards 61
distinguishing a specifically philosophical love. With these three problems in 
mind we will now turn to Socrates’s speech. 
Socrates’ love of wisdom 
Socrates begins his speech by warning that he will not be able to offer the same 
unequivocal praise for love as the previous speakers, but only the truth.  And 62
if Aristophanes gave voice to the baseness and fragility of the common 
experience of love, Socrates’ account will be markedly revisionary. Socrates 
promises a love which escapes the Aristophanic predicament—the vulnerability 
of human erotic aspiration to the transient nature of its object. Socrates claims 
that this vulnerability stems from a failure to account for the true nature and 
object of love and that, properly understood, the highest lover can achieve 
stable and lasting happiness through the love of eternal and unchanging forms. 
By climbing Plato’s ladder of love, the lover of the individual and particular 
might be cured of these attachments, and learn a love which grants self-
sufficient and unshakeable happiness.  
The nature of philosophy 
Socrates first rejects that love itself is good or beautiful. Putting the object of 
love to the side, he identifies love as a kind of desire and, by means of an 
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interrogation of Agathon, draws a number of conclusions. First, desire depends 
on the absence of its object: “there is no desire if there is no lack”,  since a 63
desire ceases if it is satisfied by possession of its object. There is an apparent 
counterexample in the situation when, for instance, a healthy person desires to 
be healthy, or someone with particular attributes “also desire[s] to have the 
attributes they have”.  Socrates answers that in such a case, what is desired is 64
not simply to possess a certain attribute, but to possess that attribute into the 
future. The healthy person desires to continue being healthy and desire, in 
general, is for the continued possession of an object. 
There is a riddle as to why, if love is devoid of beauty, as Socrates argues, it 
nevertheless takes beauty as its object. In his opening remarks he takes this 
thought from Agathon; in the body of his speech, he provides an explanation 
given to him by the priestess Diotima. According to Diotima, love is neither 
beautiful nor ugly, but an intermediary between the two, in the same way as 
correct belief exists at a midpoint between ignorance and wisdom (which 
requires both correct belief and a reasoned justification thereof). Diotima 
explains love’s intermediary nature through a story concerning its parentage. 
While Phaedrus called love the eldest of the gods and Agathon named it the 
youngest, Diotima disputes that love is a god at all. Instead, love is the child of 
Poros [resource] and Penia [poverty]. Because it is the child of poverty, love 
lacks the beautiful, but because it is the child of resource, it is always 
“scheming to get what is beautiful and good”.  Because of this fact of its 65
birth, love is neither mortal nor godly, but daemonic—in an intermediary 
position between the mortal and the divine. 
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While this is a novel conception for Socrates within the setting of the 
Symposium, the notion that love involves an intermediary principle is not new 
in Greek thought. Carson discovers this idea in a poem from Sappho, two 
centuries before Plato.  The consequence of the intermediary nature of love 66
for Carson, and for Socrates in the Symposium, is to give love a dynamic 
character. Platonic eros is not the “windless calm” praised by Agathon, but a 
movement between lover and beloved. Additionally for Socrates, love is an 
inspired movement—the lover is daimonios according to Diotima; that is, 
inspired by the divine.  The same notion of love appears in the Phaedrus, 67
where Socrates praises it as an “inspired madness” which is “given by the 
gods”.  68
At a practical level, love as a daimon affects the lover as a “frenzy […] of 
heavenly origin”.  In speaking of the ‘demonic’ character of love, Plato 69
describes the way in which passionate engagements exceed and escape the 
control of sober, non-inspired deliberation. To speak of the philosopher as a 
lover, then, implies that the pursuit of wisdom is one such passionate 
engagement. 
In order to distinguish philosophical wisdom from the disruptive and 
harmful passions which afflict, for examples, Alcibiades, Plato must explain 
how a philosophical love might conduce to rational self control. The passions 
disrupt practical reason by holding the course of one’s life hostage to fragile 
and transient objects. If Plato can find a stable and omnipresent object of 
desire, he dissolves the difficulties of loving such fallible things. He finds 
precisely this in the divine form of the good—an eternal, unchanging object the 
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desire of which allows him to rationally order his life. Socrates frees himself 
and others of passions for mortal objects by cultivating a singular devotion to 
the good. 
The object of philosophy  
There is an ambiguity in Socrates’ speech: whether the object of love is the 
beautiful, as Agathon held, or the good. At first, Socrates borrows the notion 
that the object of love is the beautiful from Agathon during their initial 
dialogue, 
“I think you said something like this, that the interests of the gods were established by 
reason of their love of beautiful things; for there is no love of ugly things, you said. 
Didn’t you say something like this?”  70
This notion continues into Socrates’ speech proper, the retelling of his 
dialogue with Diotima. At 204c, Diotima calls the object of love “supremely 
beautiful”. Yet soon after, she draws a distinction between love of the beautiful 
and love of the good. When Socrates expresses confusion at what securing 
possession of the beautiful might grant the lover, Diotima shifts the discussion
—“imagine that the object is changed, and the inquiry is made about the good 
instead of the beautiful”.  This is an easier question for Socrates to answer: 71
secure possession of the good grants happiness to its possessor. This line of 
reasoning leads Diotima to claim that “the only thing people love is the good” 
and ultimately to conclude that “love is the desire to possess the good 
always”.  72
Socrates does not thereby abandon the beautiful in favour of the good. 
Immediately after concluding that “love is the desire to possess the good 
always”, Diotima returns to a consideration of love as desiring what is 
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beautiful. Even at the culmination of Socrates’ speech, he calls the object of the 
philosopher’s contemplation “beauty itself”.  Socrates’ speech “begins with a 73
refutation of the assertion that love is of the beautiful and it ends with an 
unbelievable reassertion that love is love of the beautiful”.  74
Between these two assertions, Socrates fine-tunes the role the beautiful plays 
in love. Love is the desire, not just of the good, but of its perpetual possession. 
In order to possess the good perpetually, one must also desire some kind of 
immortality, since death dispossess us.  Diotima describes a number of ways 75
in which mortal humans might achieve a kind of immortality: through rearing 
offspring, through fame, or through giving birth to the ‘offspring’ of the soul—
wisdom and virtue.  The path to all three forms of immortality is through 76
“continual generation”.  According to Diotima, generation is only possible in 77
the presence of the beautiful, and so the presence of the beautiful is necessary 
for the reproduction of the good. The ultimate goal of philosophical love is to 
give birth to and nurture true virtue: 
When he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue it is possible for him to be loved 
by the gods and to become, if any human can, immortal himself.  78
Love, then—procreation in the presence of the beautiful—is the means by 
which mortals might live well. Philosophy posits the eternal form of the good 
as an object of desire in order that its followers can avoid the dangers of 
passionate attachment to (however beautiful) objects in the world. To “have an 
object of love and understanding that is perfectly unchanging and always 
available to be loved and contemplated” enables the philosopher to direct her 
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life in a manner which the passions, supposedly, make impossible.  This is the 79
distinction between philosophy and poetry which Rosen drew, above, that 
philosophy “advocates the […] transformation of desire in accord with the 
definition of completeness as wisdom” or practical reason.  80
Diotima achieves a reconciliation of sorts between poetry (which loves the 
beautiful) and philosophy (which loves the good) “by interpreting the beautiful 
as an instrument or means to the good”.  Again, recalling that the quarrel 81
between philosophy and poetry in fifth-century Athens is a central theme of the 
Symposium, we can interpret this reconciliation politically. Plato depicts a 
settlement whereby poetry, and especially tragic poetry, could be used for 
philosophical ends. Socrates’ expulsion of the poetry from the city in the 
Republic is made on the grounded of poetry’s intemperance with desire. He 
excludes the “pleasure-seasoned Muse” for replacing the rule of nomos with 
the rule of pleasure and pain.  Yet, “if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show 82
any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit 
her”.  If poetry can be reformed of its harmful relationship with desire, it may 83
be admitted back to the city. As Rosen observers, “Socrates does not actually, 
despite his explicit statement to that effect, expel poetry from his city but 
rather subordinates it to philosophy. […] the philosopher must imitate the poet 
‘for the benefit of the city’”.  84
 Such a possibility is realised in the Symposium itself. Plato exhibits great 
literary skill in its production—the dialogue is poetic—but the dialogue serves 
not only to beautify the life of Socrates, but also to draw the readers’ eyes 
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towards the good, so that by “[fixing their] gaze upon the things of the eternal 
and unchanging order” the reader “will [themselves] become orderly and divine 
in the measure permitted to man”.  85
The life of the Socratic lover 
This account of love as the desire for the perpetual possession of the good gives 
rise to a particular way of life. This way of life is exemplified by Socrates as the 
dialogue’s fourth manifest lover and its only lover of wisdom. 
Plato foreshadows his account of the highest form of love as contemplation 
in his depiction of Socrates and Aristodemus on their way to Agathon's house. 
At some point, Socrates falls behind, becoming “absorbed in his own 
thoughts”.  Later, having made his way nearly to Agathon's door, he again 86
stops in thought, deaf to Agathon's attendants who beckon him to enter. 
Socrates is additionally praised for his capacity to drink without getting 
drunk,  walk over frost without footwear,  and resist Alcibiades’ sexual 87 88
advances.  Socrates seems able to escape the intoxication, painful compulsion, 89
and temptation others would suffer in the same situations. In each of these 
cases, the ill can be traced to the body, and Socrates’ success against it to the 
“psychological distance” between himself and his body as an object in the 
world.  In these moments Socrates shows his capacity for detachment and 90
becomes, as Nussbaum notes, “actually forgetful” of the world.  Similarly he 91
avoids the pains and distractions of passionate engagement to objects in the 
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world, thus freeing himself from the danger of unhappiness threatened by their 
transience and frailty. This is the image of Socrates—self-sufficient and 
impervious to the outside world—which so seduces Apollodorus, Aristodemus, 
and Alcibiades. Socrates escapes the danger of passionate attachment to 
transient physical objects by directing his eros towards the stable and ever-
present form of the good.  
Socrates’ speech is a lesson in how to attain such a state. He presents an 
ascent from the lowest desire of a beautiful body, to beauty in many bodies, in 
souls, in science and the arts, until eventually one desires “the vast sea of the 
beautiful” itself.  Importantly, the first rung on this ladder of love is merely 92
the narrowest expression of the highest. The lowest lover loves another 
individual because, according to Plato, the beautiful individual participates in 
absolute beauty: for Plato “the lower that must be interpreted in light of the 
higher”.  Thus, shaking off attachment to any particular individual, even one 93
as striking as Socrates, is a way of ascending to a higher form of love. 
Each step in the ascent is a sublimation of the lower desire into the higher.  94
In the Republic, Plato likens the upwards redirection of desire to a channeling 
of erotic energies.  The ascendant lover gradually transforms the love of 95
objects in the world to more and more abstract objects, until striking upon an 
object which transcends the physical world altogether. At the first step, a lover 
becomes enamoured with another individual body: 
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Then he will realise for himself that the beauty of any one body is closely akin to that 
of any other body, and that if what is beautiful in form is to be pursued it is folly not to 
regard the beauty in all bodies as one and the same.  96
As Nussbaum observes, the first step on the ladder is a decision made on 
the basis of prudential reasoning.  It would be folly to remain attached to a 97
single particular object, and so one should recognise other beauties, which 
resemble the object of one’s desire, to be “one and the same”. This redirection 
of desire, from the singular to the plural, diminishes the grip the first object has 
over our happiness: 
When he has understood this he should slacken his intense passion for one body, 
despising it and considering it a small thing, and become a lover of all beautiful 
bodies.  98
The motive for starting the ascent (which means the motive of philosophy) 
is the inadequacy of untrained desire, which surrenders our happiness to 
transient objects beyond our control. In such a condition we have “the feeling 
that we are not what we ought to be”.  Alcibiades admits that listening to 99
Socrates convinces him that “[his] kind of life [is] not worth living”.  On 100
Plato’s account, worldly existence is marked by the lack of the only thing that 
would grant us secure happiness, the divine form of the good. 
Nevertheless, the form of the good provides a stable object of desire which 
allows us to regain rational control of ourselves and our lives. The rational life 
secures its practitioner from the “misery and the irrational tumult of personal 
erotic need”.  The philosopher achieves this security through gradually 101
removing himself from the “mortal dross” of the natural world.  Not only 102
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does he abandon passionate attachments to worldly objects, in doing so he 
professes to transcend the mortal world itself and to partake in the immortality 
of the gods.  He eschews all that attaches to organic life—its embodiment, 103
transience, and perspectival character—in favour of attachment to the eternal 
and universal forms. This attachment frees the philosopher from the anxiety of 
depending on anything in the natural world. The desire for perpetual 
communion with the eternal forms is only realised once the philosopher has 
purified himself of all natural attachments. In its most extreme case, this means 
purifying himself of life itself. Hence Socrates’ last words in the Phaedo that he 
owes Asclepius, the god of medicine, a rooster.  A rooster was sacrificed to 104
Asclepius when one was cured of a disease, so Socrates’ words suggest death, 
according to Nietzsche, was a return to health.  As Nietzsche observes in the 105
culminating sections of The Gay Science, Socrates saw death as a cure and life 
itself as a disease.  106
The Symposium is Plato’s treatment for the emotional disorder brought 
about by the passions. Within the dialogue Socrates is his exemplar of 
psychological health. Plato’s philosophically trained eros, of which he claims all 
desire is merely a defective species, has three essential characteristics. Firstly, it 
grows from a poverty of the human soul. Love is a kind of neediness the 
exposes human inadequacy and motivates individuals to seek redemption from 
their narrow mortal lives. Secondly, the object of Platonic desire is the eternal 
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form of the good, which offers a secure alternative to the transient and frail 
objects of the natural world. Thirdly, Platonic desire promises an escape from 
temporal existence. In contemplation one is able, like Socrates, to forget one’s 
place in the world and participate in the divinity of the unchanging and eternal 
forms. Because the forms escape temporality, they can be experienced at any 
and every moment. When death comes, as it did to Socrates, one goes willingly, 
since the transience of life itself is an affliction to overcome. 
The failure of Platonic eros 
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche turns his attention explicitly towards 
Platonic eros. This move is motivated by Socrates’ deathbed judgement against 
(at least his own) life, and Nietzsche’s therapeutic inclination, to read 
philosophical positions as indicative of conditions of health or sickness. More 
precisely, he asks of philosophers the same question he asks of artists in book 
five of The Gay Science, “is it hunger or superabundance that has here become 
creative?”  Reacting to Socrates’ assessment of life itself as an illness, 107
Nietzsche proposes to “take a closer look”—to carry out a thorough diagnosis
—because “here at any rate there must be something sick”.  108
Nietzsche draws attention to an encounter between Socrates and the 
physiognomist Zopyrus, attested to in the Tusculan Disputations. Cicero tells 
us that Zopyrus publicly lists the inborn faults of Socrates: he declares that 
Socrates to hold a poor constitution, to be irascible, pitying, and envious by 
nature.  In Nietzsche’s words, Socrates contains “every kind of foul vice and 109
lust”.  To this Socrates assents, “saying that [all manner of vices] were indeed 110
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inborn in him, but that he had cast them out by reason”.  Socrates, according 111
to Nietzsche, suffered from the disaggregation of his drives. He thus epitomises 
what is, on both his and Nietzsche’s accounts, the broader cultural malady of 
fifth century Athens: the drives which constitute the order (or disorder) of the 
soul were unruly, “in anarchy” and “becoming mutually antagonistic”.  112
Socrates avoids the anarchy of the drives through the use of reason—he 
subdues and masters the drives and thereby masters himself. 
Reason is the expression of the need for self-preservation against the 
“universal danger” of the monstrum in animo.  It was necessary to pose 113
reason as a ruler over and against the drives because in their mutually 
antagonistic state; the alternative would have been the dissolution and 
destruction of the soul: “one had only one choice: either to perish or – be 
absurdly rational”.  What results is a radical opposition between 114
consciousness and reason on the one hand and the unconscious drives, desires, 
and passions on the other. Socratic reason is the single legitimate ruler of the 
soul—all legitimate motives and values derive their legitimacy from it.  115
To cure the mutual antagonism of the drives, Socrates posits a new 
antagonism, between the drives and reason. This is why Nietzsche’s diagnoses 
the Platonic treatment of eros—subjugation to reason and the eternal form of 
the good—as reinforcing the malady it purports to cure. As long as the Socratic 
opposition between reason and the drives persists, as long as one has “to 
combat one’s instincts”, one remains, according to Nietzsche, in a state of 
distress. 
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Nietzsche recognises nineteenth century romantic pessimism as the logical 
extension of Platonism. In Schopenhauer he identifies a Platonic conception of 
desire without the prospect of transcendence. 
Schopenhauer echoes Plato in claiming that all human desire arises “from a 
lack, from discontent with one’s state”.  For Schopenhauer, this lack is 116
experienced as a painful absence of the desired object. Importantly, gaining 
possession of the object of one’s desire grants only temporary cessation of this 
pain. Schopenhauer claims that “[a]ll satisfaction […] is really and essentially 
only negative and never at all positive”.  Satisfaction of a desire is merely its 117
cancellation—gaining possession of an object of desire puts its possessor in 
precisely the state she was in before she formed her desire. The only 
consequence of desire is an intervening period of pain. Desire is unruly, 
disordered, and painful. 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will additionally prevents the will from 
experiencing—in addition to any positive notion of happiness—even the 
blissful state of ataraxia brought about by the elimination of desire.  All 118
manifestations of will, including human desire, are characterised by a blind and 
constant striving, “to which no end is put by the achievement of any goal, 
which is therefore capable of no final satisfaction but can only be held up by 
impediments”.  According to Schopenhauer, the satisfaction of one desire 119
leads immediately to one of two conditions. Either one desires and thus 
experiences the painful lack of another object or, because of Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical premise that the will involves unending striving, lacks an object 
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to strive for. In both cases one experiences a painful lack, and thus ataraxia is 
an impossible goal. 
Schopenhauer agrees with Plato that desire cannot be tamed by satisfaction. 
For Plato, however, desire can be brought under rational control through the 
ascent to metaphysics. The metaphysical forms furnish Plato with a stable 
object of desire, the love of which allows for the rational conduct of life. 
Schopenhauer denies that the ascent to metaphysics achieves this goal. 
For Schopenhauer, like Plato, metaphysics is an exercise in psychological 
detachment. Plato’s Socrates succeeds in his ascent because it grants him 
freedom from the hardships of the world and the risks of loving mortal objects. 
The sight of the forms purifies Socrates of the infirmities associated with 
existing as a body in the world. For Schopenhauer too, in metaphysical 
contemplation an individual comprehends the world “purely objectively”, 
shucking off the immediate concerns of will (and the body).  The aesthetic 120
experience of pure contemplation gives an individual such a respite from the 
otherwise incessant press of desire. In such a state, which Schopenhauer 
explicitly links to contemplation of the Platonic forms, one becomes “entirely 
absorbed in [perception] and lets the entirety of consciousness be filled with 
restful contemplation of a natural object”—one loses oneself in the object of 
contemplation, becoming “pure, will-less, painless, timeless,” and, according to 
Schopenhauer “no longer an individual”.  121
Schopenhauer’s account of metaphysical contemplation diverges from 
Plato’s in two important respects. Firstly, in contemplation the intellect “tears 
itself free” of the will and “is removed from any relation to the will”.  In 122
metaphysical contemplation, desire is entirely silenced. Whereas Plato claims 
 WWR 2.16.120
 WWR 1.34.121
 WWR 1.34.122
 89
that the ascent to metaphysics is like a channeling of desire, for Schopenhauer 
metaphysics is explicitly a project of subduing and eliminating desire. The 
object of aesthetic contemplation is not an object of desire, but stands “in no 
relation to our will”.  Contemplation is only possible by escaping the will’s 123
demands. Schopenhauer recommends the radical cure of complete extirpation 
because of his anti-teleological conception of the will—there is no object which 
would satisfy the will, as possession of the good would satisfy eros for Plato. 
Secondly, for Plato the good is a stable and readily available object of 
desire. Accordingly, contemplation of the good grounds a stable and secure 
happiness—Socrates’s perfect state of mind endures both the passage of time 
and threats from the outside world. For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, 
contemplation is only possible in “exceptional cases”;  it is “difficult and 124
therefore rare” and persists “only for a short time”.  This is because of the 125
organic nature of the intellect as an outgrowth of the will. On Schopenhauer’s 
account, the capacity for metaphysical reflection is the latest fruit borne of the 
long process of the will’s development. The intellect, which in other animals is 
merely “the medium of motives”, in humanity develops into reason by 
divorcing itself from the immediate needs of the will.  This is why 126
Schopenhauer refers to humans as the animal metaphysicum. The intellect 
nevertheless remains rooted in the will as the metaphysical grounds of all life. 
When the individual inevitably returns to the concerns of life, she must 
abandon the happiness granted by aesthetic contemplation:  
[A]s soon as the consciousness of one’s own self, and thus subjectivity, i.e., the will, 
again obtains the ascendancy, a degree of discomfort or disquiet appears in keeping 
therewith; of discomfort, in so far as corporeality (the organism that in itself is will) 
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again makes itself felt; of disquiet, in so far as the will, on the intellectual path, again 
fills our consciousness by desires, emotions, passions, and cares.  127
All human life then, is marked by ineliminable suffering. In fact, since 
human life is the latest development of will, humans are “the neediest of all 
beings” and suffer the greatest.  Aesthetic contemplation grants the 128
individual a momentary respite from this suffering, but it is only an intimation 
of a definitive cure: the complete silence of the will. Human desire vacillates 
between painful absence and painful boredom: there is no object which could 
serve, as the form of the good did for Plato, to secure a stable happiness, either 
in life or outside it: 
So long as we are given over to the press of desires with its constant hoping and 
fearing, so long as we are subjects of willing, lasting happiness or rest will never come 
to be for us.  129
The only palliative Schopenhauer offers for the almost ubiquitous pain of 
existence is the deadening of the will and the denial of the individual. 
Schopenhauer picks out a unified force underlying all human striving, 
which he identifies with a painful deficiency in the human condition. This force 
finds its only temporary cessation in its own denial through metaphysical 
contemplation. Without the possibility of lasting satisfaction, Schopenhauer 
arrives at advocating the “denial and abandonment of all willing, and precisely 
thereby redemption from a world whose entire existence has shown itself to be 
suffering […] a passage into empty nothingness”.  For Nietzsche, this is the 130
horizon of possibility for a Platonic conception of the passions. The Platonic–
Schopenhauerian conception of the passions fails because it cannot sustain an 
attachment to life. He names this failure of desire nihilism.  To overcome 131
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nihilism, then, he requires a renovated conception of the passions not tied to 
the possibility of transcendence. We turn to the role of a rejuvenated account of 
the passions in The Gay Science in the next chapter.  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4. La Gaya Scienza: Nietzsche and the Passions 
Nietzsche’s campaign to expose and overcome Platonism is one of the few 
constants in his oeuvre. He attacks the Platonic therapy of the passions as both 
misdirected and symptomatic of a distressed physiological condition. Plato’s 
prescription of the ascent to metaphysics betrays the pain and poverty of his 
this-worldly life. In Human, All Too Human and Dawn, Nietzsche expresses an 
appreciation for Stoic self-mastery as an alternative to what he sees as the 
Platonic tyranny of reason. Nietzsche at this point has deep sympathies with 
the Stoic attempt to return to nature through the use of reason; he praises, for 
instance, the ideal of Epictetus as one who “believes strictly in reason”: “the 
silent, self-sufficient man […] who defends himself against the outside world 
and lives in a constant state of supreme bravery”.  Contrary to the Platonic 1
education of the passions, Nietzsche expresses an affinity to the Stoic who 
renounces the passions in order to gain control of himself.  Yet, looking back 2
on this period eight years after the publication of Human, All Too Human, he 
characterises this affinity as both a great liberation and “at the same time a 
sickness that can destroy the man who has it”.  Nietzsche judges that his 3
experiments with Stoicism, Epicureanism, and the other Hellenistic therapies 
had instrumental value: they furnished him with techniques of self-control and 
self-cultivation, but they fail as comprehensive therapies in as much as they 
manifest a fundamental timidity towards the world.  They are symptoms of a 4
deficit or impoverishment of life.  5
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Nietzsche’s self-described convalescence of 1882 marks a distinct break 
with what he calls the Hellenistic ethics of timidity. In book four of The Gay 
Science Nietzsche formulates a new, fundamentally affirmative, ethical project. 
To open book four, he declares amor fati as his love thenceforth. The 
penultimate section of book four (and of The Gay Science in its first volume) 
confirms the amorous character of this project in Nietzsche’s depiction of the 
fervent craving for the eternal recurrence of life as the sign of the best 
disposition towards oneself and one’s life. Book four is bookended by these 
two formulations of an attitude which seeks to reinscribe value on this-worldly 
life. 
Between his declaration of amor fati and the demon’s revelation of the 
eternal recurrence, Nietzsche tells us how we might learn how to love fate and 
its eternal recurrence. In this chapter I elucidate the techniques and practices of 
love at work in book four of The Gay Science to argue that therein Nietzsche 
develops a rival theory of ascent to the Platonic-metaphysical ladder of love. 
In the previous chapter I characterised Platonic love as having three parts. I 
set out Plato’s particular account of the nature of love, the object in which it 
finds its fullest expression, and the relationship with the world such a 
perfection of love induces in the lover. In this chapter I analyse Nietzsche on 
the nature of love through his account of the passions [Leidenschaften]. I 
accomplish this in two parts. First, I trace the development of the term 
“passion” from its Greek origins, through Christian and secular developments 
to make clear what conceptions of the passions were available to Nietzsche at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Only by following the history of the passions 
can we make sense of Nietzsche’s self-conscious allusions to the gaya scienza of 
the Provençal troubadours, who he claims invented passionate love.  Second, I 6
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chart Nietzsche’s shifting valuation of the passions through the middle period, 
from Human, All Too Human, where passion is included in a list of “the worst 
of all methods of acquiring knowledge”  to The Gay Science, where Nietzsche 7
characterises the philosophical drive to knowledge as both passional and 
constitutive of human flourishing.  While Nietzsche makes room for the 8
passions in the flourishing life—contra the Stoics—he nevertheless maintains 
that the passions are in need of treatment. His recuperation of the passions is 
not the indiscriminate production of passionate engagements, which he 
elsewhere characterises as romanticism.  I pay particular attention to 9
Nietzsche’s declaration in book five of Dawn of a “new passion” for 
knowledge and the role of this passion in arranging the drives that constitute 
Nietzsche’s well-ordered soul.  10
In the following chapters, I use this account of Nietzsche’s Leidenschaften 
to distinguish Nietzsche’s affirmation of eros from the ostensibly similar Stoic 
attitude towards nature. I distinguish Nietzsche’s affirmation from Stoicism’s 
love of fate  on the grounds that it involves an appreciation of the passions 
foreign to Stoicism, premised on a decidedly anti-Stoic account of nature (and 
naturalism). To underscore Nietzsche’s contrast with Platonism, I finally set out 
Nietzsche’s contention that The Gay Science supports a passionate affirmation 
of this-worldly life, contrary to the Platonic denial of and flight from the 
world. 
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Nietzsche’s ascent 
In the 1886 preface to Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche describes his own 
therapeutic experiments as an ascent on “a long ladder upon whose rungs we 
ourselves have sat and climbed—which we ourselves have at some time 
been!”  The first edition of Human, All Too Human, published eight years 11
earlier, is one such rung. Nietzsche would come to describe it as a “melancholy-
valiant” book, written while he was “surrounded by ills” and in a state of 
illness himself.  But in recognising Human, All Too Human as the work of a 12
sickly author, Nietzsche does not repudiate its place in his philosophical 
development. Instead, Nietzsche considers the sickness of Human, All Too 
Human, and the overcoming of this sickness necessary precursors to his later 
philosophical health. The Stoic coldness of the text, its “hatred of love,” and 
“such bad and painful things” all contribute to “the history of a great 
liberation”.  The sickness of Human, All Too Human is instrumentally 13
valuable in granting the free spirit control over her passions: 
You shall become master over yourself, master also over your virtues. Formerly 
they were your masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other 
instruments. You shall get control over your For and Against and learn how to 
display first one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal.  14
It is essential to Nietzsche’s therapeutic program that the free spirit does not 
remain cold and hostile to the passions. Rather, she undergoes a 
transformation, at the end of which she can deploy them in pursuit of her 
“higher goal”.  This transformation constitutes the work of Nietzsche’s 15
middle period. 
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The promise of Human, All Too Human’s preface is that the long ladder of 
the middle period culminates in the purposive control of the passions. 
Nietzsche’s project is then, according to Nussbaum, an attempt “to bring about 
a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation within a post-
Christian and post-Romantic context”.  Yet as we have seen in his 16
confrontation with Stoicism, it is precisely the overriding Stoic concern for self-
control which Nietzsche singles out as harmful. The Stoic, unable to lose 
herself to the passions, cuts herself off from the fortuities of her own instincts 
and social goods including the teachings of others. For the Stoics, the passions 
were harmful because they cede control of our happiness to fortune; for 
Nietzsche, “one must be able to lose oneself” to reap the full harvest of life.  17
The gulf between Nietzsche and the Stoics as to the place of the passions in 
the highest human life depends importantly on their distinct conceptions of the 
passions. For the Greeks of antiquity, pathos denoted “a state of being afflicted, 
a state of being affected, a reception or a suffering”; its definitive characteristic 
was passivity.  The modern passions, on the other hand, are essentially active, 18
storms and whirlwinds of the mind which are associated with passivity only 
inasmuch as they act upon a sufferer. To describe the modern passions, 
including Nietzsche’s Leidenschaften, the Greeks would more readily use terms 
such as epithymia [desire] or mania [madness]. Indeed Plato eschews talk of the 
pathê altogether in the Symposium, and in the Phaedrus that which afflicts 
lovers [erotikon pathos] is a kind of theia mania [divine madness].  What 19
remains from the earliest philosophical treatments through to Nietzsche is the 
close association between passion and suffering. One suffers from a passion, 
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whether as pain, illness, or vulnerability. What is at stake in separating 
Nietzsche from the Stoics, then, is what sense can be made of his therapeutic 
project if it does not alleviate suffering? 
Pathos, passio, Leidenschaft, passion 
Erich Auerbach traces the gap between ancient pathos and modern 
Leidenschaft in his history of the latter term, “Passio als Leidenschaft”, 
wherein he purports to explain the entrance of the modern sense of the 
passions into the semantic field of the pathê. According to Auerbach, Aristotle 
captures the classical understanding of pathos as passivity. On Aristotle’s 
account, pathos means “everything that is passively taken in, received, 
suffered”.  Thus Aristotle’s pathê encompass a broad range of mental 20
phenomena including sensation, strong and weak feeling, and experience. The 
important distinction is between an active doing and a passive receiving. As a 
consequence, pathos is an ethically neutral term: one is neither praised nor 
blamed for one’s pathê, since a pathos is an intervention of an outside cause. 
The very idea of controlling pathos is difficult on this account because the 
pathê are precisely what befall an individual. At best, one might influence the 
external causes one is receptive towards. In this sense, Aristotle’s passions are 
susceptible to one’s influence, but not direct manipulation. 
The first significant development after Aristotle’s account of pathos as 
passivity, according to Auerbach, occurs with the Stoics. Rather than simply 
passive, the pathê for the Stoics become restive and stormy perturbations that 
“destroy the tranquility of the wise”.  Because these perturbations are 21
themselves active psychological forces, they fall on the wrong side of Aristotle’s 
active–passive distinction. The Stoics instead oppose pathos to reason, not 
 Auerbach, “Passio as Passion,” 290.20
 Auerbach, “Passio as Passion,” 291.21
 98
action. The consequence of this shift is that, as we have seen in chapter one, the 
passions take on a strongly pejorative sense. Since, according to the Stoics, 
humans have a distinctly rational nature, it is the duty of humans to perfect 
this nature and bring the passions under the control of reason.  
Whether a Stoic suffers a passion is, as we have seen in chapter one, under 
his control. This is because to suffer from a passion is to assent to certain 
judgements in the hegemonikon. This control, however, extends only so far as a 
Stoic can eliminate a passion, which means to reject the false impression it 
presents (in the case of desire, that a certain object is a good) and refrain from 
acting according to it (reaching for a desired object): control of the passions 
entails their elimination. 
Auerbach states that it is only the Stoic conception of pathos, and not the 
Aristotelian, which is recognisable as modern passion.  As Nietzsche’s 22
commendation of the passions shows, however, the resemblance is imperfect. 
For the Stoics, the passions are universally destructive. Their effect is exhausted 
in disrupting their sufferer’s mind. Yet Nietzsche’s revaluation of the passions is 
clearly not a celebration simply of irrational mental disturbance. Nietzsche’s 
passions contain within them the possibility of nobility,  rapture, and the 23
sublime.  For Auerbach, too, these are distinctive features of modern passion. 24
Ancient terms, including pathos as well as terms such as epithymia and mania,  
lack the possibility of the sublime. Modern passion [Leidenschaft] is more than 
desire, craving, or frenzy. The word always contains as a possibility, often as its 
dominant meaning, the noble creative fire which extinguishes itself in either 
struggle or surrender, and next to which temperate reason at times appears 
contemptible.  25
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On Auerbach’s account, this capacity for the sublime enters the passions 
through a tradition of Christian passion mysticism. Nietzsche, without 
mentioning Christianity, traces his conception of the passions back to the heirs 
of this tradition, the twelfth-century Provençal troubadours, who he claims 
“invented” the “European speciality” of passionate love.  The notions of 26
passion operative in the troubadours’ profane love poetry and in the Christian 
mystical tradition both derive from the transformation of the term at the hands 
of early Church fathers—a contribution exemplified by Augustine. 
Augustine 
Augustine broadens the Stoics account of the passions, both in regards to 
what counts as a passion, and their evaluative possibilities. On the extent of 
the passiones, Augustine notes that the Stoic claim that the wise person is not 
subject to passion depends on the notion of indifference: that the wise person 
may hold a preference for an object without considering that object a good. 
Such an object is an preferred indifferent. Augustine claims that this is a false 
distinction. 
The Stoic insistence that such things [as life and material existence] are not to be 
called ‘good’, but ‘advantageous’, should be regarded as a quibble about words, 
not a question of the realities they signify.  27
He prefigures the argument by Schopenhauer, which we have already seen, 
that the notion of preferred indifferents is a means for the Stoics to 
“[sophisticate] themselves into all the amenities of life”.  While he attacks the 28
Stoic notion of indifference, he also rejects their distinction between passions—
which follow from false judgements—and first-movements [propatheia]—
 BGE 260; Nietzsche’s relationship with the troubadours will be revisited below. These 26
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involuntary jitters of the body or mind that precede but are not yet such 
judgements. This second notion is at play in an example Augustine recounts 
from the author Aulus Gellius, of a Stoic in danger of suffering shipwreck.  29
On a journey across the Ionian sea, a ship carrying Gellius and an eminent (but 
unnamed) Stoic encounters bad weather. Gellius reports on the behaviour of 
the Stoic as their ship is tossed to and fro: 
I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any 
lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his 
loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others.  30
The Stoic, when challenged by Gellius, states that his loss of colour is merely a 
first-movement. This movement produces fantastic and terrifying images to 
which the Stoic claims he does not assent. Since assent to a false judgement is 
the key characteristic of Stoic pathos, the Stoic aboard Aulus’ ship can claim 
that he does not suffer from fear. 
Augustine rejects this account. As in the case of indifferents, he claims that 
the Stoic distinction is merely verbal, “so long as Stoic, no less than Peripatetic, 
trembles and grows pale [pavescat et palleat] at the thought of being deprived 
of [supposed indifferents]”.  Augustine equates the Stoic first movements, 31
bodily reactions such as growing pale or trembling, with briefly suffering a 
passion: 
When these sensations arise from terrifying and awe-inspiring circumstances, the 
mind of even the wise man must unavoidably be disturbed, so that for a little 
while he either becomes pale with fear [metu] or is depressed by gloom [tristitia]  32
 De Civ 9.4; the story is especially pertinent, as the Stoic founder Zeno was said to have 29
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He justifies this equation with reference to Gellius and concludes that passions 
“do befall the Stoic wise person”.  However, as Sorabji shows forensically, 33
Augustine simply misunderstands Stoic terminology. This follows from 
Augustine’s use of Gellius for an account of first movements and Gellius’ use of 
the ambiguous term pavor [trembling]. Had Augustine turned to Seneca’s De 
Ira for his account of first movements, he would have seen that in first 
movements, “fear [metus], anxiety, sadness [tristitia], and anger are not found, 
but only certain things like them”.  34
The consequence of Augustine’s reading of the Stoics is that a much broader 
range of mental phenomena come to be called passions. Augustine shifts the 
conceptual core of the passions away from false judgements made by the 
faculty of assent, to the very presence of stormy undulations in the psyche. 
Augustine follows the Stoics in classifying four major passions depending on 
whether an object is considered a good or an evil and whether it is present or 
anticipated. But rather than locate, for instance, laetitia [joy or delight] in 
assent to a false judgement of a present good, he characterises it as the presence 
of a love which possesses and enjoys its object. The three other major passions 
are similarly characterised as modifications of love.  35
Since even the wise person is susceptible to the passions (in the form of 
what the Stoics call propatheia and the preferred indifferents) the Stoic project 
of self-sufficiency is doomed to failure. While Augustine grants that freedom 
from passionate disruption is “clearly a good and desirable state”, such a state 
does not belong to embodied this-worldly life.  A life of bliss, free from fear 36
 Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation 33
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and distress, “will not come until there is no sin in man”—until the life of 
eternity after death.  37
The Stoic attempt at self-sufficiency through the elimination of suffering is, 
for Augustine and the Christian tradition, a futile task: “all men, as long as 
they are mortals, must needs be also wretched”.  Thus the good Christian 38
abandons self-sufficient impassivity as a goal. What is important in the 
Christian transformation and recuperation of the passions and suffering is that 
the Christian suffers righteously. Love is the wellspring of the passions, and the 
good passions spring from the love of God. The Christian in this life is still 
vulnerable in precisely the way the Stoics sought to avoid—through passionate 
engagement with God, which can only be manifested in the frail and unreliable 
external world. But in cultivating a passionate vulnerability, through an ardent 
love of God, the Christian opens herself up to receive grace. 
Against the evil passiones of this world, they set neither Stoic apathy, nor the 
“good feelings” in order to arrive at the Aristotelian mean through rational 
balance, but instead they contrast it with something entirely new, until then 
unheard of: the gloriosa passio that derives from the burning love of God. The 
person who is impassibilis [incapable of suffering] is not perfect, but he is 
perfectus in omnibus [perfect in every way] […] quem caro iam revocare non 
posset a gloria passionis [whom the flesh could no long retrieve from the glory of 
suffering]  39
Augustine rehabilitates passionate suffering through a transformation of the 
passions. Against the Stoic conception of the passions as entirely harmful 
perturbations, he makes the passions worthy of praise and cultivation. The 
passions become part of the best human life because they grant one access to 
the divine. To suffer the passions is to give oneself over to the grace of God—
the only hope for the human to attain happiness. This is why the burning love 
of God gives rise to a compelling new passion: suffering the gloriosa passio 
redeems the painful and wretched experience of natural life. To reject this new 
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passion, on the other hand, is to cut oneself off from the grace of God and 
from redemption from pain and all earthly suffering. The Stoic in GS 305 cuts 
himself off from the full harvest of life by denying the passions. Augustine’s 
Stoic similarly loses life’s highest reward—eternal happiness in the next life—
by refusing to loosen the reigns of his self-control. 
For the Christian mystics of subsequent centuries, passion as stormy 
disturbance and passion as the ecstatic experience of the love of God merge.  40
To suffer a passion becomes simultaneously a moment of torment and one of 
divine rapture. Suffering becomes a means to experience the love of God and a 
source of redemption from the world. As a result, passionate disturbances 
themselves become noble, laudable experiences. 
In stark contrast to all ancient, especially Stoic concepts, [Christian] passio is 
praised and longed for; the life and stigmatization of St. Francis of Assisi 
concretely realize the union of passion and suffering, the mystical leap of one to 
the other. The passion of love leads through suffering to an excessus mentis and 
to union with Christ; whoever is without passio is without grace; whoever does 
not give himself over to the passio of the Savior lives in hardness of heart, 
obduratio cordis, and one finds in the mystical tracts much instruction about how 
to overcome this condition.  41
Christian mystics, thus, seek to cultivate their capacity for suffering. They reject 
the Stoic project of self-sufficiency and promote their vulnerability to the 
external world. 
Whether this capacity is realised, that is, whether one received grace, 
depends on the arrival of God’s love. In this sense, the Christian passio strikes 
an Aristotelian tone: it denotes a receptive state rather than an wholly active 
force. The activity of the redemptive power of the passions originates in God 
alone, only entering those who have prepared themselves to receive the grace of 
God. The redeeming love of God, furthermore, “always originates from the 
heights or depths of superhuman forces and is received and suffered as a 
 Auerbach, “Passio as Passion,” 295.40
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magnificent or terrifying gift”.  The Christian mystic gives herself up to the 42
terrifying power of God and it is in this manner that the Christian account of 
the passions heralds the possibility of the sublime. 
God’s love terrifies because of his overwhelming power. The love of God 
torments the one who suffers from it because, without a response from God we 
are stuck in our wretched state of neediness and if God answers our love, he 
would overwhelm us, “for God is too strong for the soul. If He took it to heart 
[…] the soul would die a Liebestod in real torment and real rapture at the 
same time.”   43
The early Christian account of the passions echoes Plato’s amorous ascent 
in sanctioning a flight from the pains and sorrows of the natural world, 
whether into the arms of God or the ocean of beauty. In both cases, this is 
because our happiness depends on forming an attachment to a transcendent 
object. But, there is a crucial difference between the Platonic and Christian 
attitudes. For the Platonist, as we saw, each step on the ladder of love slackens 
the intensity of her passions until, at its apex, she achieves a perfectly secure 
tranquillity. The Platonic lover suffers less from the torment of the passions the 
closer she comes to the Platonic ideal. The closer the Christian mystic comes to 
God, however, the more severely she suffers—love always remains an affliction 
with the potential to prove fatal. The love of God reaches its apex in 
simultaneous torment and rapture; this terrifying prospect, of the 
overwhelming force of God’s love, marks it out as an experience of the 
sublime. The “deepening” of suffering to include the possibility of the sublime 
is, according to Auerbach, the “incontestable” influence of Christian 
mysticism.  44
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Courtly love 
The mystical account of the passions was taken up in profane love poetry, 
first by the Provençal troubadours and by later figures such as Dante. These 
poets repeat Christian mystics’ insistence that the passions are the only route to 
a noble life, that the passions foster all virtue and insight, and importantly that 
the passions involve simultaneous rapture and torment that gives rise to the 
feeling of the sublime. Why then, does Nietzsche claim that the troubadours 
invented passionate love, and why does he christen his most personal book 
with the Provençal term for the troubadours’ love poetry, gaia scienza?  What 45
distinguishes the troubadours’ account love from its life-denying mystical 
precursor? While Auerbach devotes significant attention to the continuity 
between Christian mystical and secular poetic accounts of the passions and 
indeed finds them sometimes indistinguishable, there are important divergences 
between the two.  Making a clear distinction between what is novel in courtly 46
love and what isn’t will allow us to see what precisely Nietzsche is praising the 
troubadours for and the possibilities he sees in the passions. 
Auerbach is correct to note a strong resonance between troubadour (or 
courtly) love and Passion mysticism. Both held that the highest form of human 
existence was to be found in sublime love—passionate devotion to an object 
with the potential for simultaneous torment and rapture. Courtly love differs 
most importantly from religious love in its selection of sublime object. Instead 
of God, the courtly lover of the twelfth century devotes himself to a woman he 
takes to embody and objectify “in herself beauty, goodness, and all the other 
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goals of human aspiration recognised by the eros tradition”.  Heterosexual 47
love did not, of course, originate in the twelfth-century. Sexual relations are 
ubiquitous in the history of myth and literature because they are ubiquitous in 
human life. Even Plato accounts for heterosexual love as an attempt to secure 
immortality through children.  Such love and indeed all forms of interpersonal 48
love, however, are for Plato subordinate to the higher love of beauty itself. For 
Plato interpersonal love is a step towards the perfection of eros, but as such it 
is only either instrumentally useful or a defective kind of love. In the Christian 
tradition too, Paul instructs married Christians to love one another, but only 
“out of reverence for Christ”.  Paul sanctions interpersonal love as an 49
imitation or subordinate form of the love of God. In courtly love on the other 
hand, the highest of human aspirations reside in the beloved, without reference 
to any transcendent object: 
About this more ultimate love the troubadours are remarkably unconcerned. 
Their beloved is indeed more than just another beautiful form in the external 
world: she is for them the supreme instance of beauty and that is why they love 
her. And yet, they do not love her for the sake of beauty, at least not beauty as an 
absolute or abstract entity. It scarcely occurs to the troubadours that love might 
be extended beyond the lady.  50
Just as Christian-mystical passions spring from a burning love of God, 
devotion to the beloved inspires the emotional life of the courtly lover. The 
passions of the courtly lover are put in the service of his higher devotion. The 
beloved takes on the role of God as an absolute. This displacement has the 
consequence that courtly love encourages “a kind of autonomy or self-
sufficiency of human love […] a closed trajectory within itself”.  If human 51
love is self-sufficient, the human lover need not resort to the Christian-Platonic 
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flight from the world as a radical cure for the passions. The Aristophanic 
predicament encountered in the previous chapter—the threat of the imperfect 
object—is surmountable within the human realm. The innovation of the 
troubadours regarding the passions is to ground them in the human world. 
Gaya scienza denotes troubadour love poetry, which was of central 
importance to operation of courtly love. The troubadours practice gaya scienza 
when they use poetry to elevate the beloved as the unique exemplar of beauty, 
goodness and excellence in character. This aesthetic activity becomes the basis 
for the lover’s desire; his longing for the beloved is underwritten by poetry 
showing the beloved to be worthy.  In the Tractatus amoris & de amoris 52
remedio by Andreas Capellanus, the most systematic contemporary 
formulation of courtly love, we find an ambiguity over whether poetry 
produces the excellence of the beloved or reveals it. Love was certainly taken to 
have a transformative power. In a dialogue between a suitor and a woman who 
denies that she is outstanding in the way courtly love requires (the embodiment 
of beauty itself) the suitor claims that love changes the ugly into the beautiful 
by means of aesthetic falsification: “your beauty seems to me to put the charms 
of all other women in the shade, and to a lover love makes even an ugly 
woman appear most beautiful”.  The beloved becomes beautiful (to the lover) 53
through the power of his love. On the other hand, Capellanus also suggests 
that the beloved is objectively beautiful, and that “love is required [merely] as a 
means of detection”.  So love makes the beloved beautiful or reveals her 54
antecedent objective beauty. As Singer notes, this problem remains unresolved 
in the history of love until Romanticism abandons the belief in the antecedent 
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objective beauty of the beloved.  But in either case, the significant point for 55
our purposes is that courtly desire is stoked by the aesthetic means of gaya 
scienza (whether these means are productive or revelatory). We will be able to 
understand Nietzsche’s use of aesthetic techniques to “make things beautiful, 
attractive, and desirable […] when they are not” in these terms.  56
In addition to idealising the beloved, the troubadours idealise themselves as 
lovers. They take their amorous state as itself a model of nobility. To take 
desire and longing as themselves worthy aspirations means that the courtly 
lover prolongs desire by deliberately frustrating it. Often the courtly lover takes 
a married woman as his beloved, so that their sexual continence testifies to 
both the moral virtue of the woman and the ennobling power of the lover’s 
devotion. Jealousy is not a vice, but the condition of possibility for such a 
necessarily unrequited love.  The courtly lover thereby charts a course 57
between the despair of being without love, and the terrifying prospect of 
rapture and Liebestod which, we have seen, attends to the notion of sublime 
passions the troubadours inherit. It is clear why Nietzsche would admire such 
lovers—they are strong enough to bear the sublime terror of their passion 
without shying away from their beloved, or falling into a rapture which 
destroys them both. 
We can characterise courtly love, then, as the jealous love of an idealised 
woman, the experience of which makes life noble and worth living. It is, at the 
same time, an affliction which torments the lover and radically alters the 
orientation of the lover’s life. In forging a passionate attachment to a particular 
other, the courtly lover becomes vulnerable to all of their familiar pains and 
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sorrows. The courtly lover lives dangerously, but in pursuit of a higher plane of 
human existence. 
Auerbach tells us that the courtly account of the passions was, at first, 
neglected. It takes until the seventeenth century for it to win out over its 
Aristotelian and Stoic rivals, when we are left with a descendant of the 
troubadours’ anti-Christian turn of Passion mysticism best exemplified in the 
tragedy of Racine: 
The passions in seventeenth-century France are the great human desires, and what 
is particular about them is the clear inclination to regard them as tragic, heroic, 
sublime and worthy of admiration. At the beginning of the century, the pejorative 
Stoic judgment is still sounded quite frequently, yet it soon changes into a dialectic 
combination in which the terrible and the noble unite in the sublime. That is 
already to be sensed in Corneille and Pascal, perhaps already in Descartes, and it 
reaches its high point in the tragedy of Racine, whose goal it is to excite and 
glorify the passions. He speaks of les belles passions and les passions généreuses, 
and critics judged a tragedy according to the authenticity, depth, and beauty of 
the passions it represents; for the sensitive spectator, the torment and rapture of 
passion become the highest form of life.  58
The passions of the seventeenth-century promise to elevate human life 
through an experience of the sublime. These are the coordinates within which 
modern discussion of the passions, including Nietzsche’s, takes place. There 
remain two questions at issue in the remainder of this chapter. First, what does 
Nietzsche make of the very notion of such great human desires; is stoking the 
passions a viable hope for the elevation of human life? As I will show, 
Nietzsche only arrives at an affirmative answer to this question after much 
philosophical labour. Second, given this belated affirmative answer, which 
passion is capable of granting such elevation? I will show that Nietzsche 
proposes a new passion, the passion for knowledge, in book five of Dawn, and 
that in The Gay Science he elaborates the possibilities of this passion for the 
ennoblement of life.  
 Auerbach, “Passio as Passion,” 302, emphasis in original.58
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Nietzsche’s passionate development 
Nietzsche provides his clearest characterisation of a passion in section 429 of 
Dawn, titled “The new passion”. In this section he inaugurates the passion for 
knowledge. He describes a passion as a certain drive distinguished by its 
strength and intensity. Recall that for the Greeks, happiness [eudaimonia] 
served as the ultimate goal of life. When Diotima quizzes Socrates on the use of 
love, the value of happiness is beyond question: “the happy are happy by 
acquisition of good things, and we have no more need to ask for what end a 
man wishes to be happy, when such is his wish: the answer seems to be 
ultimate”.  Nietzsche’s passion for knowledge is a drive which usurps the 59
motivational primacy of happiness. It is not the case, Nietzsche thinks, that 
satisfaction of this drive necessarily brings happiness. Nevertheless, the 
attainment of knowledge becomes a higher, more worthy goal than the Greek 
goal of happiness. The strength of a passion is so great that happiness without 
its object is undesirable: “even to imagine such a state of things is painful to 
us!”  One suffering a passion prefers the restless state of longing and torment 60
to the tranquillity of Greek happiness—the tormented state is attractive in 
itself. Nietzsche specifically aligns this account of passion with the situation of 
unrequited lovers who, as we have seen in the courtly case, idealise their own 
state of unrequited desire. A passion “shrinks at no sacrifice and at bottom 
fears nothing but its own extinction”.  Nietzsche suggests that even the 61
prospect of death will not shake a passion’s hold. The question of the value of 
a passion comes down to a choice between two deaths: the glorious rapture of 
Liebestod or a contemptible, passionless end “in the sand”.  62
 Symp. 205a.59
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All the features of Auerbach’s sublime passions are present in Nietzsche’s 
depiction. And yet while in Dawn he celebrates the noble possibilities of the 
passions, this position undergoes multiple shifts and transformations 
throughout his philosophical development. We can elaborate Nietzsche’s 
account of the sublime passions by examining the self-treatment he sets out in 
his prefaces. At the beginning of this chapter we noted the therapeutic program 
Nietzsche puts down in the preface to Human, All Too Human. This is one of 
five prefaces which Nietzsche writes for his earlier works in 1886. In each of 
these Nietzsche turns his attention to the states of philosophical health and 
sickness that work expresses. Thus, the prefaces to the two volumes of Human, 
All Too Human, in addition to the “Attempt at Self-Criticism” he attached to 
the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy, as well as the prefaces to the 
second editions of Dawn and The Gay Science provide a crucial insight into his 
proposed therapy and perfection of the passions. 
Returning to The Birth of Tragedy a decade after its first publication, 
Nietzsche distances himself from the artistic metaphysics described therein. In 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche reflects, he sullied the Greek relation to 
suffering manifested by tragedy through his allegiance to Wagner and to 
German music.  In particular, he finds in the book’s still-metaphysical outlook 63
a “profound hatred of ‘the contemporary age’, ‘reality’ and ‘modern ideas’ […] 
which would rather believe in Nothing, in the devil, than in ‘the now’”.  64
Nietzsche counterposes nothingness and “the devil” to the temporal world to 
show that his preference for nothingness over this world is a form of 
metaphysical consolation. This preference expresses the fearful attitude 
towards suffering in the world which he so strongly rejects in his later thought. 
The preface is scathing about his early work, in the end warning that its 
 ASC 6.63
 ASC 7.64
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romantic trajectory leads dangerously towards Christianity. However, 
Nietzsche’s self-criticism is not merely a dismissal. He draws a distinction—as 
he does during the same period in GS 370—between Dionysian and Romantic 
pessimism. The substance of the distinction is in the two attitudes’ response to 
suffering. The Romantic, Nietzsche says, devises metaphysical consolations, 
and offers to redeem the suffering of this world in another. Romantic 
pessimism exhibits an urge to escape from this-worldly suffering: for Nietzsche, 
from life itself. The Romantic detachment from life is such that it sanctions the 
“practical nihilism” of preferring oblivion to jealous suffering in “the now”: “I 
would rather nothing were true than that you were right, that your truth 
should triumph!”  Nietzsche chides his earlier self for spoiling his treatment of 65
pessimism with Romantic ideas and asks other young pessimists to learn from 
his mistake: 
You ought first learn the art of this-worldly consolation—you should learn to 
laugh, my young friends, if you are determined to remain pessimists; perhaps as 
laughers you will consign all metaphysical consolations to the devil —and 
metaphysics in front of all the rest!  66
Dionysian pessimism, then, is a pessimism which laughs. In book five of 
The Gay Science Nietzsche associates Dionysian pessimism with an 
overflowing vitality and strength.  Nietzsche’s lament, in both the Attempt at 67
Self-Criticism and section 370 of The Gay Science, is that his early estimate 
viewed the problem of Greek tragedy—the necessity of suffering—through a 
Romantic lens. 
When Nietzsche claims that Human, All Too Human constitutes an “anti-
romantic self-treatment”, he refers to the broader project of that work to cool 
down the hot-headedness of the passions exemplified by The Birth of 
 ASC 7.65
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Tragedy.  From the vantage point of 1886, Nietzsche looks back on Human, 68
All Too Human as an artefact of this project. In the preface to Human, All Too 
Human he lays out his own philosophical evolution and states that finding the 
place of the work in this evolution will be a simple task for any “psychologist 
or reader of signs”.  For once, Nietzsche’s allusion is fairly straight forward. 69
Human, All Too Human corresponds to his discussion of a midway condition 
between “morbid isolation” and a “great health”.  This condition is 70
characterised by a “bird-like freedom, bird-like altitude, bird-like exuberance” 
and “bird-like flights in cold heights”.  It is the free-spirit, to whom Human, 71
All Too Human is dedicated, who experiences this cooling down of the 
passions and the freezing of the ideals upon which they depend.   72
We can garner a more nuanced understanding of Nietzsche’s anti-romantic 
self-treatment by examining the sections of the work itself concerned with the 
passions. HH 244 is central to this cooling project. In it, he offers Christianity, 
but also “philosophers, poets, [and] musicians” as responsible for the 
inflammation of the passions: 
If these are not to stifle us we must conjure up the spirit of science, which on the 
whole makes one somewhat colder and more sceptical and in especial cools down 
the fiery stream of belief in ultimate definitive truths; it is principally through 
Christianity that this stream has grown so turbulent.   73
Nietzsche’s position in this section is that the excesses of passion need to be 
tamed by the spirit of science. He opposes the fiery and turbulent passions to 
the scientific pursuit of knowledge. The passions are, indeed, impediments to 
this enterprise. They colour and distort the world and must be overcome if we 
 AOM P 3.68
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are to climb the hundred-rung ladder of knowledge.  In The Wanderer and his 74
Shadow, Nietzsche softens his tone somewhat, setting as his task to “take from 
the passions their terrible character and thus prevent their becoming 
devastating torrents”.  He suggests that we might transform the passions 75
[Leidenschaften] “one and all” into joys [Freudenschaften].  76
Both volumes of Human, All Too Human exhibit an attempt to transform, 
moderate, and calm the passions. If this resembles a common Hellenistic 
treatment of the passions, we should not be surprised that Nietzsche explicitly 
considers the role of Hellenistic therapies. The Hellenistic schools are 
“experimental laboratories”  for the development of practical wisdom and the 77
results of these experiments rightly “belong to us”, in that we are entitled to 
practice Stoic, as well as Epicurean, techniques of living according to our own 
needs. Such practices of self-cultivation, which Nietzsche develops during the 
middle period are instrumentally useful in his own philosophical therapy. 
So far as praxis is concerned I view the various moral schools as experimental 
laboratories in which a considerable number of recipes for the art of living have 
been thoroughly practised and lived to the hilt. The results of all their experiments 
belong to us, as our legitimate property.  78
A higher goal, however, is not to be found in Human, All Too Human’s 
“pale, subtle happiness […] without yes [and] without no”.  The first 79
indication of such a higher goal emerges in book five of Dawn. There, as we 
have seen, Nietzsche declares a “new passion”—the passion for knowledge. He 
not only announces this passion but endorses it in the sublime ambivalence 
characteristic of his conception of the passions: it is both elevating a terrifying 
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at once. If it were possible, a consummation of the passion for knowledge 
would prove fatal. Dawn’s passion for knowledge fearlessly strives towards 
this rapturous end. Nietzsche foresees that humanity will perish in a glorious 
Liebestod and indeed sees this as desirable: “we would all prefer the 
destruction of mankind to a regression of knowledge”.  In Dawn Nietzsche 80
applauds unbounded sacrifice, including self-sacrifice, in service of the passion 
for knowledge. 
The role of sacrifice in the search for knowledge is illuminated by an earlier 
section, titled “A tragic ending for knowledge”.  In this section, Nietzsche 81
advocates knowledge as a worthy goal for the self-sacrifice of humanity and 
supposed that the drive for knowledge will prove so strong that it “could drive 
mankind to the point of dying with the light of an anticipatory wisdom in its 
eyes”.  The promise of consummation in death serves as a consolation for the 82
pains of unrequited love in life. 
The attitude to death manifested in Nietzsche’s allusion to the romantic 
motif of the Liebestod, however, seems to shift as Nietzsche moves from Dawn 
to The Gay Science. In the latter work, the thought of death no longer offers 
any “anticipatory wisdom”; it no longer promises the consummation of a 
passion in the attainment of knowledge. Or, put in the terms of An Attempt at 
Self-Criticism, the thought of a glorious death no longer offers a metaphysical 
consolation for the pains of life. In section 278 of The Gay Science, expresses 
his reservations about such a thought, aligning it with a Christian 
“brotherhood of death” which finds consolation in the false hopes, fears and 
delusional beliefs produced by metaphysical speculation. Death is merely the 
conclusion, and not the secret goal, of life. 
 D 429.80
 D 45.81
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One of the most influential figurations of the Liebestod motif occurs in 
Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde. Liebestod is the title of the opera’s final aria, at 
the conclusion of which Isolde falls dead. The cause of her death is simply the 
power of her love for Tristan. While Tristan succumbs to the wound he 
willingly sustained when his love or Isolde is discovered, the death of Isolde is 
given no further explanation—her love for Tristan is sufficient. When the two 
die in each other’s arms, they realise what has been the goal of their love all 
along. 
In Act I, Isolde and Tristan determinedly go through with what they believe to be 
an unspoken suicide pact […]. In Act II they again want to die together. They are 
now openly in love with each other, and are longing for the only true oneness that 
is permanently available to them, the oneness of the noumenal state to which 
death will return them.  83
The opera is suffused with Schopenhauerian metaphysics, to the extent that 
Nietzsche, in his essay Richard Wagner in Bayreuth calls it the “true opus 
metaphysicum of all art”.  Wagner uses the Liebestod motif to illustrate the 84
use of sexual love for the Schopenhauerian purpose of world-denial.  While 85
Nietzsche’s favourable treatment of Wagner is perhaps confined to his early 
works, BT and UM, his proposal to drive the mankind to the point of dying 
for knowledge in Dawn 45 is hauntingly reminiscent of Wagner’s Liebestod. 
The redemptive Liebestod of Tristan und Isolde is undoubtedly one of the 
life-denying delusions about death which Nietzsche sets himself against in GS 
278. So there is a puzzle whether there is a break in Nietzsche’s thought 
between Dawn and The Gay Science, or whether Nietzsche alludes to some 
other notion of death in D 45 and D 429. Since he claims in Ecce Homo that 
both works are affirmative books, “deep but bright and gracious,” we have 
 Bryan Magee, Wagner and Philosophy (London: Penguin, 2001), 221.83
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 As Magee observes, this is not a connection that Schopenhauer himself makes. Nevertheless, 85
the ends to which Wagner puts erotic love—mortification of the self and denial of the world—
are undeniably Schopenhauerian.
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reason to think the latter may be the case.  Nicholas Saul’s “Love, death and 86
Liebestod in German Romanticism” is instructive on this point.  On his 87
account, the common romantic association of love and death is much more 
moderate than Wagner’s use of the Liebestod would suggest. On Wagner’s 
extreme conception, which we might call a teleological Liebestod, death is not 
only the chronological end but the aim of the passionate life. In death, lovers 
achieve the unity which they had been unable to achievable in the actual world, 
whether on metaphysical ground (the deceitful individuation of the 
phenomenal world, as Schopenhauer would have it) or because the adulterous 
relationships characteristic of romantic, following courtly, love offend against 
prevailing mores. This notion of the Liebestod illustrates the traditional 
association of romantic love with morbidity, the perverse, and sickness in 
general.  The Wagnerian Liebstod celebrates an “escape into the dream-world 88
of beautiful, yet dead, art”.  89
However, according to Saul, this strong teleological account of Liebestod is 
not representative of the broader romantic tradition. He singles out Schlegel’s 
semi-autobiographical novel Lucinde as featuring a more sophisticated 
approach to love and death. In a letter to his beloved Lucinde, the protagonist 
and stand-in for Schlegel, Julius dreams of her death and considers following 
her. 
The years slowly passed by and one event tiresomely succeeded another; one 
work and then another achieved its end, an end as little my own as my taking 
those events and works merely for what they seemed to be. They were only holy 
symbols for me, all of them referring to the only beloved one, who was the 
mediator between my dismembered self and indivisible eternal humanity. My 
whole existence was an uninterrupted divine service of solitary love.  
 EH “Books” GS.86
 Nicholas Saul, The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism (Cambridge: 87
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At last I realised that the end had come. My brow was no longer smooth and my 
hair had grown white. My life was finished but had not been completed. My most 
productive years were past and yet art and virtue still stood eternally unattainable 
before me. I would have despaired if I hadn't seen and worshipped both in you, 
most gracious Madonna! And seen you and your gentle godliness in myself.  
Then you appeared beckoning me with the summons of death. A heartfelt longing 
for you and for freedom seized me; I yearned to be back in my dear old homeland 
and was just about to shake the dust of the journey from me when I was recalled 
again to life by the promise and reassurance of your recovery.  90
This passage doesn’t seem vulnerable to the same easy objections as Wagner’s 
so-called erotic death cult. Julius doesn’t immediately rush to suicide. Rather 
the imagined death of Lucinde inspires him to a long life of what he calls 
divine service. He dreams that, at the chronological end of life, he completes 
life through a “simultaneously ethical and aesthetic act: the wilful 
foreshortening of the narrative thread of [his] biography”.  91
What Schlegel is doing in this passage is mediating between the individual 
and the infinite (or indivisible eternal humanity). While we might retain some 
concerns about his “longing for dissolution and freedom” in death, as Saul 
notes, “the emphasis lies rather on the finite side of the equation”. That is, as 
Novalis says, death becomes the romantic principle of life. 
To return to Nietzsche, we can say that his characterisation of romanticism 
is at best unsubtle. On the other hand, if we keep in mind that the targets of his 
most emphatic polemics against romanticism are Schopenhauer and Wagner—
his anti-romantic self-treatment is directed against that romanticism he himself 
had previously endorsed—these more moderate romantic positions show us 
how we might reconcile his statements about the passion for knowledge and 
death in Dawn with his rejection of metaphysical delusions in The Gay 
Science, namely by finding, for the thought of death, a this-worldly 
consolation. 
 Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University 90
of Minneapolis Press, 1971), 117–18.
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Nietzsche thinks that knowledge can serve as such a consolation. In Dawn’s 
figuration of the passion for knowledge he makes just this claim: “mankind 
must believe itself to be more sublime and more consoled under the 
compulsion and suffering of [the passion for knowledge] than it did 
formerly”.  There are two parts to the effect of the passion for knowledge on 92
humanity. First, it gives a greater access to the feeling of the sublime than has 
previously been available. It achieves this by aestheticising the potential fatal 
consequences of the search for knowledge in the manner of a glorious 
Liebestod. In section 427, this is the task he sets for philosophy, to “discover 
the mightiest beauty in precisely the wild, ugly sides of science”.  The 93
consolation of knowledge is better expressed in The Gay Science, that with the 
principle that life can be lived as a means to knowledge—“one can live not 
only boldly but even gaily, and laugh gaily too”.  What Nietzsche means is 94
that the pains, sorrows, and disappointments of life can be redeemed under the 
understanding that they serve the search for knowledge. 
There is an obvious tension internal to the passion for knowledge. 
Knowledge, on Nietzsche’s account, inevitably dissolves our aesthetic 
productions.  This must include the sublime character of knowledge. Rather 95
than reconciling this tension, Nietzsche enshrines it as a law of “ebb and flow”. 
As he writes in a note from 1881: 
We must love and nurture error; it is the womb of knowledge. Art as the 
nurturing of illusions—our cult. To love and promote life for the sake of 
knowledge, to love and promote illusion for the sake of life. The fundamental 
condition of all passion for knowledge is to give existence an aesthetic meaning, 
to augment our taste for it. Thus, we discover here, too, a night and a day as the 
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conditions for our lives: desiring knowledge and desiring error are ebb and flow. 
Ruled by one absolute, mankind would perish and with it its capacities.  96
Conclusion 
The distinction Nietzsche sketched in the Attempt at Self-Criticism between 
romantic and Dionysian pessimism is at the crux of his anti-Romanticism. In 
the Birth of Tragedy, and even, it might appear, in Dawn, Nietzsche 
countenances that death be preferable to the disappointment of a passion, and 
in particular any regression of knowledge. Even the slightest of 
disappointments for the jealous lover is intolerable in this world, and requires 
the radical cure of exit. This is precisely the practical nihilism Nietzsche 
describes in ASC, to prefer the oblivion of death to worldly suffering. In The 
Gay Science on the other hand, Nietzsche devises a means by which to both 
bear the disappointments of life and negotiate the dangers of the passion for 
knowledge. 
Nietzsche proposes to frustrate the passion for knowledge in the service of 
life. In doing so he achieves the same as the troubadours, who refashioned the 
mystical love of god into a sublime this-worldly passion. Nietzsche takes and 
treats his own early romanticism, by perfecting his control of the passions, to 
achieve a new kind of philosophical health. 
In the preface to The Gay Science we find Nietzsche’s clearest enunciation 
of the relationship between philosophy and health. By engaging in philosophy, 
one inscribes one's own state of health or sickness onto “the heaven of 
concepts”,  which can then be interpreted as signs or symptoms of the 97
conditions of the philosopher’s life. In this preface, Nietzsche turns his 
 KSA 9:11[162], translated in Mazzino Montinari, Reading Nietzsche, trans. Greg Whitlock 96
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diagnostic eye back on his own work, and claims that The Gay Science is a 
work of a convalescent spirit, emerging from a period of severe sickness. 
The Gay Science concludes Nietzsche’s middle period and the so-called free 
spirit trilogy—during which Nietzsche practiced “long and dangerous exercises 
of self-mastery”.  It marks the emergence of a “new happiness”  which 98 99
stands in stark contrast to Human, All Too Human’s “pale, subtle happiness 
[…] without yes [and] without no”.  The happiness of The Gay Science is a 100
fundamentally affi rmative happiness; the free spirit trilogy reaches its 
apotheosis in book four with the double yes-saying of amor fati and the eternal 
recurrence. These affirmations flow from a revival of the passions. That 
Nietzsche recovers from the romanticism of The Birth of Tragedy and the 
Stoicism of Human, All Too Human depends the recuperation and 
incorporation of the passions and his courtly contortion of the passion for 
knowledge in The Gay Science. 
 GS P 3.98
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5. Diagnosing Eternity 
Nietzsche’s recuperation of the passions, and specifically the passion for 
knowledge, furnishes him with the means to develop a novel ethics of 
affirmation. Hitherto, he claims, philosophy has only been rendered life 
valuable in relation to ‘higher’ metaphysical or theological principles. That is, 
life has only been conditionally affirmed. Under his diagnostic eye, these higher 
principles have been exposed as symptoms of weakness or impoverishment. 
Nietzsche’s task is to revalue conditions of human existence which previous 
philosophies simply efface. 
In the previous chapter I set the passion for knowledge as Nietzsche’s post-
Christian and post-Romantic renovation of the traditional philosophical drive 
to truth, which he re-conceives as passional in the mould of the troubadours’ 
passionate courtly love. As both Plato and Nietzsche agree, the passions put 
eternity at stake and the passion for knowledge is no different.  Nietzsche 1
challenges Plato’s account of the passions, however, by developing a novel 
conception of eternity. This conception, he claims, arrests the philosophical 
flight from transience. In this chapter I examine in turn the objections 
Nietzsche levies against Plato, Stoicism, and Epicureanism, through the lens of 
their respective figurations of transience and eternity. In doing so I set the stage 
for the next chapter, in which I show how the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
undergirds the ethics of passionate affirmation we find in The Gay Science. 
Nietzsche contests the characterisations of eternity present in the main 
ethical traditions of antiquity, because he argues these characterisations express 
pathological judgments on the value of existence. In Platonism, the eternal is 
conceived as unchanging, perfect, and immune to the passage of time. In 
 Compare Symp. 206a “love loves the good to be one's own for ever” and GS 295 where a 1
“faith of passion” is “faith in eternity”.
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Stoicism, the eternal appears as the dynamic, but lawful and rational 
procession of nature. In Epicureanism, eternity figures in the infinite descent of 
dead atoms through void, as the painlessness before birth and after death to 
which the philosopher aspires. Nietzsche holds that these figures’ veneration of 
the unchanging, the rational, and the painless entails a concomitant contempt 
for transient particulars and the natural lives these transient particulars 
comprise. Nietzsche develops the thought of the eternal recurrence as an 
expression of an ethics which affirms our this-worldly entanglement with 
transient particulars. Bernd Magnus poses the thought of the eternal recurrence 
as an “eternalistic counter-myth” to classical figurations of eternity.  Such 2
figurations are expressions of an inherent aversion to time and transience, 
which he terms kronophobia. Classical figurations palliate kronophobia by 
positing an eternity which escapes the failings of temporal existence—
vulnerability to change, to contingency, and painful yearnings of desire—and 
setting this escape from temporality as the highest human aspiration. In 
Nietzsche’s words, they express a spirit of revenge against the temporal world 
itself. As a philosophical therapist he seeks to treat this traditional 
philosophical aversion to transience and return our attention to the temporal 
world. 
Plato 
As I have shown in chapter three, Nietzsche reads Platonic ethics as an attempt 
to escape the sorrows of transient existence. Socrates escapes the danger of 
passionate attachment to transient physical objects by directing his eros 
towards the stable and ever-present form of the good. The task of philosophy is 
to follow Socrates up the scala amoris thereby transcending the mortal world, 
 Bernd Magnus, “Nietzsche's Eternalistic Counter-Myth,” The Review of Metaphysics 26, no. 2
4 (1973), 615.
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and partaking in the immortality of the gods.  In chapter three our focus was 3
on the proper structure of a philosophical life according to Plato; in the current 
section I attend to Plato’s conception of eternity in justifying this life and to 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence in disrupting it. 
Recall that Plato’s aim is to resolve the predicament in which non-
philosophical human love finds itself with regards to the transient nature of its 
object, namely the discrepancy between human erotic aspirations—for eternal 
possession—and natural possibilities—of failure, loss, and death. On the one 
hand, the human lover wants her object in perpetuity; on the other, the finitude 
of natural objects prevents the satisfaction of this desire. Plato claims to have 
solved this predicament by finding a realm in which the aspirations of human 
desire can be met. He promises to do away with the pains of worldly 
attachments if only the unhappy human lover directs her attention towards the 
realm of the perfect eternal forms. Contemplation of the forms grants the 
philosopher a stable happiness, and secures her from the dangers of loving, 
even valuing, transient particulars. As Hannah Arendt notes, Plato’s 
inauguration of eternity as the highest human aspiration displaces the drive to 
immortality of earlier Greek religion. Plato and Socrates develop a way of life 
that aims at deliverance from time, rather than infinite duration. Since this 
Platonic (or, as Arendt suggests, Socratic) impetus, philosophy has fabricated a 
series of contemplative objects named eternity which compensate in the ideal 
for the failings of temporal existence.  4
The forms provide Plato with stable objects of love. The forms are not only 
stable but perfect. That is, they are complete in themselves and could never be 
otherwise to what they are. We might say that the forms do not admit of 
counterfactual hypotheses. This gives rise to an opposition between the forms 
 Symp. 212a.3
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as manifestations of perfection and transient particulars in the natural world as 
imperfect, deficient copies. The perfection of the forms both draws one’s 
attention away from the natural world and instills contempt for transient 
particulars as deficient. Plato posits the realm of the forms as a better existence 
that the natural world fails to live up to.  
Plato develops this account of the philosophical life, as we have seen in 
chapter three, in response to cultural conditions in fifth century Athens. He 
offers up Socrates as an alternative to Homeric ethical models, most especially 
the hero Achilles. But not only is Socrates an alternative, Plato presents him as 
a rival to Achilles’ heroism: Socrates trumps Achilles with a new heroic ideal. 
Achilles subordinates life to immortal honour, when he stays to fight in Troy.  5
Socrates subordinates life to reason, being “the kind of man who listens to 
nothing within [him] but the argument that on reflection seems best”.  They 6
share the “absolute subordination of everything each values to one 
superlatively precious thing”.  Besides this continuity, however, Socrates is 7
unlike Achilles in almost every respect. Most importantly, the site of his 
heroism is his struggle to overcome, masters, and extirpate the savage and 
unruly passions that characterise Achilles. Achilles’ grief over the death of 
Patroclus, and his vengeance against Hector’s corpse, allow Homer to claim the 
passions as the only source of a life worthy of immortality. Socrates trumps 
Achilles by finding a form of immortality impervious to fortune and immune to 
grief. “Desiring the kind of happiness [Socrates] does, he can’t lose”.  In 8
 Hom. Il. 9.410–16.5
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chapter six we will see Nietzsche return to grief like that of Achilles, in his own 
anti-Platonic ethical model.  9
Plato, then, teaches the purification of eros of attachments to transient 
particulars for the elimination of grief. The highest form of love is directed at 
an object with no temporal existence, arrived at through pure intellection. 
Turning to The Gay Science, we see that Nietzsche also considers coming to 
love as a process of purification, most clearly in GS 334. In this section, 
entitled “One must learn to love”, Nietzsche describes how we fall in love with 
a tune and, by extension, all things that we now love, “even he who loves 
himself”.  It is, he claims, only by patient attention that we first come to 10
distinguish and isolate an object from its surrounds. With hospitality, goodwill, 
and gentleness towards it, the object “sheds its veil and turns out to be a new 
and indescribable beauty”.  11
 We can note a number of consequences of the account contained in this 
section. First, the object of love throughout the purification of love remains a 
worldly particular. Where Plato’s ascent proceeds from a transient particular to 
its idealised perfections by means of pure intellection, the purification that 
Nietzsche offers works by striping away counterfactual hypotheses. Through 
goodwill and patient attention, the transient particulars we encounter appear 
beautiful, indispensable, and necessary. An object of love charms us as 
“enraptured lovers who desire nothing better from the world than it and only 
it”.   12
 For an extended discussion of the contest between Plato and Homer and their respective 9
avatars Socrates and Achilles, see Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and 
the Impersonal Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), especially chapter 7 
“The threat of Achilles”.
 GS 334.10
 GS 334.11
 GS 334.12
 127
Second, while GS 334 speaks the language of revelation (and, recall the 
troubadour’s ambiguous position between revelation and production of 
beauty), earlier in book four Nietzsche comes down firmly, with the Romantics, 
on the side of beauty as an artefact of human production.  Some part of the 13
troubadour’s ambiguity survives, however, in Nietzsche’s analysis of how the 
contemplative type bestows value on the world in GS 301. The contemplative, 
he thinks, always overlooks her own active contribution to the world of value; 
she considers herself only a spectator and listener, without recognising her 
creative power in fabricating the variegated world. In fact, she is both 
fashioner of and spectator on the world. This forgetfulness is not so much a 
failure on the part of the contemplative, but a mark of her success—her 
aesthetic contribution to the world is so enchanting as to fool its very author. 
A Platonist might defend a metaphysical account of love by claiming it does 
account for a love of transient particulars inasmuch as it participates in the 
eternal form of the beautiful. As shown in chapter three, it is questionable 
whether the purest Platonic lover remains attached to any of the particulars on 
which she started her ascent. Nevertheless, the human production of beauty 
provides an additional point of difference for Nietzsche’s account. Beauty, 
along with “the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, 
perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations,” is given to nature through 
artistic means.  Artists may lie when they layer beautiful appearances over 14
things (that are never beautiful in themselves)  but, as Nietzsche describes in 15
an important passage from book two of The Gay Science, an appearance 
draped over an object, over time, “gradually grows to be part of the thing and 
 See GS 299 and 301.13
 GS 301.14
 GS 299.15
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turns into its very body”.  In artistic production, according to Nietzsche, 16
appearances become essences, and over time the poet’s words become flesh. 
Not only are the objects of love subject to transience; so too are the value 
predicates which attach to them. Nietzsche’s lover is thus doubly exposed to 
the vicissitudes of temporality. Not only can harm or death come to a beautiful 
particular, as a Platonist may well concede. Value-predicates, as human 
fabrications in a transient world, are themselves just as vulnerable to the 
passage of time as the particulars to which they lend their lustre.  17
The gaia scienza of the troubadours translated religious forms of veneration 
into the human realm. In a similar manner, Nietzsche’s gay science contends to 
translate love—conceptually grounded in the Platonic tradition on an 
affirmation of another metaphysical world and a concomitant negation of 
nature—into a this-worldly affirmation. 
Stoicism 
Nietzsche connects his this-worldly account of love to eternity in a complex 
manner. In order to do so, in the context of his rejection of Platonic 
transcendence, he requires a figure of eternity that does not stand against the 
temporal world. He finds this in the thought of the eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche himself acknowledges that this thought is not entirely foreign to the 
history of philosophy, claiming to have detected “traces of it” in the 
Stoics. Although the eternal recurrence finds its popular presentation as a 18
practical doctrine in GS 341, the thought first occurs earlier in that volume, at 
GS 109. Nietzsche introduces his doctrine in a discussion of the scientific de-
deification of nature which opens book three of The Gay Science. This book 
 GS 58.16
 In connection with this possibility see GS 328.17
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begins with section 108’s announcement of the death of god. Despite god’s 
demise, Nietzsche warns, his “shadows” will remain projected on the world 
thousands of years hence.  Nietzsche’s point, here and in the related section 19
125, is that because God has stood as a transcendent guarantor of meaning 
and purpose, disbelief in God also threatens "supposedly secular truths that 
have nonetheless lost their pedigree and intellectual warrant”.  20
The task Nietzsche sets in the following sections, most importantly GS 109, 
is to dispel belief in unwarranted theological claims. Nietzsche catalogues such 
shadows of god, including the beliefs that the universe is an organism, that 
existence has a purpose, and the nature operates lawfully. More generally he 
attacks our “aesthetic anthropomorphisms” [ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten] as 
ultimately depending on divine or metaphysical warrant. 
“The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not 
of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and 
whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms”  21
Nietzsche attacks the application of anthropomorphic predicates to the world 
as a whole or judgements on the “total character” of existence. Under the eye 
of knowledge, such judgements are vacuous—“None of our aesthetic or moral 
judgements apply to [the universe]”.  Science, he says, reveals only the world 22
as a chaotic tumult of bare necessities to which the application of 
anthropomorphic predicates is an error. The progress of science will “de-deify” 
nature, correcting these errors, on the way to delivering nature “pure, newly 
discovered, [and] newly redeemed”.  The de-deification of nature, Nietzsche 23
 “There may still be caves for thousands of years in which [God’s] shadow will be 19
shown” (GS 108).
 Lawrence Hatab, “Nietzsche, Nature, and Life Affirmation,” in Nietzsche and the Becoming 20
of Life, ed. Vanessa Lemm (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 36.
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suggests, will grants us the means to “naturalise” humanity or to reconcile 
humanity with nature. 
In this difficult section, Nietzsche appears to sanction the wholesale 
dissolution of aesthetic predicates that have hitherto attached value to the 
world. Paul Loeb suggests as much in his analysis of the thought of the eternal 
recurrence. In GS 109, Loeb claims, Nietzsche first reveals the truth about the 
universe—that underneath all appearances lies the chaotic reality of eternally 
recurring flux—and recommends the extraction of aesthetic predicates which 
have preserved life hitherto.  Loeb devotes significant attention to Nietzsche’s 24
contention that, “judged from the vantage point of our reason” the universe is 
a “Spielwerk” (a plaything or musical mechanism) whose eternally recurrent 
tune “must never be called a melody”.  This passage is the first published 25
reference to the thought of the eternal recurrence (preceding GS 285 and the 
celebrated GS 341) and has the advantage, on Loeb’s account, of lending itself 
to a cosmological reading of the doctrine. The truth of the eternal recurrence is 
opposed to a collection of false predicates given to the world by our 
theological and aesthetic projections. Science dissolves these predicates by 
showing that they have no objective basis. The discipline of science therefore 
liberates us of our attachment to erroneously-valued objects in the world. 
It would seem, then, as if GS 109 establishes a prohibition of the projection 
of aesthetic predicates in favour of a world stripped of colour and melody. If 
so, we should read it as an endorsement of the disciplined Stoic withdrawal of 
value from externals. Nietzsche makes the connection between the solvent 
power of science and Stoic withdrawal explicit in GS 12, where he claims both 
Stoicism and modern science serve the same goal: purifying us of both the 
 Paul Loeb, “Eternal Recurrence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford 24
University Press, 2013), 656.
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pleasures and pains caused by our investments in transient particulars. 
Reflecting on science in the second volume to The Gay Science, he considers 
the natural-scientific interpretation of the world as a bare mechanism to yield 
an “essentially meaningless world”.  Natural scientists who evacuate the 26
world of value fail to grasp the rich ambiguity of existence and “nothing of 
what is ‘music’ in it”.  27
If Nietzsche in 1886 turns away from the intellectual Stoicism of his natural 
scientist contemporaries, we have pause to consider whether this marks a 
change in position from the earlier GS 109, or whether GS 109 can avoid a 
charge of Stoicism. We have a second reason for care in interpreting GS 109’s 
relation to Stoicism, namely the difficulty the extraction of aesthetic predicates 
would pose for Nietzsche’s ethical program in book four. We have already seen 
that Nietzsche conceptualises love in musical terms. In GS 334 he claims there 
is “no other way” to come to love another or oneself but by a process modelled 
on coming to love a musical figure. If GS 109 establishes a prohibition on the 
application of aesthetic (and especially musical) predicates in general, this 
threatens the aesthetic grounds for an affirmation of life. The following section 
asks whether knowledge can be incorporated into life. If the chaotic and 
eternally recurrent flux Nietzsche describes in GS 109 rules out the aesthetic 
techniques and practices involved in every means of learning to love, then the 
answer to the question is no, before any experimentation has taken place. 
Nietzsche does not draw this immediate conclusion, and indeed considers its 
unsettledness one of life’s greatest temptations.  28
 GS 373, emphasis in original.26
 GS 373.27
 “I find [life] truer, more desirable and mysterious every year—ever since the day when the 28
great liberator came to me: the idea that life could be an experiment of the seeker for 
knowledge” (GS 324).
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Nietzsche employs musical metaphors to describe two contrasting aspects 
of his account of the progress of science. He celebrates the absence of melody 
in the scientific world view, but decries that along with melody, modern science 
has lost an ear for all musical qualities. Returning to GS 109, we can come to 
terms with this passage and the intellectual Stoicism it appears to condone, by 
giving attention to the significant yet puzzling distinction Nietzsche draws 
between Weise (tune) and Melodie. If the eternal recurrence has a tune, but not 
a melody, this contrast will point the way towards reconciling scientific 
disenchantment (with Melodie) with the amorous enchantment he describes in 
terms of eine Weise in GS 334 and how this reconciliation might recuperate the 
notion of eternity into this-worldly, temporal life. 
Nietzsche’s prohibition on Melodie in this context recalls the caution 
towards music he expresses in Human, All Too Human. This work, in which 
Nietzsche sets his erstwhile romanticism on ice, contains reflections deeply 
skeptical of the promises of music, and of art more generally. In contrast to 
The Birth of Tragedy’s treatment of art as the “true metaphysical activity of 
this life,” in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche subjects both the production 
and experience of art to naturalistic, psychological investigation. Nietzsche 
now considers the artist’s claim to privileged epistemic access to the very 
essence of the world as a mere pretence, reinforced by the praise of her 
successfully deceived audience.  The pretence and deception of art strain the 29
intellectual conscience, as Nietzsche illustrates with reference to the music of 
Beethoven: 
Art makes the thinker's heart heavy. - How strong the metaphysical need is, and how hard 
nature makes it to bid it a final farewell, can be seen from the fact that even when the free 
spirit has divested himself of everything metaphysical the highest effects of art can easily 
set the metaphysical strings, which have long been silent or indeed snapped apart, 
vibrating in sympathy; so it can happen, for example, that a passage in Beethoven's Ninth 
Symphony will make him feel he is hovering above the earth in a dome of stars with the 
dream of immortality in his heart: all the stars seem to glitter around him and the earth 
 HH 32.29
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seems to sink farther and farther away. - If he becomes aware of being in this condition he 
feels a profound stab in the heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost 
love, whether she be called religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his 
intellectual probity [intellectualer Charakter] is put to the test.  30
The danger of art is in tempting us back to religion and metaphysics. Nietzsche 
evocatively describes the way in which Beethoven’s Symphony no. 9 draws its 
audience up to a fictitious cosmic perspective, at a remove from earthly 
concerns and interests. In this state one feels as if one is taking part in a 
rational ordered cosmos, and the dream of immortality displaces the fear of 
death. Music is particularly seductive according to Nietzsche, even for those 
who have cultivated a stringent intellectual probity. Modern music tempts us 
with such a promise of joy, grandeur, and moral ecstasy that “even the noble 
and self-controlled always drink from it a drop too much”.  Music’s danger, 31
and the danger of describing the world as a Melodie, is capitulation to 
metaphysics. 
Nietzsche’s focus on music and, more specifically, Melodie echoes the 
central position these concepts occupy in Schopenhauer’s aesthetic system, 
expounded in book three of The World as Will and Representation. Sketching 
out this position will require a brief explanation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of art.  
The general purpose of art, according to Schopenhauer, is to engender “a 
special kind of consciousness or perception which is uniquely aesthetic”.  He 32
counterposes this aesthetic experience to the ordinary experience of the world 
by the distinctive character of both its subject and object. In the course of 
ordinary experience, one considers oneself an empirical individual, occupying a 
particular body, surrounded by objects similarly located in space and time. 
 HH 153. Note that this passage predates Nietzsche’s use of the term Redlichkeit, honesty or 30
probity, from Dawn on.
 AOM 159.31
 Julian Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 32
1.6, p10.
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Schopenhauer inherits from Kant the notion that a metaphysical substratum 
exists in-itself, antecedent to the empirical world. Experience comes about 
when the thing-in-itself is determined according to the various necessary 
conditions of appearance, including the categories of space, time, and causality. 
For Schopenhauer, unlike Kant, the body plays an important role as the locus 
of this determination: relations between an individual and her surrounds is 
mediated by a body “whose affections constitute its starting-point, and which 
is itself only willing made concrete”.  The subject of ordinary experience, 33
then, is this time-bound individual who experiences the world through the 
incessant and painful demands of the body, expressing the ceaseless striving of 
the underlying metaphysical will. The objects of ordinary experience also 
relate, in the end, back to the will. Cognition, perception, and sensibility are, 
“just like the other parts of organic beings, expressions of the will” at higher 
levels of objectivation.  Consequently, “the representation which arises 34
through them also serves the will as a means for achieving its now complicated 
ends of maintaining a creature with diverse needs”.  Schopenhauer’s 35
conclusion is that the individual of ordinary experience always considers 
objects from the perspective of her diverse needs. Ordinary experience is 
always “interested”.  36
Aesthetic experience involves a transformation of both the subject and 
object of ordinary experience. As Schopenhauer summarises,  
 WWR 1.32.33
 WWR 1.33. I follow Norman, Welchman, and Janaway’s coinage of “objectivation” for the 34
process whereby the will, the thing-in-itself, “becomes object” in the world of appearance 
(WWR I, l).
 WWR 1.33.35
 As Julian Young (1992, 6) notes, Nietzsche recognises and celebrates this feature of 36
Schopenhauer’s thought. The “instrumental” character of ordinary consciousness according to 
Schopenhauer resurfaces in Nietzsche’s developmental explanation of the origins of knowledge 
in life-preserving errors (GS 110).
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there are two inseparable components of the aesthetic way of looking at things: cognition 
of the object, not as a particular thing but rather as a Platonic Idea, i.e. as a permanent 
form of this whole genus of things; and then the self-consciousness of the one who has this 
cognition, not as an individual, but as pure, will-less subject of cognition.  37
When the subject undergoes aesthetic experience, she finds not a representation 
of a particular thing in space and time, to which she relates according to her 
own interests, but one of the Ideas, the “original, unchanging forms and 
qualities” of particular things.  Following Plato, Schopenhauer claims that 38
particulars are merely deficient imitations of the forms. He also claims that the 
Ideas stand in some relation to the will, which he identifies with Kant’s thing-
in-itself. Schopenhauer reconciles the Platonic and Kantian characterisations of 
the Ideas in the claim that Kant overlooked “being-an-object-for-a-subject” as a 
necessary conditions of appearance.  The Ideas are, according to 39
Schopenhauer, the thing-in-itself made object. Because “being-an-object-for-a-
subject” is “the first and most universal form of all appearance”, the Ideas 
stand behind each and every particular appearance, as Plato had it.  40
Nevertheless, they represent the will subject to the condition of being-an-
object-for-a-subject, they stand at a remove from the Kantian thing-in-itself. As 
the “immediate and therefore adequate” objectivation of the will, the Ideas 
stand outside of time.  In aesthetic experience, then, one is confronted not by 41
a particular landscape, tree, cliff, or building, but by the eternal species to 
which such particulars belong. 
Cognition of the Ideas transforms the subject of aesthetic experience. The 
subject is gripped by contemplation of the forms. Schopenhauer describes how 
 WWR 1.38.37
 WWR 1.30.38
 WWR 1.32.39
 WWR 1.32.40
 WWR 1.32. For Schopenhauer, as for Plato, transience is the chief deficiency of particulars. 41
Time is “merely the scattered and dismembered perspective that an individual being has of the 
Ideas that are outside of time and therefore eternal”.
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one loses oneself in the object of contemplation completely: “we forget our 
individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, the clear 
mirror of the object […] a pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of 
cognition”.  This state involves the suspension of almost all conditions of 42
appearance (most importantly time) except objectivation, which conditions 
even the Ideas. Through the intellect, one momentarily escapes the world 
populated by transient particulars and ruled by the will. Schopenhauer 
illustrates this freedom from the will with the sculpture of Apollo Belvedere, 
whose head sits “so freely on its shoulders that it seems entirely wrenched 
away from the body and no longer subject to its cares”.  43
This is the general structure and function of art, according to Schopenhauer. 
Different art forms are distinguished by the degree of clarity and perfection 
with which they represent the essence of the will, mediated by the Ideas. 
Schopenhauer enumerates the arts from the crudest, architecture, concerned 
with the interplay of Ideas such as gravity and rigidity, to poetry, which 
faithfully represents the essence of humanity. 
Uniquely among the arts, music does not use the Ideas to indirectly 
represent the essence of the will. Instead, Schopenhauer claims that music is an 
“unmediated objectivation and copy of the entire will”.  Whereas the non-44
musical arts invite cognition of the Ideas in order to represent the will, music 
grants direct access to the metaphysical world. Because music bypasses both 
the Ideas (as fractured objectivations of the will) and the world of transient 
particulars (as the will conditioned by time, space and causality under the aegis 
of the principle of sufficient reason), Schopenhauer concludes that music 
 WWR 1.34.42
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provides direct insight into existence purified of these perspectival distortions.  45
Music allows one to cognise the “essence” of the will and not merely its 
“shadows”.  46
Melodie occupies a privileged position within music, according to 
Schopenhauer, due to the clarity with which it contributes to this cognitive 
task. Recall that the non-music arts indirectly represent the will, by means of 
Ideas, in ascending grades of clarity and perfection. The plurality of the Ideas 
comprise a total objectivation of the will, encompassing the basest (gravity, 
rigidity) through to the grandest (humanity) of Ideas. Since both the plurality 
of the Ideas and music are “copies” of the will, Schopenhauer concludes that 
there must exist an analogous grading of musical voices to the grades of Ideas. 
The lowest notes of harmony, like the aesthetic apprehension of architecture, 
express the lowest grades of the objectivation of the will. In like manner, 
Melodie directly expresses what poetry only achieves by means of the Ideas, the 
essence of the will at its highest grade of clarity in human affairs. 
In melody, the high-singing, principal voice that guides the whole, moving forward with 
unhindered freedom so as to join everything from beginning to end seamlessly together 
into a single, meaningful thought, a principal voice presenting a whole, – in this I recognize 
the highest level of the objectivation of the will, the thoughtful living and striving of 
human beings. Only human beings, being endowed with reason, keep looking forwards 
and backwards over the course of their actual life as well as their countless possibilities, 
thereby achieving a life course that, in being thoughtful, is a coherent whole: – 
correspondingly, only melody is joined up from beginning to end in a way that is full both 
of purpose and significance.  47
This passage on the importance of melody clarifies the position that 
Nietzsche is arguing against when he prohibits the application of melody to 
existence. Melody represents the will at its highest grade of clarity in human 
affairs. Schopenhauer thinks this is evidenced by the manner in which a 
melodic line departs, deviates, and eventually returns to the tonic. The 
 Music “could in a sense still exist even if there were no world at all” (WWR 1.52).45
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manifold different intervals and arrangements possible within a melody express 
“the many different forms of the striving of the will”, while its return to the 
tonic expresses satisfaction.  In the creation of a melody the composer unveils 48
“the deepest secrets of human willing and sensation”.  The musical function 49
of the melody is to tie a range of disparate voices into a coherent whole. It 
grants a piece of music a single unifying narrative, full of purpose and 
significance: melody bestows order on the whole of a musical piece. 
In addition to expressing deep truths about the human will, Schopenhauer 
claims on the basis of the analogy he draws between music and the non-
musical arts, that music conveys deep metaphysical truths. We recognise in 
melody, according to Schopenhauer, the unity, purpose, and significance of the 
metaphysical will’s ceaseless striving. Melodie tells us that the world comprises 
a single meaningful whole and invites us to cognise this whole by an analogy 
with the human will, namely in terms of a continual striving towards 
satisfaction. This is precisely the invitation, and temptation, that Nietzsche 
warns against when he prohibits Melodie from his aesthetic projects. 
Loeb refers to Nietzsche’s use of music in GS 109 as an allusion to the 
“Pythagorean tradition of using music to explain the cosmos” and associates 
the putatively-cosmological discussion of the eternal recurrence in this section 
with his “earlier explicit discussion of the Pythagorean cosmological theory of 
eternal recurrence” in the second untimely meditation.  He associates the 50
figure of the music box with Pythagoras to buttress his cosmological 
interpretation of GS 109 whereby, as we have seen, the de-deification of nature 
implies the Stoic withdrawal of false value-predicates. 
 WWR 1.52.48
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The passage Loeb cites occurs within Nietzsche’s second Untimely 
Meditation on history. In this essay, Nietzsche examines the practical use of 
history in response to three sets of human needs. He outlines three 
corresponding modes of historical activity. The reference to Pythagoras occurs 
during the discussion of “monumental” history—history as it pertains to 
human action and striving. Monumental history depicts a chain of human 
greatness “like a range of human mountain peaks”, the sight of which stirs 
ambition and courage in the present.  For those who need monumental 51
history, “looking to the past impels them towards the future” in order that they 
repeat, or attempt to repeat, that greatness once more.  It reminds those in the 52
present of the breadth of the horizon of the possible, “that the greatness that 
once existed was in any event once possible and may thus be possible 
again”.  This mode of history bears practical fruit inasmuch as the example of 53
past greatness provokes action in the present. Those hoping to transform 
culture in Germany, for example, might take heart from a monumentalised 
Renaissance as evidence that their task is possible. Immediately, however, 
Nietzsche qualifies the prospect of historical repetition: 
And yet - to learn something new straightaway from this example - how inexact, fluid and 
provisional that comparison would be! How much of the past would have to be 
overlooked if it was to produce that mighty effect, how violently what is individual in it 
would have to be forced into a universal mould and all its sharp corners and hard outlines 
broken up in the interest of conformity! At bottom, indeed, that which was once possible 
could present itself as a possibility for a second time only if the Pythagoreans were right in 
believing that when the constellation of the heavenly bodies is repeated the same things, 
down to the smallest event, must also be repeated on earth  54
Monumental history gives us hope for the repetition of an event resembling a 
past monumentalised event. It does not, importantly, promise the recurrences 
of identical particular events. It always deals in “approximations and 
 HL 2.51
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generalities”, makes “what is dissimilar look similar” and “diminish[es] the dif-
ferences of motives and instigations” so as to present the past as “something 
exemplary and worthy of imitation”.  Monumental history relies on the 55
falsification of the past. It aims at the incorporation of history into practical 
life in order to transform that life. The success of monumental history hinges 
upon this practical transformation. In the foreword to this essay Nietzsche 
poses the impetus to history in these practical terms: “we need [history] for life 
and for action”.  56
Because it serves a practical need, monumental history stops short of an 
attempt to depict the past in absolute veracity. An unconditional will to 
historical truth, a hypertrophy of the historical sense, is indeed the target of the 
essay. A scientific approach to history, which sought to fully understand 
relations of historical cause and effect, “would only demonstrate that the dice-
game of chance and the future could never again produce anything exactly 
similar to what it produced in the past”.  57
Nietzsche uses the Pythagoreans not to endorse their musical cosmology, 
but to illustrate failure of history. We might take monumental history as 
indicative of the return of identical particular events only by closing our eyes to 
its approximations and distortions—at the cost of the regression of scientific 
knowledge—once “astronomers have again become astrologers”.  Nietzsche 58
also indicates the dependence of Pythagorean theory of recurrence on a 
parallelism between events on earth and a recurrent celestial order. This is 
precisely the position Nietzsche warns against in GS 109—“positing generally 
and everywhere anything as elegant as the cyclical movements of our 
 HL 2.55
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neighbouring stars”.  At best, the second Untimely Meditation remains 59
neutral on the cosmological issues disputed in GS 109. 
Nietzsche uses music, and in particular melody, in GS 109 to single out the 
aesthetic experience of a deified nature. And, pace Loeb, this experience is not a 
revelation of the essence of existence, but a mystification which modern science 
purports to dispel. The experience of nature as melody is underwritten by the 
beliefs, with which Nietzsche begins his enumeration of the shadows of god, 
that the universe is an organism, that existence has a purpose, and that nature 
operates lawfully. “God is dead” rejects transcendent theism.  GS 109 warns 60
against the application of derivative theological predicates to nature, that is, 
pantheism. 
Nietzsche opposes pantheism with the claim that nature is chaotic, “in the 
sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order”.  During the 61
preparation of The Gay Science, Nietzsche frequently puts his opposition to 
pantheism in these terms. A note sketching the structure of the forthcoming 
Zarathustra from 1881 has the first book describing “Chaos sive natura”.  62
Nietzsche modifies, and parodies, Spinoza’s slogan for pantheism Deus sive 
natura by substituting chaos for god.  While Nietzsche had only just seriously 63
encountered Spinoza for the first time (an encounter that left him overjoyed), 
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he would have been familiar with Schopenhauer’s polemic against Spinoza’s 
pantheism.  64
Nietzsche’s engagement with Stoicism during the early 1880s provides 
another occasion for him to mount an objection to pantheistic beliefs and 
commitments. This is especially apparent in the case of “cosmic” Stoicism, the 
strain of Stoic thought in which one finds alleviation from the fear of mortality 
and temporality through communion with a purposive and rational cosmic 
whole. This form of Stoicism formulates a concept of eternity that enables the 
Stoic to become indifferent to temporality. 
Cosmic Stoicism, exemplified in chapter one by Marcus Aurelius, grounds 
Stoic indifference in attaining a cosmic point-of-view of the whole, whereby the 
emotional travails of earthly life shrink into comparative (and actual) 
insignificance. Marcus reminds himself of his power, 
to strip away many superfluous troubles located wholly in [his] judgement, and to possess 
a large room for [himself] embracing in thought the whole cosmos, to consider everlasting 
time, to think of the rapid change in the parts of each thing, of how short it is from birth 
until dissolution, and how the void before birth and that after dissolution are equally 
infinite.  65
This passage makes explicit the connection in Stoicism between the striping 
away of perspectival aesthetic predicates, and the belief in an underlying 
cosmic order which is thereby revealed. The importance of the rapidly 
changing part of nature, including those parts of ourselves subject to transience 
and eventual dissolution or death, pale in comparison to the cosmic grandeur 
of everlasting time. The figure of an eternal natural order palliates against the 
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 Marcus Aurelius 9.32.65
 143
pains caused by investing transient particulars with value and compensates for 
our impending dissolution into the “great sea of being”.  66
Cosmic Stoicism clarifies the temptation present in the false cosmological 
beliefs Nietzsche details in GS 109—why we need not only reject the shadows 
of god but beware of them. To follow Marcus in holding nature as “a single 
living organism […] with a single purpose” is to treat this anthropomorphised 
nature as if it were the possible source of a deep and abiding satisfaction.  By 67
ascending to a cosmic point of view, where one identifies with the organic, 
purposive whole, Marcus escapes from the disorder of the passions caused by 
the perspectival distortions of aesthetic value predication. Pantheism provides 
him with a means of reaping pleasure from the experience of nature, at the 
same time as eliminating pain. Cosmic Stoicism protects Marcus from the 
vagaries of temporality with an image of eternity as the rational order of the 
cosmos. 
Recall that in chapter one, cosmic Stoicism was opposed to “human” 
Stoicism, in which one finds relief from the fear of death and temporality 
through the attainment of complete rational self-possession that makes one 
impervious to time. Time can take nothing from one who is already complete 
or in complete self-possession. This notion of self-completion furnishes human 
Stoicism with a conception of eternity in terms of indifference to external 
temporal goods. 
The two conceptions of eternity considered so far—Platonic transcendence 
and Stoic pantheism—give eternity a cosmological character. The conception of 
eternity at play in human Stoicism is different in that it posits an escape from 
temporality from an evaluative, rather than cosmological, perspective. The 
emphasis of Seneca’s counsel in his Epistles to Lucilius is firmly on the need for 
 Marcus Aurelius 4.43.66
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fortitude in the face of an ‘indifferent’ external world. Seneca instructs Lucilius 
to put his own mind in order so as to endure external events.  Lucilius is to 68
cultivate his capacity for a particular kind of joy, which hinges on 
distinguishing true goods from mere indifferents (or, as Seneca derisively refers 
to them, “useless things”).  69
The description of the Stoic telos as joy, as we have seen, comes under sharp 
criticism from Nietzsche as a “casuistic delicacy”.  Seneca himself admits that 70
it is a “a stern [or severe, severa] matter”.  Nevertheless, Seneca recommends 71
Lucilius to turn away from the enjoyment of externals and to “cast aside and 
trample under food all the things that glitter outwardly”.  Rather than the 72
imaginative expansion of perspectives, which comprised the therapy of 
Marcus, Seneca finds the grounds for a rejection of external objects in a “true 
good […] which comes from [one’s] own store”.  By learning “how to feel 73
joy” from his own store, Lucilius will attain a state of internal self-completion 
which leaves him impervious to time.  74
Seneca’s consolation to Lucilius, then, offers him a form of perfection as 
completion in the moment. We saw that Stoic pantheism ascends to a state of 
perfection by identifying with an eternal cosmic order. This identification 
grants the perfection of the whole to the Stoic sage in the moment. Lucilius is 
offered the same perfection or completion, without reference to the cosmic 
order. If Lucilius achieves this completion, he has nothing to fear from death. 
 Elsewhere, for instance in the Natural Questions, Seneca adopts a more ‘cosmic’ perspective. 68
The compatibility of these two poles of the Stoic system is discussed below.
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That a complete life is possible in the present moment shows that absent 
goods, whether future or past, are not necessary for happiness. Thus Seneca’s 
instruction to “live every day as if it were a complete life”.  The complete life 75
is not defined by its duration, but by its self-sufficiency—it “depends neither on 
our years nor upon our days, but upon our minds”.  76
Eliminating the fear of death has the effect of freeing us from any kind of 
temporal attachment. Lucilius conceptualises the passage of time as itself a 
kind of death. Inasmuch as time passes, it is lost to us—“all past time is lost 
time”.  Every day “a little of our life is taken from us” and thus “we die every 77
day”.  Seneca provides us a verse of Lucilius’ own, 78
Not single is the death which comes; the death 
Which takes us off is but the last of all.  79
In the context of ubiquitous death, deliverance from the fear of death is both 
more urgent and a more powerful psychological remedy. If death is not to 
feared, then neither is the loss of any other object by the passage of time. 
Indeed, because such objects are not real goods, their passing is no real loss. 
One can meet death and the passage of time cheerfully, according to Seneca, if 
the present moment is the only time to which we ascribe value. Time “means 
nothing” to one who enjoys the present “to the full”.  One who does so is free 80
of care or greed for future, and has “no need of added years”.  81
Against the constant presence of death (which is itself simply a consequence 
of the passage of time) Seneca sets the possibility of living a complete life in the 
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present moment. That is, he suggests Lucilius can transcend temporality by 
fashioning within himself a perfectly organised whole, impervious to the 
passage of time. Seneca develops a sense of self-completion entirely 
independent of temporality. 
Nietzsche clearly rejects the Stoic project of fabricating a rationally 
organised whole, independent of transience. Lambasting the Stoics as poor 
physicians of the soul, he counterposes radical Stoic withdrawal to the 
“innumerable palliatives against pain” with which one might treat one’s losses. 
While the Stoics deny the possibility of loss, for Nietzsche admits our 
vulnerability to loss, if equivocally: “a loss is a loss” if only for “barely an 
hour”.  Nietzsche’s equivocation—a loss in the moment can be easily 82
recuperated in a short period of time—gives us pause in our consideration as to 
exactly how far he departs from Stoicism. He steadfastly rejects the Stoic’s faith 
in reason and flight from temporality. Duration and other extra-rational means 
are necessary components of Nietzsche’s philosophical therapy.  Yet at some 83
points his goal does resemble a form of completion—the fabrication of perfect 
whole, where loss, sickness and injury are reinterpreted “immediately or very 
soon” as an essential component of a whole.  84
We might also note that Seneca himself sometimes goes beyond the strict 
Stoicism of the letters to Lucilius. In his Consolation to Marcia, Seneca denies 
that he plans to “filch from [Marcia] any of [her] sufferings”.  In the same 85
letter he distances his consolation from “precepts of the sterner sort” which 
“bid [Marcia to] bear a human fortune in inhuman fashion”.  In the 86
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Consolation to Polybius, Seneca describes the wisdom of those who “deny that 
the wise man will ever grieve” (that is, especially, the Stoics) as “harsh rather 
than brave”.  Whatever the means, self-completion is still certainly Seneca’s 87
goal in these more eclectic consolations. The good of self-completion is that it 
delivers us from the disorderly conduct caused by emotional commitments to 
objects outside our own control. 
We will return to a consideration of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, and 
whether it gives him an ethical goal in the form of self-completion, in chapter 
six. For now, we should keep in mind that inasmuch as Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of duration and extra-rational means of consolation echo Seneca, 
they both depart from Stoic orthodoxy. 
Human and cosmic Stoicism present different approaches of the Stoic ethics 
of indifference. Marcus describes time as “a kind of river” and “an irresistible 
flood”.  By adopting a cosmic perspective, Marcus escapes the disruption of 88
local turbulences. Seneca maintains an individual point of view, but relies on 
the strength of an internal “guiding purpose” for the heroic endurance of 
violent currents and whirlpools.  Despite this contrast, both arrive at an ethics 89
of indifference towards transient particulars on the basis of a principle of order 
impervious to time. This agreement should not be surprising, given the 
connection the Stoics draw between the rationality of human nature and the 
rationality of the universe. It is the same regulative principle that rules in the 
individual and the cosmos, and so the difference between human and cosmic 
Stoicism is one of emphasis, rather than essence.  90
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Nietzsche diagnoses both aspects of Stoicism in turn as expressing, and 
masking, a fear of the disorder of the passions.  By fashioning eternity as an 91
perfectly ordered whole and projecting this upon the self and the cosmos, the 
Stoics seek to protect themselves from the dangers of transience. To return to 
the inauguration of the eternal recurrence in GS 109, if this is to be Nietzsche’s 
figure of eternity—an undergirding principle of a Dionysian life of the passions
—his doctrine must leave one open to the vagaries of temporality and human 
finitude. 
Epicureanism 
Nietzsche returns to the theme of GS 108–9 at the outset of book four of The 
Gay Science. He again warns against both the belief in a personal god “who is 
full of care and personally knows every little hair on our head” and belief in 
any “providential reason and goodness” in nature.  There is neither a 92
transcendent, nor an immanent, world order; only the “beautiful chaos of 
existence”.  While GS 108–9 enumerates the theological and pantheistic 93
beliefs we must guard ourselves against, GS 277 describes the circumstances 
which tempt us to such beliefs. GS 277 gives us the occasions that require us to 
exercise the caution advised in the earlier sections. The moment of greatest 
temptation, Nietzsche writes, occurs at “a certain high point in life” where 
“everything that befalls us continually turns out for the best”.  Our luck and 94
happiness seems to demand that nature and its parts are organised for our own 
benefit. At this moment, Nietzsche exhorts us to remember the gods of 
Epicurus who are wholly indifferent to our fate and entirely removed from the 
 In the case of cosmic Stoicism, GS 109 and more explicitly BGE 9. For human Stoicism, GS 91
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human world. In place of providence, Nietzsche identifies two factors necessary 
for our happiness: first, one’s own contribution to the active fabrication of the 
human world by artistic means; and second, “good old chance”, which bears 
responsibility for the most surprising and beautiful parts of the “wonderful 
harmony” of our lives.  That our artistic powers alone are insufficient for 95
happiness draws into question whether Nietzsche’s ethics can be described as a 
form of self-completion or “artistic” Stoicism, even before considering the 
elevation of the Epicureans above the Stoics in book four. 
Nietzsche’s call to remember the Epicurean gods echoes his positive 
appraisal of Epicurean physics in Human, All Too Human. Modern science, 
Nietzsche says, has sided with Epicurus over Christianity “point by point”.  96
Most importantly for the current discussion, modern science and Epicurus both 
reject, at least on Nietzsche’s account, the existence of a rational ordering of 
nature. The Epicureans denied that nature required any supernatural agency to 
regulate the turbulent descent of atoms through the void.  Rather, the atoms 97
and composite bodies fall in a straight line, except when they are knocked off 
course by collisions with each other, or diverted by the unpredictable influence 
of the clinamen or swerve. The total image of Epicurean nature is of an 
unstable, chaotic tumult of atoms falling purposelessly through the void. 
Epicureanism does without both the providential divinity of Stoicism and the 
interventionist gods of Greek myth (and later Christianity). Because they live 
wholly removed of our affairs, we have no reason to fear the gods. 
In Dawn, Nietzsche shifts his focus from the physical to the moral parallels 
between Epicureanism and modern science. This involves a shift of emphasis 
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from the Epicurean remedy against the fear of the gods to that against the fear 
of death. In particular, Nietzsche paints science’s rejection of a life after death 
as a new triumph for Epicurus.  Because we meet our definitive end at death, 98
we have nothing to fear from religious prophesies of the afterlife. In particular, 
we needn’t fear punishment in hell as retribution for conduct in this life. 
Punishment in hell is just one of the harms to which religious believers imagine 
death will expose them. Eradicating this belief is just one part of the broader 
Epicurean project to dispel the fear of death in general. 
That death is not a harm follows from the Epicureans’ negative hedonism 
and their materialist view of the soul. The experience of pain is the only harm, 
and death is the dissolution of the experiential subject. Since there is no subject 
to experience pain at or after death, death is not a harm (at least, to the one 
who ‘suffers’ it). 
The Roman Epicurean Lucretius answers a series of objections centred on 
the contention that death harms by depriving the one who dies of the goods of 
life. Lucretius claims that death can only count as a harm by means of an 
imaginative projection of the still living individual to a time after death. Death 
can only count as a harm, he argues, if there is a subject of that harm. One 
who worries about deprivation in death illicitly considers the ante-mortem 
individual subject to post-mortem harms. Normal deprivations like hunger or 
thirst are harms because they produce a painful longing for particular goods. 
To count the deprivation of life as a harm, then, is to imagine that some part of 
us survives death and that the surviving part is subject to painful longing for 
the goods of life. 
 D 72.98
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Lucretius answers this objection with a comparison of death and sleep. In 
particular he describes the restful, dreamless sleep in which we enjoy none of 
the goods of waking life and yet feel no painful longing to recover them.  99
Death is therefore to be regarded as something much less, if there can be anything less 
than what we can see to be nothing, because a greater disturbance and dispersal of 
matter ensues at death, nor does anyone wake and rise once the chill severance of life 
has overtaken him.  100
No one suffers just by virtue of dreamless sleep, which puts us at a remove 
from both the goods of waking life and the painful desire for their possession 
and enjoyment. Death removes us even further from desire’s painful longings—
in the case of the peaceful dream we will eventually be brought back to 
consciousness and waking neediness. In the case of death we are permanently 
free from desire. 
The weight of this comparison is carried by the finality of death, and the 
eternity of painless non-existence which follows. While the analogy between 
death and sleep serves to extend the indifference in which we hold sleep to 
death, a more forceful Epicurean response draws an equivalence between death 
and the eternity of non-existence before birth. Just as no one has been harmed 
by the eternity of non-existence before birth, no one will be harmed by the 
eternity of non-existence after death. There is nothing to fear in the post-
mortem void because the only harm is in pain and suffering, and non-existence 
precludes suffering. 
Keith Ansell-Pearson has drawn attention to the presence of a cosmological 
recurrence in Lucretius’ discussion of the fear of death.  Considering the 101
“past expanse of measureless time,” Lucretius suggests that “you could easily 
 In the Apology, Socrates claims that if death were such a dreamless sleep, it “would be a 99
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come to believe that these same seeds of which we are now composed have 
often been placed in the same arrangement as they are now”.  Unlike 102
Nietzsche’s presentation in GS 341, the thought of the eternal recurrence is no 
great cause of anxiety for Lucretius. We retain no memories from before birth, 
and so the sufferings of past qualitatively identical individuals cannot cause us 
distress. It cannot simply be the case that we lack epistemic access to past lives, 
however, since Lucretius grants that we might easily come to believe in the 
regular recurrence of particular configurations of atoms, including those of 
which we are composed. 
The dominant position in the classical scholarship is to ascribe Lucretius an 
account of personal identity in which psychological continuity is a necessary 
condition. In a critical edition of De Rerum Natura III, Brown claims that the 
break in conscious self-remembrance would “give our ‘recycled’ selves a 
different identity from our own”.  Without psychological continuity, 103
qualitatively identical individuals in the past and future are not “us” and hence 
not the object of our self-directed concern. This concurs with Epicurus’ claim 
that “We have been born once and cannot be born a second time; for all 
eternity we shall no longer exist”.  104
Warren offers an alternative reading of this section which does not ascribe 
to Lucretius a position on the problem of personal identity. Instead Lucretius 
offers the stronger claim that were we brought back to life by the return of the 
atoms which presently make up my body to their present configuration then 
“this would not affect us in any way”.  On this reading, even if an identity 105
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holds between recurrences, the Epicurean need not fear the eternal repetition of 
worldly pain. “Even if these future individuals are identical with me, the fact 
that no memory is retained from one instantiation to the next ensures that 
none of these identical individuals should be concerned about what has 
happened or will happen to others”.  The break in memory between 106
recurrences allows Lucretius to avoid the thought of my pains recurring on to 
eternity, but we may question whether it necessarily excludes my concern for 
future or past individuals like, or identified with, myself. As we will see in 
chapter six, when Nietzsche considers the possibility of recurrence this allows 
him the imaginative projection of the self into the future and past. Lucretius 
and Nietzsche’s starkly different responses to the thought of the eternal 
recurrence signals the divergence between Nietzsche and Epicurean 
philosophical therapy. We can use Nietzsche’s formulation of the eternal 
recurrence as a diagnostic tool to discover the failings—in his eyes—of 
Epicureanism. Nietzsche’s recurrence leaves no place for the tranquil 
equanimity towards death and eternity which the Epicureans, like the other 
Hellenistic schools, prize dearly. On Nietzsche’s telling, the thought of eternal 
recurrence will induce either sublime rapture or despondency in those it seizes. 
If the Epicureans fails Nietzsche’s test, we can ask what it is about life that 
prevents them from passionately longing for its return.  107
In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus concerns himself primarily with 
philosophical purgatives. There, Epicurus counsels his reader to rid himself of 
unnatural desires (which are vain and empty) and temper natural desires so 
that they are easily satisfied. Once they have been reigned in, natural desires 
(whether those which strike of necessity or not) will not be experienced as a 
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source of pain or mental disturbance. Epicurus is a hedonist in that he takes 
pleasure as the highest good, but he is a negative hedonist in that he identifies 
pleasure with the removal and absence of pain. The end result of elimination of 
pain is ataraxia, the “painless state that Epicurus prized as the highest good 
and the state of the gods”.  108
The voice of the flesh cries, “Keep me from hunger, thirst, and cold!” The man who has 
these sureties and who expects he always will would rival even Zeus for happiness.  109
For Epicurus the happiness of the gods is identical to the highest human 
aspiration, an identification the Epicureans signal by their preference for the 
term makaria or blessedness over eudaemonia.   110
Benjamin Farrington tells us that there is “no more important concept in 
Epicurus than that of the blessed life”.  Howard Caygill, writing on 111
Nietzsche’s interpretation of Epicurus, focuses on blessedness as the grounds 
on which to build an rapprochement between the two. To this end, he argues 
that Epicurean blessedness, makaria, is a state beyond ataraxia. Whereas the 
negative ideal of ataraxia stands for the Epicurus Nietzsche castigates as 
another kind of Christian tranquilliser, a focus on blessedness allows for what 
Caygill calls a “Dionysian reading of Epicurus”.  112
Farrington’s inspection of Lucretius lends support to this account. While he 
doesn’t find a Latin equivalent for makaria (he claims Cicero’s later coinages 
beatitas and beatitudo were unavailable for “metrical reasons”), he identifies 
certain uses of voluptas with, on the one hand, run of the mill pleasure or 
hedone and others, especially in the phrase divina voluptas with “this most 
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exalted state of feeling known to [Lucretius],” “that state of blessedness for 
which Epicurus would have used the word makaria”.  113
Caygill develops an account of a distinction between ataraxia and makaria 
on the basis of the Vatican Sayings.  In these fragments, he detects an 114
“intimation” of blessedness “beyond the therapeutic consolations of 
ataraxia”.  “Blessedness,” Caygill claims, “is not identical to ataraxia”.  115 116
Returning to Epicurus’ letter to Menoeceus, this distinction becomes 
difficult to make out. 
He who has a clear and certain understanding of [Epicurean precepts] will direct every 
preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing 
that this is the sum and end of a blessed [makarios] life. 
When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel 
the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed 
[makarios] life.  117
The sum and end of a blessed life is pleasure, which “reaches its limit in the 
removal of all pain”.  118
Epicurus has a good reason for identifying blessedness with ataraxia. 
Ataraxia, as the absences of disturbance, resists quantification. That is, it 
doesn’t make sense to speak of having more or less ataraxia, as we might speak 
of the magnitude of a kinetic pleasure. As Cicero reports, while static pleasures 
may vary in kind, they cannot in intensity or degree.  Later, Cicero attributes 119
to Epicurus the stronger position that not even protraction in time increases 
the amount of static pleasures: Epicurus “maintains that long duration can not 
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add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span 
of time as if pleasure were everlasting”.  120
As Julia Annas explicates, this has the consequence that pleasure “does not 
make a longer life any better, and thus more desirable, than a shorter life”.  121
Even everlasting Jupiter is no happier than Epicurus (as long as we grant that 
Epicurus actually achieved ataraxia). Again, from Epicurus’ principle doctrines: 
“Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we 
measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.”  122
This counter-intuitive identification of the happiness of the gods and the 
happiness of ataraxia plays a fundamental role in establishing the Epicurean 
slogan that “death is nothing to us”. Namely, since duration is irrelevant to 
happiness, one can live a complete life in the moment: “If you are already 
happy, then further time cannot give you anything you don't now already have, 
so you have no reason to prefer having further time to dying now.”  If 123
blessedness were a positive notion beyond the zero-point of ataraxia—one that 
gave rise to a conception of happiness as protracted in time—the immortality 
of the gods would grant them a richer harvest of existence than any mortal, 
and a premature death would be harmful to the one who dies. 
Both both ataraxia and blessedness are protected from duration because 
neither include desires for goods that nature does not readily provide. The 
Epicureans avoid protracted desires precisely to escape the “implacable sense 
of risk and exposure” that Caygill correctly ascribes to Nietzsche.  This leads 124
us to the striking conclusion that, since Nietzsche refuses the Hellenistic 
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indifference to duration, he must count death, at least some of the time, as a 
harm. And this is right: if any of our temporally-extended projects can be 
harmed, then death at an inopportune time will harm them. 
As I will argue in the next chapter, where Nietzsche does develop his own 
conception of blessedness [glückseligkeit], he both evokes and contests the 
sympathetic portrait of the blissful Epicurus drawn in GS 45. 
Epicurus, like the Stoics, conceives of happiness in terms of completion on 
the moment or indifference to duration. While they purport to thereby do 
away with the longing for immortality, the Epicureans smuggle in an escape 
from mortal life through the godliness of ataraxia. We can understand this 
escape from temporality, as in the case of Stoic self-completion, as a figure of 
eternity, in this case an eternity of non-existence or the void. The culmination 
of Epicurus’ ethical letter is the promise that “man loses all semblance of 
mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings”.  By exercising 125
Epicurean precepts, we can hope to escape the pains of mortal life, chief among 
them the painful turbulence of desire. 
Fear of Time 
Plato, the Stoics, and the Epicureans each develop a distinctive conception of 
eternity. In each case, this figure of eternity functions as a consolation for or an 
escape from necessary features of temporal life. Plato shies away from change 
and unsettledness of the human world. The Stoics deny the chaos of nature. 
The Epicureans avoid the press of desire. These are three distinct refractions of 
the philosophical fear of time expressed in the inauguration of eternity. Each 
exposes an acute awareness of and hostility to the pains of transient existence. 
Nietzsche diagnoses this hostility as a symptom of distress. His task, which I 
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will examine in the next chapter, is to develop a novel conception of eternity 
that is properly therapeutic. 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6. Nietzsche’s Eternity: A Voluptuous Art of Living 
In the newly added preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
describes that whole work as emerging under the influence of an intoxication 
of convalescence from an “interlude of old age at the wrong time”.  The Gay 1
Science describes a renewed vitality and vigour—a return to youthfulness—
which finds expression in the work’s hope and anticipation for the future. Set 
against the Hellenistic flight from temporality analysed in the previous chapter, 
in The Gay Science Nietzsche re-situates himself and his readers within a 
temporal horizon. The eternity of antiquity expressed the possibility of living a 
complete life in a single moment: Stoics and Epicureans considered the 
tranquility of old age both possible and desirable at any moment of life. 
Nietzsche’s return to youth signals a revaluation of the future and the 
incompleteness of the present. 
The thaw of The Gay Science grants Nietzsche a renewed appreciation of 
eros and the passions, after his disappointment with Wagner’s romanticism led 
to a Hellenistic “icing up in the midst of youth”.  In contrast to the secure 2
tranquillity offered by the Hellenistics, Nietzsche sets necessarily fragile hopes 
and anticipations for the future. His erotic attachment to life requires an anti-
Hellenistic affirmation of transience. 
In the preceding chapters I have set out, first, the general contours of 
Nietzsche’s middle-period stance towards Stoicism (chapter one) and 
Epicureanism (chapter two), and then his case against Romanticism traced 
back to its Platonic origins (chapter three). In chapter four I investigated his 
recuperation of eros, against both Stoic apatheia and Platonic transcendence, in 
the secularised love poetry of the troubadours. Chapter five tightened the focus 
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of Nietzsche’s break with the ancients to the role of eternity in consoling for 
the fear of death. In this chapter, I present Nietzsche’s alternative, anti-
Hellenistic ethics of eternity: a youthful and voluptuous art of living, youthful 
in the sense that it implies vigorous action for the sake of the future and 
voluptuous in the sense that it implies a passionate sensitivity to transience. I 
argue that this art of living must be specified in terms of the eternal recurrence. 
Youth 
With The Gay Science’s praise of youth, Nietzsche returns to a theme to which 
he had first attended in the second Untimely Meditation, On the Utility and 
Liability of History for Life. Compared with the broad target of The Gay 
Science, in the essay on history Nietzsche’s critical focus is more narrowly 
directed towards the state of his contemporary historical culture. The study of 
history has taken on a quasi-religious character within this culture, according 
to Nietzsche, in two senses. Firstly, history tells the story of a grand cosmic 
process. Through history, we study the trajectory of this process and hope to 
uncover the meaning and secret goal of existence. The second sense in which 
history has become religious is by purifying itself of practical imperatives. 
History as a ‘pure science’ takes historical knowledge as an end in itself. 
Nietzsche criticises such an unconditional will to historical knowledge because 
it glorifies the past at the expense of the present and future. History raised to 
the level of a ‘pure science’ “would be for humanity a kind of conclusion to life 
and a settling of accounts”.  This historical religiosity has promoted an 3
expansion of popular historical consciousness at the same time as it has 
 HL 1.3
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exposed a crisis in the use of historical knowledge.  Nietzsche epitomises this 4
crisis in the persona of Eduard von Hartmann. 
Nietzsche diagnoses von Hartmann’s conception of history with a 
congenital grey-hairedness: the intrusion of old age into all phases of life.  As 5
in his criticism of Hellenistic senescence in The Gay Science, Nietzsche opposes 
this expansion of old age with a figuration of youth. In this section I pull apart 
his criticism of von Hartmann in order to better understand his deployment of 
youth against the Hellenistic schools. Youth, for Nietzsche, expresses a vitality 
dependent on anticipation of the future. 
Von Hartmann provides the theoretical underpinnings of the historical 
sensibility Nietzsche attacks with a teleological, developmental conception of 
history. He likens world history to the stages of individual development, 
moving from the childhood of early societies to the contemplative maturity of 
nineteenth century Germany.  The motive force in history is, reminiscent of 6
Schopenhauer, the operation of the metaphysical Will, which over the course of 
history gradually comes into consciousness. Von Hartmann expands 
Schopenhauer’s momentary experience of the intellect silencing the will in 
aesthetic contemplation to a historical scale. The historical epoch of the 
nineteenth century corresponds to the closing stages of a cosmic struggle 
between Idea and Will, at the conclusion of which will come the “redeeming 
triumph” of the former over the latter.  7
 For an account of the political dimension of this crisis in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian 4
war of 1870-71, see Christian J. Emden, “Toward a Critical Historicism: History and Politics 
in Nietzsche’s Second “Untimely Meditation,” Modern Intellectual History 3, no. 1 (2006):1–
31.
 Nietzsche refers to Hesiod’s apocalyptic prophesy: “But Zeus will destroy this race of speech-5
endowed human beings too, when at their birth the hair on their temples will be quite 
gray” (Hes. WD 180).
 Gary Shapiro, Nietzsche's Earth: Great Events, Great Politics (Chicago: University of 6
Chicago Press, 2016), 38.
 Michael J. Inwood, “Hartmann, Eduard von (1842–1906),” in The Oxford Companion to 7
Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 361.
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As Shapiro notes, while Nietzsche ridicules the ontological extravagance of 
von Hartmann’s position, the weight of his opposition to von Hartmann is 
“from the standpoint of ethical and political action”.  Nietzsche’s attention, 8
then, is focused on the practical consequences of historical cultivation. He 
diagnoses a crisis in historical culture in terms of the kind of life it promotes. 
The kernel of his criticism of von Hartmann’s historiography is that it 
promotes a life in the service of history, rather than a history in the service of 
life. 
A life devoted to the accumulation of historical knowledge is primarily 
contemplative. The historical occupation is “that of looking back, of reckoning 
up, of closing accounts, of seeking consolation through remembering what has 
been”.  Under von Hartmann’s conception of history, this is the form of life 9
appropriate to the end of history, near the final triumph of consciousness over 
the will. The contemplative historian embodies the telos of the Weltprozess. 
Nietzsche identifies three moods attendant on such historically cultivated 
individuals. At first, understanding oneself as the culmination of the history 
produces an ecstatic pride. They themselves, as the most historically cultivated 
and conscious individuals, are the culmination and perfection of world history. 
They constitute the completion of a cosmic process stretching back over the life 
of the universe: “even in the deepest depths of the ocean”, according to 
Nietzsche, they “discover the traces of [themselves] in living slime”.  As with 10
the Stoic sage, who encompasses within himself the entirety of the cosmic 
whole, the highest representatives of historical culture can pronounce “we have 
reached our goal; we are the goal; we are nature perfected”.  11
 Shapiro, Nietzsche’s Earth, 39.8
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Nietzsche’s contemporaries are proud of their historical cultivation because 
it allows them to encompass the whole of the past (as a perfect historical 
whole) in thought. This historical knowledge inevitably reveals a discrepancy, 
however, between their own condition and that of the significant figures of 
history. Because they consider the goal of history to lie in contemplation, 
modern historians adopt a spectatorial relation to history. Yet, as Nietzsche 
argues, exceptional lives are marked by their historically significant actions. 
Significant historical figures act precisely inasmuch as they rise “against that 
blind power of the factual and tyranny of the actual and [submit] to law that 
are not the laws of the fluctuations of history”.  The tension between the 12
position of the spectator and actor in history produces what Nietzsche calls an 
“ironic self-consciousness” in modern historians.  The important distinction 13
between the two position concerns their causal power. The historical actor is a 
causal agent (their actions bear historical consequence) while the historical 
spectator is an epiphenomenon of history. That is, modern historians are a 
byproduct or effect of history, but not a cause in history: 
The expression of individual Will does not significantly affect history or culture in any 
period of world history but, rather, only contributes in a minuscule way to the unfolding of 
universal and already determined cultural, historical, philosophical, or even biological and 
environmental movements.  14
 The strivings of modern historians are, on their own account, necessarily 
ineffectual. 
The historian’s ironic self-consciousness is stultifying in suggesting that the 
great feats of human history lie in the past, and that nothing remains to do 
 HL 8.12
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except contemplation of the world process’s final stages.  In this mode, history 15
takes the form of a nostalgia for the now lost capacity for action: while 
previous generations could hope to carry out great tasks, the current 
generation is condemned to document and reflect on the past. In addition, this 
ironic sensibility eats away at the pride of the historically cultivated. Being 
merely a byproduct of history, the historian’s insignificance to the process of 
history undercuts his pride at being its ripest fruit. 
The third mood produced by historical cultivation follows when, on 
Nietzsche’s telling, the individual can no longer endure the psychological 
tension of the ironical state. Instead of the position of the spectator as a special 
case, the end and competition of history, these individuals generalise their 
impotence backwards, and consider all prior historical figures as 
epiphenomenal to the world-process: “as things are they had to be, as men now 
are they were bound to become, none may resist this inevitability”.  Nietzsche 16
attaches von Hartmann’s exhortation for the “total surrender of the personality 
to the world-process” to this resignation in the face of history.  17
The upshot of Nietzsche’s analysis of historical cultivation is the connection 
he draws to Schopenhauerian resignation. The total effect of von Hartmann’s 
historiography is to expose as illusion all claims to historical agency. This is the 
same effect of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the Will. Nietzsche’s presentation of 
Von Hartmann is of an historically distended Schopenhauer. The constellation 
of pride, irony, and resignation together serve to rob Nietzsche’s 
contemporaries of vitality. In historical knowledge “there is no longer any 
 Jensen, “The Rogue of All Rogues,” 49.15
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support for […] life”.  Von Hartmann’s history functions, from the standpoint 18
of ethical and political action, as an enervating spiritual exercise. 
Nietzsche’s claim in the history essay is that history need not have this 
devitalising effect. Indeed, the “active and powerful human being” “shrinks 
from resignation and uses history as a means to combat it”.  The first half of 19
the essay sets out how three modes of history can be deployed against 
resignation. Monumental history can inspire action, antiquarian history can 
teach how to preserve life through tradition, and critical history reveals the 
existing state of things as historically contingent and amenable to change. Each 
mode of history contains its own dangers, and Nietzsche explains at length the 
possibility of their misuse. The malady of historical cultivation is a failure to 
press each kind of history into the service of life, brought about by von 
Hartmann’s misguided quasi-religious historiography. 
Nietzsche offers two remedies for the historical malady: the ahistorical and 
the supra-historical. The supra-historical remedy is to adopt a perspective 
outside of time, indifferent to the course of history. This perspective is 
exemplified by the melancholy Italian poet Giacomo Leopardi who, nauseated 
by the “infinite superabundance of events”,  calls for a tranquillity insulated 20
from history: “Nothing exists that is worthy / of your emotions, and the earth 
deserves no sighs”.   21
While this perspective may combat the hypertrophy of the historical sense 
by lifting one out of the fluctuations of history, it achieves this at the cost of 
turning one away from life. The supra-historical character reaches a standpoint 
outside of history by grasping the ultimate vanity of all endeavour. Jenkins 
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explains this as a consequence of Nietzsche’s contention that in addition to 
pursuing particular ends, life is always also directed towards the expression 
and expansion of its drives, whatever they may be.  On Jenkins’ account, 22
supra-historical wisdom is the recognition that the content of one’s particular 
drives, and hence the particular values these drives produce, are arbitrary from 
the perspective of this second-order drive (which the late Nietzsche will 
conceptualise as the will-to-power). This second order drive is indifferent to 
which particular drives it seeks the expression and expansion of, and so “any 
particular drive, and any action based upon it, is superfluous in the sense that it 
could, in principle, be replaced by another”.  Apprehending the superfluity of 23
all of life’s particular endeavours “leads to disgust or nausea [Nietzsche’s Ekel] 
in the supra-historical person, accompanied by a reluctance to go on living”.  24
In a revealing intimation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche 
asks whether his contemporaries “would like to relive the past ten or twenty 
years”.  The supra-historical character, Nietzsche claims, would refuse, 25
because of her indifference towards the future: “What could ten more years 
teach that the past ten were unable to teach!”  This reluctance to go on living 26
is indicative of her poor disposition towards life. Since the supra-historical 
practice of history does not find the individual’s salvation in surrender to the 
Weltprozess, and indeed destroys this false hope, it does treat the particular 
historical malady that Nietzsche targets. It nevertheless facilitates a 
“withdrawal from life and action”.  In the context of the entire essay then, it 27
 Scott Jenkins, “Life, Injustice, and Recurrence,” in Nietzsche and the Becoming of Life, ed. 22
Vanessa Lemm (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 125.
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must “arouse our intense hatred”, following Goethe’s dictum with which 
Nietzsche opens his text: “Moreover, I hate everything that only instructs me 
without increasing or immediately stimulating my own activity.”  28
Schopenhauer praises Leopardi as having been “entirely imbued and 
penetrated” with the misery of existence and for treating this subject more 
“thoroughly and exhaustively” than any of his contemporaries.  29
Following his description of the supra-historical character, Nietzsche asks 
his reader to “leave the supra-historical human beings to their nausea [Ekel] 
and their wisdom”.  Here, wisdom necessarily leads to resignation. Nietzsche 30
instead pursues an ahistorical remedy under the title of “youth”. Nietzsche’s 
youthfulness tempers the historical malady in the recognition that “the 
ahistorical and the historical are equally necessary for the health of an 
individual, a people, and a culture”.  The ahistorical is necessary for the 31
health of individuals and collectives because of the effect that historical 
knowledge has on one’s endeavours. Namely, historical knowledge reveals 
these endeavours to be superfluous, to either the historical totality (for von 
Hartmann) or the drive to express and expand one’s power (for the supra-
historical individual). From both perspectives, particular actions lack any 
significance. This fact undermines our commitments to particular values or 
projects leading to, as we have seen, resignation or a turn away from life. 
Youth escapes resignation by enveloping itself in an protective “ahistorical 
atmosphere”. Within this atmosphere, it retains a capacity for action that an 
overabundance of historical knowledge destroys. Youth retains it’s “most 
beautiful privilege”—“the power to plant, overflowing with faith, a great 
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thought within itself and letting it grow into an even greater thought”—
because it does not recognise and so is not discouraged by the universal vanity 
of all endeavour.  This active forgetfulness is essential to the project which 32
Nietzsche sets for youth in the close of the essay, of producing a “happier, more 
beautiful cultivation [Bildung] and humaneness [Menschlichkeit]”.  In On the 33
Utility and Liability of History for Life, only youth, in its folly, is well-disposed 
enough towards life to plant the seeds of the future. 
Stoics and Epicureans 
The preceding section set out how Nietzsche diagnoses a malady in his 
contemporaries’ attitude towards history, namely an incapacity to use the past 
as a source of nourishment in the present. This malady expresses itself in 
resignation, which Nietzsche figured as a kind of congenital senility. We saw 
that ‘youth’ designates a healthier historical sensibility, capable of acting for the 
sake of the future. In The Gay Science Nietzsche modifies his account of 
youthful vitality, directing it against the Hellenistic aversion to transience. 
Against the Hellenistic position, Nietzsche expounds sensitivity to transience as 
a necessary condition of joy. 
Nietzsche returns to a consideration of the historical sense in an important 
section towards the end of GS IV, titled “The ‘humaneness’ [Menschlichkeit] of 
the future”. Again, he considers the practice of history deeply ambiguous from 
the perspective of life: it is his present day’s “distinctive virtue and disease”.  34
Nietzsche restates the danger that writing the history of earlier humanity will 
become a means to distract from and deflate present drives and goals—an 
escape from the demands of life. He restates the possibility that the historical 
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sense will become a “marvellous growth with an equally marvellous scent” that 
will make life more agreeable.  But now Nietzsche reveals that this danger and 35
this possibility are two aspects of the one sensibility. GS 337 brings this 
prospective historical sensibility into a sharper focus. There are a number of 
conclusions Nietzsche reaches in this rich and expressive passage.  
To start, history is the means by which one can incorporate experiences of 
the past into one’s own life. As we have seen in the history essay, Nietzsche 
criticises his contemporaries for accumulating historical knowledge without 
any effect on the outward form of their lives. The practice of history that 
Nietzsche describes in “The ‘humaneness’ of the future” grasps not just the 
factual, but the experiential and emotional register of past events. History 
grants access to historical perspectives such that one might “experience the 
history of humanity as [one’s] own history”.  It extends recollection beyond 36
the limits of an individual’s experience. Here we should note a contrast with 
the Epicurean position on the past. The Epicurean’s indifference to (pains after) 
death is mirrored by their indifference to events before birth.  Whereas the 37
Epicureans restrict the scope of desirable recollections to pleasant experiences 
from one’s life,  Nietzsche radically expands this scope to encompass the sum 38
of past experiences, both pleasant and painful. 
This expansive historical attitude helps bring out the implicit criticism of 
Epicureanism in GS 306. As we have seen, in this section Nietzsche expresses a 
preference for an Epicurean sensitivity to the world over Stoic indifference. It 
also brings Epicurean modesty to the foreground, in that it reveals the strong 
Epicurean need to reduce their exposure to outside events by restricting their 
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horizon of experience. The Epicurean enjoys the “unextended present” and 
“momentary comfort” (and “does everything he can to maintain these”) that 
Schopenhauer grants to the limited human individual in a discussion of the 
tumultuous sea of existence.  In Schopenhauer’s description of the sensibility, 39
the principium individuationis protects the individual from the tumult of 
existence, allowing for a calm repose in the midst of “a world full of sorrow 
[…] with its infinite past and infinite future”.  Nietzsche cites this passage in 40
BT 1 in connection with the tranquillising effect of the Apollonian dream. At 
first glance, the Nietzschean historian of GS 337 looks much closer to the Stoic 
rather than the Epicurean of GS 306, in insofar as both Nietzschean and Stoic 
aspire to expand the boundaries of the self and incorporate an ever greater sum 
of experiences, and, on the coordinates of The Birth of Tragedy, to a Dionysian 
intoxication with the world. 
In one respect, this incorporative stance also aligns the Nietzschean 
historian with the supra-historical individuals of HL, whose digestion of the 
painful, terrible, and questionable segments of the past, as we have seen, has a 
profound effect on their lives. However, Nietzsche’s sensibility differs from 
Leopardi’s supra-historicism in its response to the unfathomable sum of 
historical grief. Instead of resignation, Nietzsche imagines the heroic endurance 
of suffering. In illustrating this endurance, he lists various unhappy occasions 
of historical reflection—nostalgia for lost health, yearning for an absent lover, 
the injury and the death of a friend—which his expansive historical sense 
exposes one to: 
But if one endured, if one could endure this immense sum of grief of all kinds while 
yet being the hero who, as the second day breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune, 
being a person whose horizon encompasses thousands of years past and future, being 
the heir of all the nobility of all past spirit—an heir with a sense of obligation, the 
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most aristocratic of old nobles and at the same time the first of a new nobility—the 
like of which no age has yet seen or dreamed of; if one could burden one’s soul with 
all this—the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of 
humanity; if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single 
feeling—this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known 
so far  41
Nietzsche goes as far as to describe this happiness as godlike, in the extent 
of its “power and love”, full of both “tears and laughter”.  These terms set 42
high demands on Nietzsche’s new human happiness—so high as to qualify as a 
kind of divinity. Nietzsche’s model is a military hero who, after losing a friend 
in an indecisive battle, returns to the field the next day.  Nietzsche’s analogy 43
between the military hero and the historian incorporating the whole of the past 
underlines how this godlike happiness or nobility entails incorporating intense 
grief over a seemingly pointless, absurd, cruel loss. The hero’s loss is not 
redeemed by subsequent victory,  but neither is it followed by at least the 44
resolution of defeat.  The “power and love” of Nietzsche’s hero—his 45
attachment to even the painful, terrible, and questionable aspects of life—
makes it possible for him to return to the fray. While we will return to this 
issue below, we might presently make a distinction concerning the role of 
suffering in this vignette. We could either conceive of heroic endurance as 
valuable for its own sake or as instrumental to obtain some other good. I will 
suggest below that we should understand Nietzsche to be endorsing the latter: 
the magnitude of suffering the hero endures or can endure indexes his love of 
life. 
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We can make more sense of this distinction by turning to Nietzsche’s 
comments in GS 12, “On the aim of science”.  In that earlier section, he 46
alludes to the Romantic doctrine that pleasure and pain are so intertwined that 
“whoever wanted to have as much as possible of one must also have as much 
as possible of the other”.  If we accept this assertion then there are two 47
possible responses. The first, which he attributes to modern science and to 
ancient Stoicism, would seek to diminish one’s capacity for pleasure as a means 
of protection against pain, yielding a conception of happiness as cool 
tranquillity. Motivated by this tranquillising goal, science serves to protect or 
insulate one from the dangerous excess of the passions. The second, Romantic 
position would sanction the intensification of pain in the pursuit of a higher 
feeling of pleasure. The means to this intensification is the expansion of one’s 
vulnerability to the passions. 
Nietzsche’s explicit claim in GS 12 is only that science [Wissenschaft] can 
serve either set of interests. While his sympathy for the Romantic 
intensification of both pleasure and pain is clearly apparent, the desirability of 
a “joyful science” motivated by such a goal is left as mere suggestion. In the 
early sections of The Gay Science, Nietzsche simply sets the coordinates of two 
general approaches science can take regarding our vulnerability to objects of 
desire, either tranquillising (in fear of suffering) or expansive (in pursuit of 
joy), to which he will return. When he does return to this question in GS IV, 
however, he makes explicit his aspirations that the sciences (more specifically in 
GS 337, history) will serve the expansive ideal. 
We can discern a development in Nietzsche’s position on the use of history 
from Untimely Meditations to The Gay Science. In the former work, three 
 See Thomas Ryan and Michael Ure, “Nietzsche’s Post-Classical Therapy,” Pli 25 (2014): 46
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historical approaches are canvassed. Both von Hartmann’s progressive 
historiography and Leopardi’s supra-historicism, Nietzsche argues, lead to 
nausea and resignation. Only youth, encased within a protective ahistorical 
atmosphere, avoids such a turn away from life. This atmosphere insulates 
Nietzsche’s vigorous youth from the sorrows of history. In The Gay Science, on 
the other hand, Nietzsche deploys the conception of the passions he has 
developed through the middle period to allow for the endurance of suffering 
caused by historical reflection. In the later work, Nietzsche turns away from 
the protection offered by the ahistorical, in favour of attachment, sensitivity, 
and exposure to history. His task remains, in both works, to affirm life. In the 
former this is achieved only by means of blind love or folly, in the latter by 
means of a more sophisticated pedagogy of eros. In Untimely Meditations, 
youthful vigour is made possible by a lack of cognitive capacities. In The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche shows how a passionate engagement with the world can be 
one more such capacity. 
Nietzsche’s erotic revaluation of suffering finds expression in the section 
following ‘The humaneness of the future’. In the context of a polemic against 
“those who feel pity [die Mitleidigen]”, Nietzsche complains that an attempt to 
alleviate outward signs of suffering (as he analyses pity both here, and in more 
depth at sections 131-139 of Dawn) fail to account for the “personal necessity 
of distress”.  The objection to pity is two-fold. First, because it is targeted at 48
outward signs of suffering, pity is satisfied with any treatment which does 
away with its symptoms. And Nietzsche claims that these are the treatments 
which die Mitleidigen pursue, accusing them of outrageous “intellectual 
frivolity” for not undertaking the slow and subtle psychological enquiry 
necessary for understanding and treating the causes of another’s psychic 
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distress: “one simply knows nothing of the whole inner sequence and 
intricacies that are distress for me or for you”.  Pity, as a form of moral 49
“quackery”, is unlikely to successfully treat suffering even on its own measure 
(that is, alleviation).  The second part of Nietzsche’s objection follows from 50
what the pitier’s hasty and superficial analysis misses, namely, that from the 
perspective of the “whole economy of [the] soul” many necessary and indeed 
valuable psychic occurrences can give rise to outward signs of suffering. As 
examples Nietzsche lists “the way new springs and needs break open, the way 
in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are 
shed”.  Because the pitier seeks, however clumsily, to arrest any psychic 51
process which gives rise to outward signs of suffering, it aims to interrupt or 
anaesthetise the pitied to painful processes of life (growth, convalescence, and 
forgetting, respectively). They act without regard for the role of these processes 
in the economy of the soul or, more prosaically, that the benefits of these 
processes outweigh the harm of the pain they cause. The point, at this juncture, 
is not a valorisation of suffering, but the claim that internal events that give 
rise to external signs of distress play a role within “the whole economy of [the] 
soul”.  52
The Stoic might well accept the general point that hardships and painful 
experiences can be endured as either instrumentally preferred (such as the 
aches of growth or the return to health, a preferred indifferent) or necessary 
from the perspective of the whole. However, Nietzsche’s examples make it clear 
he has a much broader idea of distress’s role within the economy of the soul 
than Stoicism. “Terrors, deprivations, impoverishments, midnights, adventures, 
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risks, and blunders” are all listed as candidates for personal necessities, a view 
unthinkable on the Stoic conception of the self identified with the 
hêgemonikon.  Indeed, the necessity of unpleasant or threatening experiences 53
such as these is grounded in Nietzsche’s much more sophisticated, post-
Romantic conception of the self. While the Stoic is satisfied to embody 
universal reason, Nietzsche’s project requires the capacity to view oneself from 
an “artistic distance” and “occassionally find pleasure in [one's] folly”.  More 54
generally, throughout book four Nietzsche likens his project of the self to 
musical composition—the self as an improvisational, creative construction 
bringing diverse parts into a harmonious whole.  We will return to this project 55
of the self below. For now it is sufficient to recognise the instrumental role of 
suffering in a project of self-formation. 
Nietzsche admits that in GS 338 he puts his point “mystically”.  The 56
contrast with Stoicism is made explicit in GS 305. There, Nietzsche criticises 
ethics of self-mastery for their aversion to “natural stirrings and inclinations”. 
The Stoic, on guard against his passions, cuts himself off from “the most 
beautiful fortuities of his soul” and “all further instruction [Belehrung]”.  The 57
demand for self-mastery freezes up the hydraulics of the soul, so to speak. The 
Stoic cannot enjoy the vicissitudes of the passions as dramatic material or tap 
the passions for knowledge of oneself or the world. In GS 338 these beautiful 
fortuities, insights, and personal necessities come under the banner of the 
“voluptuousness of one’s own hell”.  58
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He mentions the “voluptuousness of hell” [Wollust der Hölle] at only one 
other location in the published works, and only once in the Nachlass. The 
published use occurs in the later Ecce Homo, in a discussion of Wagner’s 
Tristan. There, Nietzsche praises Wagner’s Tristan for causing him profound 
suffering: “and, given the way I am, strong enough to turn even what is most 
questionable and dangerous to my advantage and thus to become stronger, I 
call Wagner the great benefactor of my life”.  Nietzsche makes the bold 59
statement that his disposition has enabled him to transform suffering to his 
advantage, restating the claim of GS 338 in the first person. The unpublished 
use of the phrase, from 1888, occurs in a notebook of poetry. The line reads 
“By the voluptuousness of hell no sage [Weisen] has yet gone”.  We can see 60
here that in praising the “voluptuousness of hell” as the condition of the 
highest joy, Nietzsche is clearly aiming for an ethical ideal sharply distinct from 
classical figurations of the sage. 
To reinforce the anti-Stoic resonance of the “voluptuousness of hell” we 
might note that Nietzsche uses the same term, Wollust, to describe Epicurus in 
GS 45. In that section, voluptuousness refers to the pleasure Epicurus takes in 
the “tender, shuddering skin of the sea [of existence]”.  Nietzsche suggests that 61
the comparative calm Epicurus has achieved through his regimen of small 
pleasures grants him a new perspective on the modest suffering that remains 
(for instance, desires for food and conversation). While Nietzsche’s tone is 
poetic, there is also a touch of melancholy. Epicurus represents the weary 
“afternoon of antiquity”.  His modesty testifies to his will to “rest, stillness, 62
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calm seas, [and] redemption from” himself.  In book four of The Gay Science, 63
Nietzsche opposes the Epicureans’ “subtle irritability” [feine Reizbarkeit] to 
Stoic insensitivity.  The Epicurean disposition connotes a propensity for 64
irritation, but also for excitement, for provocation and for stimulating 
anticipation. When Nietzsche cites the “voluptuousness of hell” in GS 338, he 
refers to an intensification of this erotic sensitivity to the world and the 
“accidents of existence”.  65
Throughout The Gay Science, Nietzsche uses Stoicism and Epicureanism to 
triangulate his own position. In sections 12 and 338 he makes his case against 
the Stoic rejection of eros. Section 306 privileges Epicureanism above Stoicism 
for its modest erotic sensibility, but a comparison of the portrait of Epicurus in 
section 45 and the Nietzschean historian in section 337 clearly explicates the 
limitations of Epicurean ataraxia. Epicurean modesty stands in stark contrast 
to the immodesty of Nietzsche’s voluptuousness. Where Stoicism withdraws 
and Epicureanism contracts one’s sensitivity to transience, Nietzsche’s 
voluptuousness implies an anti-Hellenistic expansion, in both scope and 
intensity, of one’s exposure to time through sensible interaction with transient 
objects. Nietzsche arrives at the anti-Hellenistic position that sensitivity to 
transience is a necessary condition of joy. 
Eternal recurrence 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche deploys a more sophisticated account of the 
passions under the banner of youthfulness than the blind folly under 
consideration in Untimely Meditations. His recuperation of eros also furnishes 
him with a more sophisticated, and more demanding, test for the affirmation of 
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life. While in On the Utility and Liability of History for Life Nietzsche 
dismissed the historical and supra-historical sense because he conceives them as 
inducing a nausea that made it impossible to wish to relive “the last ten or 
twenty years”, in The Gay Science his question concerns the entirety of life, 
relived in repetition to eternity.   66
We gain a richer understanding of Nietzsche’s ethics of affirmation by 
connecting Nietzsche’s conception of eros to the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence. Throughout book four Nietzsche develops what we might call a 
musical project of the self. He describes a process of self-formation akin to 
musical composition. To affirm life, one must fashion the self into a beautiful, 
integrated, harmonious whole. In the previous section, we saw how Nietzsche’s 
affirmation is indexed by an anti-Hellenistic form of pleasure. This form of 
affirmation implies a recuperation of eros and the passions. It also allows us to 
make sense of the eternal recurrence as the necessary culmination of 
Nietzsche’s project of the self. When Nietzsche turns the question of 
affirmation back onto the self, what results in the successful case is a passion 
for life that necessarily entails a longing for its return. I want to suggest that 
the voluptuous disposition examined in the previous section allows us to make 
sense of the specific affirmation canvassed in GS 341 within the context of The 
Gay Science, in a way that is consistent with the near unanimous rejection of a 
literal cosmological reading of the eternal recurrence. It is not that one loves 
life because it is eternal, but one wants life in repetition to eternity because one 
loves it. 
In the remaining section, I connect Nietzsche’s anti-Hellenistic 
voluptuousness to the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, rejecting a 
‘cosmological’ account of the latter. I show how this connection challenges the 
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popular ‘heroic’ reading of Nietzsche. Against Nietzsche’s purported heroism, I 
emphasise the ‘erotic’ dimension of the eternal recurrence as the test and 
measure of one's attachment to life. 
Nietzsche first sets out the doctrine of the eternal recurrence in any detail in 
section 341 of The Gay Science. Famously, the reader is confronted with the 
warning that their life will recur ad infi nitum, including all its sorrows and 
joys, and “everything unutterably small and great”.  The demon who delivers 67
this message mocks the reader: “The eternal hourglass of existence is turned 
upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”.  Nietzsche 68
asks how the reader would respond to such a confrontation. As Janaway 
astutely notes, he asks this apropos two distinct instances.  Firstly there is the 69
question of one’s immediate reaction to the demon’s warning. Nietzsche, and 
the demon, suggest the default response will be one of crushing despair, that 
the reader would “throw themselves down and gnash [their] teeth and curse 
the demon who spoke thus”.  The only alternative immediate response 70
canvassed by Nietzsche is an ecstatic affirmation, the exclamation that “You 
[the demon] are a god and never have I heard anything more divine”.  71
Nietzsche’s phrasing refers back to a previous tremendous moment when one 
would have answered affirmatively, drawing the reader back to the Nietzsche 
frequent depictions of the life-affirmation throughout book four. This response 
comes, on Janaway’s telling, before one subjects the demon’s message to critical 
scrutiny, or any reflective thought. The second instance comes if and when “this 
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thought [of the eternal recurrence] gained possession over you”.  At issue then 72
is “a huge transformation in one’s life, a long-sustained attitude of joy or 
despair towards oneself”.  In this moment, the question is one of disposition: 73
“how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave 
nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?”  74
We might note, at this stage, that Nietzsche does not countenance the 
possibility of a equanimous response to the demon’s shocking pronouncement. 
We might also note that, while the passage features Nietzsche’s familiar 
bifurcation into life-affirmation and life-denial, it does not by itself tell us why 
affirmation and denial take on their particular characters. Why, we might ask, 
does Nietzsche conceive of affirmation as a fervent craving for repetition and 
not, for instance, as tranquil assent? We can answer this question by focusing 
on Nietzsche’s use of eros through The Gay Science. In doing so I will show the 
inadequacy of existing accounts of the eternal recurrence and provide a 
distinctive reading of Nietzsche’s ethics of affirmation. 
The final sentence of section 341 is crucial to grasping the role of the 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence within Nietzsche’s ethics of affirmation. It 
reads: “how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to 
crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and 
seal?”  For Nietzsche, the necessary condition for affirming the eternal 75
recurrence is that one is sufficiently well-disposed to life and to oneself. While 
this condition may seem vague if we restrict ourselves to section 341, or to the 
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closing triptych of book four,  Nietzsche in fact provides ample detail on what 76
it takes to come to this affirmative disposition. We can analyse the condition in 
two parts. What does it take to be well-disposed to life, and what does it take 
to be well-disposed to oneself? 
In section 291 Nietzsche singles out the builders of Genoa as “well-disposed 
towards life, however ill-disposed they often may have been towards 
themselves”.  While the Genoese may not pass the test of the eternal 77
recurrence, they nevertheless provide a model for the partial fulfilment of 
Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. Nietzsche praises the Genoese for a desire to go on 
living. This desire, he thinks, is evidenced by the longevity of their architectural 
constructions, “built and adorned to last for centuries and not for the fleeting 
hour”.  To be well-disposed towards life is to desire to go on living, but it is 78
not only the durability of Genoese architecture that Nietzsche praises. In 
Genoa the landscape has been transformed according to the personal styles of 
its inhabitants. The Genoese imbue their “villas and pleasure gardens” with 
personality to the extent that Nietzsche recognises “faces that belong to past 
generations” and “images of bold and autocratic human beings” in the built 
environment of the city.  In their architecture, the Genoese give full expression 79
to a desire to incorporate, transform and possess their world. The Genoese 
exemplify the creative virtuosity Nietzsche celebrates throughout The Gay 
Science. In On the Utility and Liability of History for Life he calls this “plastic 
power”: 
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the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate 
into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, 
to recreate broken moulds.  80
Nietzsche draws a contrast between Genoa and the cities of northern 
Europe which—so he claims—have been laid out according (or obedient) to an 
orderly city-wide plan. The contrast turns on the uniquely personal style of 
Genoese architecture. The personality in the Genoese buildings expresses, 
according to Nietzsche, a strong “lust for possession and spoils”.  The 81
Genoese come to possess the landscape by fitting it into their own plan. 
Nietzsche emphasises the individuality of the Genoese style: “All this [the city, 
the sea, and the contours of the mountains] they want to fit into their plan and 
ultimately make their possession by making it part of their plan”.  The spoils 82
of this refashioning are the pleasures and satisfactions of “the moments of a 
sunny afternoon when [the Genoese builder’s] insatiable and melancholy soul 
does feel sated, and only what is his and nothing alien may appear to his eyes”. 
The Genoese builder takes an aesthetic pleasure at the sight of his own 
reflection—the entire landscape becomes “a feast for his eyes”.  83
The Genoese disposition towards life is proved by their willingness to 
undertake the fabrication of enduring artefacts of their own design. They do 
not shy away from acting for the sake of the future, as Nietzsche accuses both 
the classical tradition and his historically-fevered contemporaries of doing. The 
“personal infinity” they lay between their neighbours and themselves exists 
both spatially, encompassing the entire landscape, and temporally, enduring 
long after their own time. 
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Because the Genoese direct their creative activity outside of themselves they 
do not satisfy the second half of the necessary condition for the affirmation of 
life. The Genoese are like the artists Nietzsche describes in section 299, with 
whom “this subtle power usually comes to an end where art [or architecture] 
ends and life begins; but we want to be the poets of our life”.  Where the 84
Genoese arrange bricks, mortar, and soil into an all-encompassing personalised 
landscape, to pass the test of the eternal recurrence one must organise the 
elements of one’s life into a unified, idiosyncratic, harmonious self. Indeed, 
section 291 immediately follows the well-known section 290, wherein 
Nietzsche, parodying Luke 10:42, declares “giving style” to oneself the “one 
thing […] needful”.  The parody implies that fashioning the self into a 85
pleasurable sight to behold is on par with the eternal redemption offered by 
Christianity.  86
Nietzsche begins book four of The Gay Science by describing a “high point 
in life” when we can take in the view of the “wonderful harmony created by 
the playing of our instrument” brought about by a combination of “our own 
practical and theoretical skill in interpreting and arranging events” and “good 
old chance”.  In section 303 he depicts an “improviser of life” who, like 87
“masters of musical improvisation” are “ready at any moment to incorporate 
into their thematic order the most accidental tone to which the flick of a finger 
or a mood has driven them, breathing a beautiful meaning and a soul into an 
accident”.  He again likens the fashioning of the self to a musical composition 88
 GS 299.84
 GS 290, emphasis in original.85
 Daniel Came, “The Themes of Affirmation and Illusion in The Birth of Tragedy and 86
Beyond,” in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, eds. Ken Gemes and John Richardson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 218.
 GS 277.87
 GS 303.88
 185
in section 334. The claim in that section is that all loves, even self-love, develop 
just like the love of a musical composition, after a slow, patient process of 
acquaintance and digestion. 
Conceiving Nietzsche’s ethics as an art of self-fashioning has, of course, 
received significant attention in the scholarly literature, since Alexander 
Nehamas’s Life As Literature.  However, by focusing on Nietzsche’s figuration 89
of the self as a kind of musical composition we gain a sharper insight into how 
it differs from classical projects of the self, particular that of the Stoics.  90
Nietzsche’s musical self has three important characteristics. As we’ve 
already seen, Nietzsche’s project of the self is the fashioning of an idiosyncratic, 
unified whole. A musical understanding implies a first characteristic, that this 
self is a diachronic entity. Nietzsche conceives the self as the result of a 
dynamic process that develops through time. The personal necessity of “terrors, 
deprivations, impoverishments, midnights, adventures, risks, and blunders” 
only makes sense within such a temporal order.  In this sense, a complete life 91
requires duration and Nietzsche’s ethical program cannot be identified with a 
Stoic or classical flight from temporality. The second characteristic suggested 
by a musical understanding of the self is that its composition involves the 
integration, or harmonisation, of plural voices. Nietzsche criticises the monistic 
rationalism of the Stoics as monotonous.  While the Stoic strives to identify 92
the self solely with universal reason, Nietzsche rightly observes that in doing so 
he cuts himself off from the most beautiful fortuities of his soul. Nietzschean 
eudaimonism incorporates a wider range of drives and experiences than the 
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singular focus of Stoic apatheia.  The third characteristic concerns the manner 93
of composing the musical self. As we’ve already seen, Nietzsche likens life to 
musical improvisation. The explicit comparison in section 303 is with the 
ability to incorporate mistakes and missteps into a thematic order and in so 
doing “[breath] a beautiful meaning and a soul into an accident”.  Adroit 94
improvisers know how to quickly remedy pains and losses and so do not 
require the “radical cure” of Stoic rationalism.  Nietzsche’s praise of 95
improvisation makes sense of his claim in section 277 that chance plays an 
essential role in the beautiful harmony of the soul. Improvisation allows for the 
incorporation of the new and unexpected. It is only through improvisation that 
one can fabricate the “new, unique, incomparable” self that Nietzsche 
advocates in section 335.  96
From this view of the self, we can make sense of the necessary condition to 
desire the eternal recurrence noted above. One desires the eternal recurrence of 
life—“this life as you now live it and have lived it”, in the words of the demon
—only if one is successful at fashioning the self into a unique, diachronic, 
harmonic whole. 
Why is this the case? In section 334 Nietzsche elaborates his pedagogy of 
eros, taking as his model the love of a musical figure. He explains that once we 
have learnt to love such a tune, we “desire nothing better from the world than 
it and only it”.  Its harmony “continues to compel and enchant us” such that 97
we become “enraptured lovers”.  While we sense that “we should miss it if it 98
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were missing,” our desire is stoked by the enjoyment of the tune: it does not 
depend on the object’s absence.  99
Nietzsche explicitly affirms the application of this erotic pedagogy to the 
love of the self. The image of rapturous desire painted in section 334 repeats 
that of section 278, of “thirsty life and drunkenness of life”  and 292, of the 100
“insatiable lust for possession and spoils”.  101
Bernard Williams asks, introducing The Gay Science, “if there is anything in 
this test [of the eternal recurrence] at all, why would willing one recurrence not 
be enough?”  Williams’ question helps bring out the importance of insatiable 102
desire for Nietzsche. A thirst for life that could be quenched by just one, two, 
or any finite number does not measure up to Nietzsche’s conception of 
passionate love. If one loves life then one must wish for its eternal recurrence. 
This understanding of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as expressing 
the passionate love of life coheres better with the other elements of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy than two influential interpretations, the ‘cosmological’ and the 
‘heroic’. These two interpretations fail to connect the doctrine with Nietzsche’s 
voluptuous art of living and the centrality of eros to that art. 
Paul Loeb’s cosmological reading of the doctrine is premised on the notion 
that Nietzsche has discovered the recurrence of life.  From this it follows that 103
to affirm life, one must affirm it as it is, that is, as eternally recurrent. Putting to 
one side the details of Nietzsche’s alleged proof of the eternal recurrence as a 
cosmological doctrine, this claim sits uncomfortably with the affective 
dimension of the demon’s message in section 341. If one affirms life by wishing 
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for its eternal recurrence on the basis of a demonstration of recurrence, why 
would recurrence become the object of fervent craving? If the eternal 
recurrence was a demonstrable cosmological doctrine, this might generate 
tranquil assent to life’s recurrence as a fait accompli. It is difficult to see how a 
proof of recurrence could generate the anxious craving for life that Nietzsche 
depicts both in section 341 concerning recurrence, as well as throughout book 
four as a sign of health.  104
In the 1886 preface, Nietzsche associates his “new happiness” with a 
jealous love for someone that “causes doubts in us”.  Nietzsche’s love is 105
“dangerous” in that he asks us to love life even after “the trust in life is 
gone”.  That is, the Nietzschean lover remains unsure of whether life will 106
return her good will (despite the optimism of GS 334). In other words 
Nietzsche is skeptical that life possesses any properties which guarantee that it 
is loveable. Nevertheless, apparently this loss of faith in the world is not a 
reason for gloom. Nietzsche’s passion doesn’t hinge on the demonstration that 
life eternally recurs. To “live dangerously” as Nietzsche exhorts in GS 283 
requires a voluptuous attachment to life. The passionate suffering of the 
jealous lover itself entails a kind of pleasure. This pleasure is located at the very 
process of desire, not in the overcoming of resistance to desire. We might say 
that Nietzsche conceives a kind of voluptuous suffering that is its own reward. 
When he returns in 1886 to appraise The Gay Science in a preface, as we 
have seen, Nietzsche considers the whole work an expression of convalescence. 
The gambit of the work is whether the stakes of philosophy are something 
other than “truth”.  Philosophical positions, and especially the “world 107
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affirmations or world negations tout court” in which Nietzsche criticises and 
participates, are to be read “first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies”.  108
The preceding chapters of this work have focused on how these remarks shed 
light on his criticism of Hellenistic philosophies as expressions of sickness or 
deprivation. We should not overlook, as a result, that Nietzsche also 
countenances how health or richness philosophises. Nietzsche declares that 
such a voluptuousness would have to “inscribe itself in cosmic letters on the 
heaven of concepts”.  Nietzsche’s allusion to the Platonic heaven of concepts 109
makes clear that he plans not just to jettison, but replace, the eternity of the 
forms with the eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence is an expression of a 
voluptuous attachment to life which “desire[s] nothing better from the world 
than it and only it”.  It is not that one loves life because it is eternal, but one 110
wants life in repetition to eternity because one loves it. 
In Bernard Reginster’s terms, because the eternal recurrence indexes the 
scope and intensity of one’s attachment to life, it is a ‘practical’ doctrine. 
Reginster takes the doctrine to express the highest possible regard for life by 
representing a moment of perfection where one overcomes resistance to a 
desire. One affirms life, on this account, if one desires the continual 
overcoming of resistances to one’s will. Reginster likens his affirmative 
character to a Olympian competitor, who wants victory, but also for “their 
victory to be short lived and to be an opportunity for new games”.  Counter-111
intuitively, Reginster’s account implies a desire “that one not succeed in that 
satisfaction without resistance—preferably great and painful resistance—to 
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overcome”.  Since life is an arena for the heroic overcoming resistance, 112
greater resistance generates a stronger attachment to life. 
Reginster explains the eternal recurrence in reference to Zarathustra’s 
roundelay, that “all joy [Lust] wants eternity”.  He characterises joy as the 113
experience of a perfect moment, and perfection as that which leaves nothing to 
be desired.  In such a moment, one experiences momentary and total 114
satisfaction. Reginster takes the doctrine of the eternal recurrence to express a 
wish for the endless concatenation of such momentary satisfactions.  
In identifying perfection as that which leaves nothing to be desired, 
however, Reginster inadvertently capitulates to a Schopenhauerian conception 
of desire, namely of satisfaction as the cancelation of desire. As we have 
already seen, Nietzsche’s joy involves the enjoyment, intoxication and 
intensification of desire. Nietzsche rejects the Schopenhauerian premise that 
enjoyment cancels desire. On the contrary, Nietzsche is aligned with the 
Romantics’ idealisation of desire, such that he could say with Rousseau that 
desire “is sufficient in itself, and the anxiety it inflicts is a sort of enjoyment 
that compensates for reality […] Woe to him who has nothing left to desire.”  115
Nietzsche’s idealisation of desire undermines Reginster’s account of the eternal 
recurrence because it rules out the perfection of a state free from desire. 
We can level three main criticism at Reginster’s account. Firstly, his ethics is 
too formal, in that it could endorse any arbitrary pursuit from the banal to the 
abhorrent, so long as there is resistance to overcome. Secondly, it is ascetic, in 
that such pursuits are valued according to the suffering they induce. Thirdly, 
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his account of the eternal recurrence is enervating, in that it idealises the 
absence of desire. 
Reginster’s account fails because it does not consider the central role of eros 
in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. In the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence Nietzsche venerates desire. One longs for the eternal recurrence of 
life if and only if one has learned to love oneself in Nietzsche’s sense of the 
intoxication of unquenchable desire. The doctrine implies the enjoyment and 
intensification of the desire for nothing but one’s life repeated into eternity.  
Conclusion 
In chapter five we saw how Nietzsche uses the concept of eternity as a 
diagnostic tool. The eternities venerated by Plato, the Stoics, and the 
Epicureans expose an underlying state of distress. Eternity plays an analogous 
role in Nietzsche’s art of living, except for the crucial difference that in this 
case longing for the eternal recurrence is an indication or expression of health, 
not sickness. In the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche ventures to 
“paint [his] happiness on the wall”.   116
In this chapter we have traced the development of Nietzsche’s thinking 
regarding the necessary conditions for the affirmation of life. In book four of 
The Gay Science, Nietzsche presents us with a youthful and voluptuous art of 
living, the success of which is indexed by a longing to relive life in repetition to 
eternity. The doctrine of the eternal recurrence is the central achievement of 
this project of the self because it is the necessary expression of an erotic 
attachment to life. The account of the eternal recurrence elaborated in this 
chapter advances on existing accounts in the literature by more closely linking 
the doctrine to Nietzsche’s broader ethics of affirmation and to his 
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recuperation of eros and the passions. It avoids the ontological extravagance of 
literal or cosmological readings of the doctrine, as well as addressing the 
shortcomings of heroic readings. Rather than the formal criterion of activity 
for activity’s sake, it emphasises the substantive value Nietzsche places on 
beauty. Rather than the ascetic valorisation of suffering, it admits the 
instrumental value of suffering to the formation of a beautiful dramatic 
harmony of the self. Rather than idealising the absence of desire, it celebrates 
the intoxication of desire as the only path to “new galaxies of joy”.  117
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Conclusion 
The Gay Science marks Nietzsche’s radical break with classical philosophical 
therapeutics. By naming this work after la gaya scienza of the troubadours he 
signals the central role that passionate love comes to play in his post-classical 
art of living. Passionate love becomes Nietzsche’s measure of what it takes to 
affirm life. Nietzsche challenges classical philosophies for their exclusion of 
eros. Because they eliminate, diminish, or transcend eros respectively, Nietzsche 
diagnoses Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Platonism as themselves forms of 
sickness. 
Nietzsche’s long antagonism with Plato is a commonplace in the literature. 
According to Nietzsche, Plato inaugurates an idealist philosophical tradition 
that has its logical and historical culmination in Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
romantic pessimism. Platonic love can be satisfied only by an unchanging and 
ever-present object. Secure possession of such an object promises to release 
Plato’s lovers from their anxious longing. Platonic lovers want to secure 
perpetual possession of their beloved. Chapters three and four make it clear 
that Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in believing Platonic love necessarily fails, 
but that he also develops a profoundly anti-Platonic pedagogy of eros: “one 
loves differently” and discovers “a new happiness”.  1
Nietzsche takes the jealous lover as his model. Without the security of the 
ideal, the Nietzschean lover is wracked by doubt whether the beloved will 
return her goodwill. The effect of this uncertainty is to intensify the 
Nietzschean lover’s attachment to life. Nietzsche follows the Provençal 
troubadours in conceiving of a kind of voluptuous suffering that is its own 
reward. By connecting Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism to the tradition of courtly 
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love, this thesis advances our understanding of how Nietzsche’s development of 
a pedagogy of eros directly challenges the Platonic idealist tradition. 
This thesis significantly advances our understanding of Nietzsche’s 
relationship with Stoicism. Despite his early praise for Stoic eudaimonism as a 
rival to the morality of pity,  in The Gay Science his assessment of Stoicism 2
makes an about-face. Here he accuses the Stoics of evacuating the world of 
value. The Stoic aspiration to embody universal reason implies the destruction 
of the passions. By destroying the passions, Nietzsche claims, the Stoics destroy 
that which gives shade and colour to the world. 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche is comparatively sympathetic to the figure of 
Epicurus. He compares the Epicurean’s “subtle irritability” [feine Reizbarkeit] 
favourably to the Stoic’s hard and insensitive.  However, this praise is heavily 3
qualified. Nietzsche’s evocative and melancholy portrait in GS 45 emphasises 
the modesty of Epicurean hedonism. In GS 306 Nietzsche brings his implicit 
criticism of Epicureanism into the foreground, revealing the Epicurean’s deep 
need for analgesics and shelter from the accidents of existence.  
Despite their quarrels, the moral schools of antiquity all aim for different 
forms of tranquillity. This thesis systematises Nietzsche’s rejection of 
tranquillity as an ethical ideal and his claim that this ideal of a symptom of 
cowardice. Chapter five demonstrates the crucial diagnostic role played by the 
ancient school’s conceptions of eternity. Nietzsche argues that the eternities 
venerated by Plato, the Stoics, and the Epicureans expose an underlying state 
of distress: each provide different refractions of a common fear of transience. 
The three ancient philosophical therapies offer merely palliative treatments. 
Chapter six develops Nietzsche’s own properly therapeutic remedy. 
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The centrepiece of that remedy is Nietzsche’s reconfigured conception of 
eternity. With the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche directly 
challenges, and seeks to displace, the ancient ethics of eternity. While the 
ancient desire for eternity was premised on the denial of the passions, 
Nietzsche’s doctrine entails the affirmation and incorporation of the passionate 
longing the ancients found so disruptive. It heralds liberation from the 
debilitating tyranny of reason. 
The eternal recurrence has recently returned to scholarly attention, after 
long neglect, in the form of Paul Loeb’s cosmological reading.  This thesis 4
makes sense of the centrality of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence to 
Nietzsche’s philosophical project, not as an extravagant cosmological theory, 
but as the necessary expression of the healthy soul. If Nietzsche seeks to 
displace particular ancient ethics of eternity, he nevertheless revives the ancient 
concern for eternity as a philosophical object. By bringing his conception of 
eternity to the foreground of his ethics, this thesis raises the question of what 
role eternity plays in our ethical theories. 
The crux of this thesis is the fundamental incompatibility Nietzsche exposes 
between eros and tranquillity. Nietzsche symbolises this opposition with his use 
of hydraulic metaphors of the soul. He figures his experimentation with the 
Hellenistic schools as an “icing up” at the wrong time.  In Assorted Opinions 5
and Maxims he holds out hope for a “thawing breeze for the frozen will”.  On 6
the title page of book four of The Gay Science, he refers to the blood miracle 
 Paul S. Loeb, The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4
2010).
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of St Januarius  and attached an poem as epigraph.  Nietzsche conceptualises 7 8
the sudden and unexpected return to health attested in The Gay Science as first 
a melting and then a turbulent surge towards the “highest hope and goal”. 
Nietzsche signals on this title page that The Gay Science marks the overcoming 
of Hellenistic tranquillity in favour of a more elevated post-classical 
disposition. 
This thesis gives coherence to Nietzsche’s diagnoses of past philosophies as 
forms of sickness, alongside the centrality of eternity, both to these diagnoses 
and to the prospects of devising a viable therapy. It systematises Nietzsche’s 
striking assertion that passions, hitherto neglected or derided by philosophy, 
are an essential component of the good life. 
 “The blood of St Januarius is preserved in a phial in a church in Naples, and on a certain 7
holiday a miracle takes place causing it to liquefy. The people think a great deal of this 
miracle” (Sigmund Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 2nd ed. [London: Ernest Benn 
Limited, 1948], 13).
 “You who with your lances burning  8
Melt the ice sheets of my soul 
Speed it toward the ocean yearning 
For its highest hope and goal: 
Ever healthier it rises, 
Free in fate most amorous:- 
Thus your miracle it prizes 
Fairest Januarius!” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes 
and an Appendix of Songs, ed. Bernard Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001], 155).
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